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Foreword  
 
In his masterpiece Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (1930), Robert Musil ironically 
baptized the Austro-Hungarian Empire as “Kakania”, a title formed by taking the 
initial letters of the two labels adopted by that State: kaiserlich (Imperial) and 
königlich (Royal). Describing it as the “State since vanished that no one 
understood”, Musil noted that Kakania was at once “kaiserlich-königlich” (k-k, or 
“Imperial-Royal”) and “kaiserlich und königlich” (k & k, or “Imperial and Royal”):  
 
“[…] but to be sure which institutions and which persons were to be designated by 
k.k. and which by k.& k. required the mastery of a secret science. On paper it was 
called the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but in conversation it was called Austria, a 
name solemnly abjured officially while stubbornly retained emotionally, just to show 
that feelings are quite as important as constitutional law and that regulations are one 
thing but real life is something else entirely. Liberal in its constitution, it was 
administered clerically. The government was clerical, but everyday life was liberal. All 
citizens were equal before the law, but not everyone was a citizen. There was a 
Parliament, which asserted its freedom so forcefully that it was usually kept shut; 
there was also an Emergency Powers Act that enabled the government to get along 
without Parliament, but then, when everyone had happily settled for absolutism, the 
Crown decreed that it was time to go back to parliamentary rule”. 
 
The description of Kakania shows the decadence of the form of the imperial 
State that had survived until the early 20th century, and was then overwhelmed by 
the rise of mass society and destroyed during the two World Wars. Since then, 
the historical and political context has been profoundly transformed; yet the idea 
of Kakania, with its inner contradictions, still seems to be a useful metaphor for 
understanding the legal issues and challenges with which States are confronted in 
an age of globalization. Just as it was a century ago, the very idea of the State is 
under transformation; its centrality to the notion of public powers has become 
illusory, and new forms of governance are emerging. The conceptual juridical 
tools built during the 20th century no longer appear sufficiently refined in order to 
address the problems raised within the contemporary global arena; and some 
“cornerstones” of modern legal jurisprudence, such as the idea that 
administrative law is essentially and only national in nature, are vanishing; just as 
did the “misunderstood State” evoked by Musil. 
Today almost all human activity is subject to some form of global regulation. 
Goods and activities that are beyond the effective control of any one State are, in 
almost all cases, regulated at the global level. Global regulatory regimes cover a 
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vast array of different subject-areas, including forest preservation, the control of 
fishing, water regulation, environmental protection, arms control, food safety and 
standardization, financial and accounting standards, internet governance, 
pharmaceuticals regulation, intellectual property protection, refugee protection, 
coffee and cocoa standards, labour standards, antitrust regulation, to name but a 
very few. 
This increase in the number and scope of regulatory regimes has been 
matched by the huge growth of international organizations: nowadays over 2,000 
IGOs, and around 40,000 NGOs, are operating worldwide. In the environmental 
area alone, for instance, there are – amongst many others – the International 
Whaling Commission, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Secretariat, the UNEP Ozone Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biodiversity, the Secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species, the Basel Convention Secretariat, the UN Secretariat of the 
Convention to Combat Desertification, the FAO/UNEP Secretariat on the 
Rotterdam Convention on Prior Informed Consent, the UNEP Convention on 
Migratory Species Secretariat, the International Tropical Timber Organization; 
not to mention the large number of interested NGOs. 
There are, of course, great differences among the various different types of 
regulatory regimes. Some merely provide a framework for State action, whereas 
others establish guidelines addressed to domestic administrative agencies, and 
others still impact directly upon national civil society actors. Some regulatory 
regimes create their own implementation mechanisms, while others rely on 
national or regional authorities for this task. To settle disputes, some regulatory 
regimes have established judicial (or quasi-judicial) bodies, or refer to those of 
different regimes; while others resort to “softer” forms, such as negotiation. 
Within this framework, the traditional mechanisms based on State consent as 
expressed through treaties or custom are simply no longer capable of accounting 
for all global activities. A new regulatory space is emerging, distinct from that of 
inter-State relations, transcending the sphere of influence of both international 
law and domestic administrative law: this can be defined as the “global 
administrative space”. IOs have become much more than instruments of the 
governments of their Member States; rather, they set their own norms and 
regulate their field of activity; they generate and follow their own, particular legal 
proceedings; and they can grant participatory rights to subjects, both public and 
private, affected by their activities. Ultimately, they have emerged as genuine 
global public administrations. 
One of the key factors in identifying the administrative nature of the 
organization and activities of these global regulatory institutions is the absence of 
any effort make them legislative or judicial in nature (within the traditional 
conceptual structures of international law); and this alone gives rise to particular 
problems in terms of their legitimacy and accountability. In other words, the 
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structures, procedures and normative standards for regulatory decision-making 
applicable to global institutions (including transparency, participation, and 
review), and the rule-governed mechanisms for implementing these standards are 
coming to form a specific field of legal theory and practice: that of global 
administrative law. The main focus of this emerging field is not the particular 
content of substantive rules generated by global regulatory institutions, but rather 
the actual or potential application of principles, procedural rules and reviewing 
and other mechanisms relating to accountability, transparency, participation, and 
the rule of law in global governance. 
Some specific characteristics of the emerging global administrative law can 
already be identified. 
Firstly, it is sectoral, due to the presence of many different global regulatory 
regimes. This feature stems directly from the very origin of global regulation 
itself, which follows first of all the emergence of a specific public aim that cannot 
be achieved by the actions of one State alone. This sectorality itself has effects on 
the organization of global governance, with the variety of regimes producing 
various forms of global administration: from formal international organizations 
(such the WTO) to private institutions with regulatory functions (such the 
ICANN). This lack of unity, however, is to some extent counterbalanced by a 
strong inter-connection between different sectors: for example, global bodies are 
formed by other international institutions (such the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, created by the FAO and the WHO); agreements or networks are 
established that connect different regimes (as is the case of agreements between 
the WTO and the WIPO, or between the WTO and the WHO); and dispute 
settlement bodies created by one regime can be used to resolve disputes raised 
within another: (the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center addressing disputes 
involving internet domain names provides one example). 
Secondly, global administrative law addresses a wide range of actors – States, 
domestic public administrations, global institutions, NGOs, citizens. The role of 
States within the global arena has become increasing multifaceted, and there is a 
constant interaction between the global and national levels; indeed, global 
administration cannot plausibly be said to exist in isolation from the national 
level. It is for this reason that an examination of the decision-making processes 
of IOs reveals a plurality of techniques of joint action and mutual conditioning. 
In other words, there is no clear way of separating, either analytically or 
empirically, the global from the national. 
Thirdly, global administrative law operates beyond State borders and, in so 
doing, becomes divorced from any constitutional basis (which is, otherwise, one 
of the main characteristic of national administrative law). At the global level, 
there is no government or higher authority; only a plurality of sectoral “sub-
governments”. The absence of a constitutional foundation to global 
administration and administrative law again gives rise to new – and quite 
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particular – issues of legitimacy and accountability. 
Fourthly, and in a profoundly related manner, the primary focus of global 
administrative law is aimed at increasing the various protection mechanisms in 
operation to ensure that the institutions of global governance are properly 
responsive to the interests of those on whom their activity impacts. The lack of 
constitutional basis, discussed above, and, indeed, of any realistic possibility of 
achieving a “global democracy” anytime soon, compels the emphasis of other 
legitimacy- and accountability-promoting mechanisms, such as, for example, the 
spread of principles transposed from national legal orders (transparency, 
participation, duty to give reasons, review, etc.).  
Lastly, from a strictly legal perspective, the global administrative space is both 
international and administrative: in this way, the global legal order might actually 
begin to appear as Kakania, as at once – in a sense – “imperial” and “royal”. To 
prevent the theoretical study of these going the way the vanished Empire 
described by Musil, the coexistence of both international and administrative law 
aspects must neither be denied nor conceptualized as a rigid dichotomy; rather, it 
should simply be recognized, accepted, and confronted as a new challenge, 
necessitating the development of a new set of conceptual tools. 
 
 
*   *   *  
 
 
This book is an attempt to analyze global administrative law through the 
elaboration and examination of a number of different cases and case studies. 
The architecture of its contents mirrors the characteristics of this emergent 
field. 
The first chapter addresses one of the most important activities of global 
administrations: standard-setting. Global standards provide a clear example of the 
spread of global regulatory regimes, and of the ways in which they interconnect; 
in addition, they illustrate well the various interactions between the global and 
domestic levels. Moreover, these standards can be set either by private bodies 
(such as, for example, in the accounting sector), or by formal IGOs (such as the 
labour standards approved by the ILO). 
The public-private distinction is also evident in the second chapter, in which 
the various forms of governance existing within the global order are illustrated. 
The different sections of this chapter demonstrate both the sectorality and the 
complexity of global administrative law, incorporating analyses of hybrid 
governance solutions (the ICANN and the WADA); multipolar conflicts (the 
Chinese textiles affair involving the WTO and the EU); shared powers (the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty); mutual recognition (the free movement of 
professionals); joint decision-making processes (fisheries governance); and 
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transgovernmental networks (the Basel Committee). 
Moving from the structure of global regimes to the activity of global 
administrations, chapters three and four address the application of different legal 
principles within global regulatory governance. 
Chapter three examines the increasing spread of principles, established by 
global bodies, which must be respected within national administrative 
procedures. Examples of most of these can be found within the WTO system, 
such as the duty to disclose information (here dealt with in relation to anti-
dumping duties), the duty to give reasons (definitive safeguard measures), and 
transparency (subsidies and countervailing measures). Other important principles 
present within the global context are the legality (as shown by the Compliance 
Committee of the Aarhus Convention), the reasonableness and the 
proportionality (applied by the NAFTA Binational Panel), and the review of 
discretionary power (such the case of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ disputes 
resolved by ICSID arbitration). 
Chapter four is wholly dedicated to the issue of due process. It thus examines 
a number of cases in which global bodies, such as the ITLOS, the World Bank 
Inspection Panel, and the World Bank Office of the Compliance Advisor 
Ombudsman (CAO), have relied upon this principle. But it considers also cases 
in which this principle has received a weaker defense than within the domestic 
orders (such as in the Security Council’s actions in relation to the “war on 
terror”). 
Chapter five considers another important topic in contemporary global 
governance: the rise of judicial globalization. Since the 1990s, the number of 
international courts and tribunals has grown rapidly. Before this, there were only 
a handful of operative international courts; in the last fifteen years, however, 
more than twenty new permanent adjudicative mechanisms and quasi-judicial 
bodies have been established. One of the most important global dispute 
settlement bodies is that of the WTO, as shown by the high number of its cases 
examined in this book. This chapter, however, broadens this focus significantly, 
analyzing other examples of courts or quasi-judicial bodies such the international 
administrative tribunals, the ITLOS, ICSID arbitral tribunals, and the alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms created by the ICANN. Lastly, the impact of 
human rights law – namely of European Convention of Human Rights and of its 
Court– on supranational regimes is also considered. 
The analysis of judicial globalization leads directly on to another issue of real 
significance: the enforcement of global decisions, either administrative or 
“judicial” in nature. From this perspective, chapter six focuses on five examples 
that highlight the difficulties that might be encountered in relation to the 
implementation of such decisions, which might in some circumstances be 
granted only in an incomplete or ambiguous manner. 
The presence of many sectoral regimes does not, however, only give rise to 
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varied forms of cooperation or interaction; it also creates conflicts. This happens 
in particular when separate jurisdictions reciprocally overlap, as is brought out in 
the four examples presented in chapter seven, dealing with the relations between 
global law and EU law, the Shengen Information System, the governance of 
cyberspace, and the international antitrust regime, respectively. 
Finally, the last chapter moves from the general perspective that informs the 
preceding ones, focusing on the specific field of global security. This example is 
strongly representative of the increasing importance of global administrative law, 
illustrating the extent to which it has begun to affect even those functions 
traditionally viewed as forming the core of State sovereignty, and fundamentally 
political in nature. 
While the structure of the book appears similar to that followed in the first 
edition, published in 2006, this new edition makes some important changes. The 
earlier version actually represented something of an experimental attempt to 
demonstrate the relevance of global administrative law issues, collecting the cases 
and materials used for courses on Global Administrative Law taught by Professor 
Sabino Cassese at the University of Rome “La Sapienza” and at the Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques in Paris. In this edition, three sections have been removed, 
while nine new ones have been added. Most importantly, however, each of the 
forty-one sections has been considerably extended, and now they all follow the 
same basic schema: each has a section on the relevant background; a list of 
materials and sources (with hyperlinks wherever possible); an analysis of the 
example in question; and a discussion of the various issues to which it gives rise, 
enabling each author to flag some basic theoretical problems, and to highlight the 
relations between the different topics examined in the book. Each section 
concludes with list of recommended further reading, relating specifically to the 
topic with which it dealt. Lastly, a general bibliography provides an overview of 
the most relevant works on global legal issues, and particularly global 
administrative law, divided into twelve different categories. 
 
 
*   *   *  
 
 
In conclusion, this new edition aims to offer a more refined resource for the 
study and practice of global administrative law. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
task that it sets itself is far from complete in its present iteration. Although most 
of the significant issues raised by global administrative law (such as 
accountability, participation, transparency, and due process) are examined in 
detail in this book, there are important aspects of the field still outstanding, 
which future editions will undoubtedly have to confront 
Amongst these, perhaps the most pressing is the need – given the vast 
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increase in the scope and importance of the activities of IOs – to begin 
examining, from a specifically administrative law perspective, not only the 
regulations that such bodies generate and the procedural rules that guide this, but 
also their organizational structure and the broader web of institutional relations 
within which they are implicated. One result of such an examination would be to 
point up the areas of overlap between global administrative law and international 
institutional law; another would be to enable the field to move beyond the fairly 
narrow, US-influenced procedural model of administrative law that has, until 
now, informed much of the scholarship, and to complement this view with a 
broader, more European perspective. 
Moreover, there are other significant examples of innovative governance 
methods, mechanisms and principles, of which any fully-rounded theory of 
global administration would have to take account. They can be found in specific 
organizations (such the ISO) or in specific sectors (such as those of health or 
environmental regulation, fields in which new international institutional models 
are emerging), both of which provide important evidence of the emergence and 
development of this new field. 
Ultimately, the most important factor to consider is that the emergence of 
global administrative law should be seen as a great opportunity to create a more 
just legal order, wherein the weaker actors in global governance can have their 
claims heard and satisfied through the use of the protection mechanisms of 
administrative law. Global administrative law is not, in fact, intended to help 
powerful States entrench their position of domination in, and control of, the 
global legal order; on the contrary, it is meant to level the playing field, ensuring 
that global regulatory bodies are responsive to the interests of all of those upon 
whom their activities impact; and that those – increasingly important – areas of 
global governance that escape the jurisdiction of both public international and 
domestic administrative laws are not thereby beyond the reach of the rule of law 
altogether. 
 
 
New York         LC 
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1. GLOBAL STANDARDS 
 
 
 
 
1.1. Labour Standards: Forced Labour in Myanmar  
Elisabetta Morlino 
 
 
1. Background 
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is the largest country in the Indochinese 
peninsula. It covers a territory of over 678,500 square kilometers, and has an 
ethnically mixed population. An English colony until the late 19th century, it 
gained independence on 4 January 1948. Myanmar is currently governed by a 
military regime that Freedom House has judged to be one of the most repressive 
in the world (as illustrated recently – in Autumn 2007 – by the violent military 
reaction to the anti-government protests involving students and Buddhist 
monks). 
Burma joined the United Nations on 19 April 1948, and ratified the Forced 
Labour Convention of 1930.  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the body charged with 
monitoring the proper implementation of both the 1930 convention and the 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957.  
The ILO is composed of a General Conference of representatives of the 
Members, a Governing Body representing governments, employers and workers, 
and an International Labour Office controlled by the Governing Body.  
The Organization pursues four main objectives: to promote and protect 
workers’ fundamental rights through the application of specific norms and 
principles; to create greater employment opportunities and guarantee basic 
incomes to all men and women; to secure the extension of social security benefits 
to provide a basic level of protection to all; and to strengthen the social dialogue 
between governments, employers and workers. The ILO thus functions both as a 
standard-setter (proposing conventions or recommendations) and as an oversight 
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body (monitoring the implementation of its standards by Member States). 
This monitoring is carried out by means of three administrative-type 
processes: the annual report (ILO Constitution, Articles 22-23), the 
representation procedure (ILO Constitution, Article 24), and the complaints 
procedure (ILO Constitution, Articles 26, 27, 28 and 33). 
Regarding the first of these processes, all Member States are obliged to 
submit an annual report on the measures it has taken to give effect to the 
Conventions to which it is a party. On the basis of these reports, the Committee 
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) 
evaluates the national implementation of international labour standards and sets 
forth its conclusions in an annual report. This report is presented to the 
International Labour Conference and examined there by the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Standards, which identifies the observations 
requiring further discussion. The interested governments are invited to respond 
before the Commission and to provide all necessary information. Where it sees 
fit, the Commission recommends that the governments take specific measures or 
accept ILO missions or technical assistance. The discussion and conclusions are 
published in a report prepared by the Commission. Copies of the report are then 
submitted to national industrial associations of workers and of employers, which 
can communicate their observations to their governments or directly to the ILO. 
In terms of the representation procedure, any industrial association of 
workers or employers can make representations to the International Labour 
Office against any of the Member States. The representation may be 
communicated by the Governing Body to the government against which it is 
made. If no statement is received from the government in question within a 
reasonable period of time, or if the statement when received is not deemed 
satisfactory by the Governing Body, the latter has the right to publish the 
representation and the statement, if any, made in reply to it.  
Lastly, a complaint against one Member State may be filed with the 
International Labour Office by either another Member, by one of the delegates 
to the Conference or by the Governing Body acting on its own initiative. It may 
be followed by a communication to the government in question and, where the 
Governing Body thinks fit, by the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. The 
latter, after fully considering the complaint, prepares a report presenting its 
findings on all questions of fact and such recommendations as it may think 
proper. The report is first communicated to the Governing Body and to each of 
the governments concerned in the complaint, and then is published. The 
concerned governments can choose to accept the Commission’s 
recommendations or not. If not, the complaint may be referred to the 
International Court of Justice. If the government does not take the action 
necessary to comply with the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry or 
a decision of the International Court of Justice within the required time, the 
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Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it deems 
expedient to secure compliance therewith (ILO Constitution, Article 33).  
 
 
2. Materials: Norms and Relevant Documents 
- ILO Constitution 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm); 
- ILO Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/index.htm); 
- C29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm); 
- International Labour Law, ILO Bureau for Workers’ Activities 
(http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/law/lablaw.htm);  
- Commission of Inquiry, ILO, Forced labour in Myanmar (Burma), Report of the 
Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the Constitution of the International 
Labour Organization to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Geneva, 2 July 1998 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloen
g&document=10&chapter=15&query=%23docno%3D%2A&highlight=on
&querytype=bool&context=0);  
- ILO, Director General, A global alliance against forced labour, Global Report under 
the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
Genève, 2005 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc93/pdf/rep-i-
b.pdf); 
- Complaint concerning the non-observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 
1930 (No. 29), made by delegates to the 83rd (1996) Session of the Conference under 
article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO, GB.267/16/2 267th Session, Geneva, 
November 1996 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb267/gb-16-
2.htm); 
- Myanmar Government, Letter to the Director-general of the International 
Labour Office, 4 February 1999 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb274/gb-
5.htm); 
- Government of the Union of Myanmar -The Ministry of Home Affairs, 
Order No. 1/99, Order Directing Not To Exercise Powers Under Certain 
Provisions of The Towns Act, 1907 and the Village Act, 1907 
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(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb274/dg-
myanm.htm);  
- Governing Body, International Labour Office, Measures, including action under 
article 33 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, to secure 
compliance by the Government of Myanmar with the recommendations of the Commission 
of Inquiry established to examine the observance of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 
(No. 29), 277th session, GB 277/6 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb277/pdf/g
b-6.pdf); 
- ILO high level team departs for Myanmar, Mission to assess government actions concerning 
forced labour, press release, 17 September 2001 (ILO/01/29) 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr); 
- Governing Body, International Labour Office, Developments concerning the 
question of the observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Report of the High-Level Team, GB.282/4, Genève, 
November 2001 
(http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/reg.burma/archives/200111/msg00018.html); 
- ILO Appoints Liaison Officer in Myanmar, press release, 4 September 2002, 
(ILO/02/40) 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr); 
- Myanmar Government-ILO, Joint Government of the Union of Myanmar-ILO Plan 
of Action for the Elimination of Forced Labour Practices in Myanmar 
(http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/ILC2003special_sitting.htm); 
- Governing Body, International Labour Office, GB.292/7/2, Addendum 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb292/index.
htm); 
- Governing Body, International Labour Office, GB.292/7/3 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb292/index.
htm); 
- Governing Body, International Labour Office, Developments concerning the 
question of the observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Conclusions, march 2005, GB.292/7/1 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb292/index.
htm); 
- CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) 
Myanmar, 2006 
(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/gbe/ceacr2006.htm);  
- ILCCR, Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 29, Forced Labour, 1930 
Myanmar, 2006 
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(http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloilc&doc
ument=61&chapter=3&query=Myanmar%40ref%2BObservation%40ref%2B%2
3YEAR%3D2007&highlight=&querytype=bool&context=0); 
- International Labour Conference, Special Sitting to examine developments concerning 
the question of the observance by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour 
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Conclusions, 3 June 2006 
(http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/ILC2006-SS-concl.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
Myanmar has been under ILO observation for almost thirty years. Despite its 
formal adherence to the 1930 Convention, the Government has maintained laws 
requiring forced labour. Section 11(d) of the Village Act provides that “persons 
residing in a village-tract shall be bound, on the requisition of the headman or of 
a rural policeman, to assist him in the execution of his duties... These duties 
consist, inter alia, of the obligation to collect and furnish… guides, messengers, 
porters, supplies of food, carriage and means of transport for any troops or 
police posted in or near or marching through the village-tract or for any servant 
of the Government travelling on duty”. Analogous measures are contained in 
Sections 7 and 9 of the Towns Act. These have given a legal basis for the 
widespread and massive exploitation of forced labour by the military authorities. 
This situation triggered the activation of all three of the administrative 
oversight processes provided by the ILO Constitution: the annual reports, and 
the representation and complaints procedures. 
In its first report on the measures taken to give effect to the Forced Labour 
Convention in 1960, Myanmar denied the existence of any forms of forced 
labour in the country. In 1964, and then again in 1966 and 1967, the CEACR 
challenged the measures contained in the Village Act and the Towns Act. 
Myanmar, moderating its position of total denial, argued that these laws, although 
formally in effect, were not actually enforced by local authorities. 
The facts, however, demonstrated otherwise; and, in January 1993, the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) made a 
representation under Art. 24 of the ILO Constitution concerning the 
Government of Myanmar for the systematic violation of the 1930 Convention 
and the institutionalized use of forced labour by the military. In 1994, the 
Governing Body confirmed the factual grounds for the representation.  
The situation in Myanmar failed to improve over the following years. On 10 
June 1996, 25 workers’ delegates to the International Labour Conference filed a 
complaint under article 26 of the Constitution against the Government of 
Myanmar. This led to the establishment, in 1997, of the Commission of Inquiry, 
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which began an investigation into the case. In the Commission’s report of 2 July 
1998, it analyzed the legal rules and practices adopted in Myanmar, and found 
Myanmar to be in ongoing violation of the Convention. The Commission called 
for the urgent abrogation of the laws and the adoption of practices coherent with 
international principles. On 14 May 1999, the Myanmar Minister of Internal 
Affairs adopted Order n. 1/99, Order Directing Not To Exercise Powers Under Certain 
Provisions of the Towns Act, 1907 and the Village Act, 1907, which seemed to 
implement the ILO’s recommendations. 
The Myanmar Government’s response was held to be unsatisfactory. In June 
1999, the International Labour Conference adopted a resolution condemning 
Myanmar’s substantive refusal to fulfil the Commission’s recommendations. It 
blocked all forms of technical assistance to the government of Myanmar and 
excluded it from most of the meetings of the ILO. Furthermore, it asked the 
Governing Body to evaluate the possibility of applying Article 33 of the 
Constitution. 
In March 2000, for the first time in the history of the ILO, the Governing 
Body invoked Article 33, specifying the measures it deemed necessary to ensure 
the implementation of its recommendations. The application of these measures 
was then temporarily suspended, due to the commencement of a new phase of 
direct monitoring. In 2001, an ILO High Level Team was sent to Myanmar to 
conduct on-site investigations and observe the implementation of the 
recommendations. The next year, an ILO Liaison Officer was appointed in 
Rangoon and charged with ensuring “the prompt and effective elimination of 
forced labour in the country.” In May 2003, following the agreement for the 
appointment of a Liaison Officer, the Director-General of the ILO and the 
Government of Myanmar adopted a Joint Plan of Action for the Elimination of 
Forced Labour Practices in Myanmar.  
That same year, a number of States also decided to act on this issue, either 
individually or through international organizations, as permitted by the 
International Labour Conference of 2000. The United States, Japan, Australia, 
Great Britain, Switzerland and Canada adopted different kinds of measures, such 
as import restrictions, the freezing of bank accounts, the prohibition of financing 
and investments and visitation limitations.  
In March 2005, the Governing Body of the ILO, on the basis of the reports 
submitted by the Liaison Officer and the High Level Team, abandoned its “wait-
and-see” attitude and recognized the right of each member State to adopt the 
measures that it held best suited to ensure compliance with the June 2000 
recommendations. 
Finally, in 2006, the International Labour Conference decided that all of the 
ILO’s decisions relating to Myanmar had to be brought to the attention of 
ECOSOC and other international organizations. 
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4. Issues: The Functions of IOs within the Global Administrative Space 
This case of Myanmar before the ILO enables us to draw a number of 
conclusions regarding both the structure of this international organization, and 
the substantive and procedural norms that regulate its activity. 
First of all, on the basis of the facts set out above, it is possible to detect 
within the ILO the presence of the three elements – legislation, administration 
and jurisdiction – that typically characterize national legal systems. The ILO has a 
Constitution containing normative prescriptions that produce legal relations 
between private actors and public authorities of national legal systems, and sets 
standards that must be observed by all States Parties. It has its own 
administrative apparatus, with the ability to initiate and prosecute actions, 
evaluate charges and levy sanctions. The administrative bodies are instrumental in 
ensuring the correct implementation of the standards. Finally, it performs quasi-
judicial functions and can, in certain cases, trigger the involvement of the 
International Court of Justice.  
The ILO’s quasi-judicial nature is particularly evident in the complaint 
procedure. This can be broken down into three phases. First, the communication 
with the government subject to the complaint, and the evaluation of the basis of 
the complaint; second, the investigation, through the establishment of a 
Commission of Inquiry; and third, the formal recognition of the failure to 
implement the Commission’s recommendations, the communication of this 
outcome to the Governing Body and to the governments concerned, and its 
general publication. The first phase has a purely administrative character. Most 
aspects of the second phase, and some of the third, are judicial in nature. The 
Commission of Inquiry collects evidence, questions witnesses and performs all of 
the other functions required for a careful ascertainment of the facts. There is thus 
a hybridization of administrative and judicial tools that can be interpreted as a 
progressive “judicialization” of administrative procedures. 
Secondly, an analysis of the constitutional norms and administrative practices 
of the ILO also enables us to observe the existence of a certain level of 
commitment to the principle of the rule of law in the implementation of 
international standards. In performing its inquiries, the Commission must respect 
the principles of a fair procedure. Part II, 2, para.13 of the Commission’s report 
specifies that “…the rules of procedure had to safeguard the right of the parties 
to a fair procedure as recognized in international law.” There are at least four 
such principles: 1) the complaint must be well founded; 2) the competent 
authority must decide on the basis of legal evidence; 3) the accused party must be 
given the opportunity to respond; 4) the complaint must be considered within a 
reasonable time and without undue delays. The geographically diverse and legally 
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competent nature of the ILO Commission in the Myanmar case was a further 
guarantee of its impartiality. Finally, the possibility of recourse to the 
International Court of Justice in a complaint procedure promotes the legal 
accountability of ILO bodies. The use of administrative tools in procedures for 
creating international standards thus ensures that, in this context at least, the 
principles of the Rechtstaat, originally developed at the national level, are 
respected.  
Finally, looking at the values that underpin the norms, the Myanmar case 
provides a good example of the relationship between different regulatory 
regimes. The main purpose of the ILO and its Constitution is to promote social 
justice. However, in the face of repeated appeals to respect the Constitution, and 
the reluctance of the Government of Myanmar to comply with its ILO 
obligations, the International Labour Conference of June 2000 encouraged 
Member States to adopt such measures as import restrictions, freezing the 
individual funds of government officials, and blocking economic subsidies. This 
implies a connection between values that belong, in large part at least, to different 
regulatory regimes: on the one hand, the respect of human dignity and integrity 
of work, on the other hand purely economic interests. These connections, 
promoted by an international body but concretely pursued by national 
administrative agencies, thus ultimately increase the efficacy of supranational 
norms. 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. K. ANDERSON, “Environmental and Labour Standards: What Role for the 
WTO?”, in A.O. KRUEGER (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization, 
Chicago (1998), pp. 229 et seq.;  
b. A.C.L. DAVIES, “Global Administrative Law at the International Labour 
Organization: the Problem of Softer Standards”, paper presented at the NYU 
Law School Conference on “Global Administrative Law: National and 
International Accountability Mechanisms for Global Regulatory 
Governance”, 22-23 April 2005, New York University 
(http://iilj.org/GAL/documents/DaviesPaper.pdf); 
c. K.A. ELLIOT, “Labour Standards and the Free Trade Area of the Americas”, 
in A. ESTEVEDEORDAL, D. RODRIK, A.M. TAYLOR, A. VELASCO (eds.), 
FTAA and Beyond: Prospect for Integration in the Americas, Cambridge MA (2003) 
(http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/03-7.pdf); 
d. K.E. MASKUS, “Should Core Labour Standards Be Imposed through 
International Trade Policy?”, The World Bank Development Research 
Group, Policy Research Working Paper, August 1997 
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(http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?ImgPagePK=64202988
&entityID=000009265_3971110141359&pagePK=64210502&theSitePK=54
4849&piPK=64210520); 
e. A. PUDDINGTON, “The 2006 Freedom House Survey. The Pushback Against 
Democracy”, 18 Journal of Democracy 125 (2007); 
f. C. SABEL, D. O’ROURKE, A. FUNG, “Ratcheting Labour Standards: 
Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace”, 
Columbia Law School, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Group, 
Paper 01-21, 2 May 2000 
(http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/ratchPO.html);  
g. A. SINGH, A. ZAMMIT, “The Global Labour Standards Controversy: Critical 
Issues for Developing Countries”, Paper of South Perspectives Series, South 
Centre, Geneva, November 2000 
(http://www.southcentre.org/publications/labour/Toc.htm); 
h. R.M. STERN, “Labour Standards and Trade”, University of Michigan, 
Discussion Paper 496, 18 August 2003 
(http://fordschool.umich.edu/research/papers/PDFfiles/00-008.pdf). 
 
 
 
 
1.2. International Accounting Standard Setting and the IASC Foundation 
Constitutional Review  
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an international 
organization composed of private entities, which establishes standards and 
guidelines for the accounting sector. Founded in 2001, it is the successor of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was created in 
June 1973 in London. As the standards it develops have been steadily gaining 
more widespread acceptance, it is a particularly interesting example of global 
private regulation.  
The objectives of the IASC Foundation are to develop a single body of high 
quality, comprehensible and enforceable global accounting standards; to promote 
the use and rigorous application of those standards; and to bring about the 
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convergence of national and international accounting standards. The accounting 
standards established by the IASC up until 2001 are referred to as the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS), while the standards produced by the 
IASB after that date are termed the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). As the IASB adopted the IAS, and continues to update it, global 
accounting standards are frequently referred to as the IAS/IFRS. 
Both the IAS and the IFRS have gained increasing prominence over the last 
decade.  
First, they have been used by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), which 
brings together the representatives of such global financial regulators as 
international intergovernmental organizations (in particular, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank); by transgovernmental networks for 
banking, securities and insurance regulation (the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissioners 
(IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)); by 
private bodies with regulatory functions, such as the IASB and the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC); by representatives of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and its 
committees; and finally, by national administrative authorities (such as central 
banks, supervisory authorities and treasury departments) in the G7 countries. The 
FSF is thus an example of hybrid intergovernmental-private administration.  
One of the Forum’s most important achievements is its Compendium of 
Standards, which brings together the various financial and economic standards 
internationally recognized as “important for sound, stable and well functioning 
financial systems”, as established by the members of the FSF. The Compendium 
highlights 12 “key standards” that are deemed essential for sound financial 
systems. Within the FSF Compendium, some of the IAS/IFRS are also included; 
which illustrates how standards originally established by a private regulator can 
later be recognized by a hybrid, private-public regulator. 
There is another consequence of the incorporation of the IASB’s standards 
in the Compendium. The twelve key standards set out in the latter are used by 
the IMF and the World Bank in their Reports on the Observance of Standards 
and Codes (ROSCs). These are a part of the Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP), founded in 1999 by these two intergovernmental organizations. 
These reports address the degree of countries’ compliance with certain global 
financial standards – namely, the twelve contained in the FSF Compendium. The 
IMF and World Bank’s staff prepare the reports at the request of the State 
concerned. Thus, the compilation of an ROSC is voluntary, just as the 
publication of the report depends on the consent of the State in question. At the 
same time, a State’s refusal to publish an ROSC may negatively affect market 
operators’ judgments. Both the IMF and the World Bank (not to mention the 
FSF) have emphasized the important role that can be played by these assessment 
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instruments, and the number of ROSCs that have been prepared is considerable: 
by the end of December 2004, 605 ROSC modules had been completed for over 
116 States, 74% of which have since been published on the IMF’s website. 
Therefore, through these mechanisms, the compliance of States with rules that 
were, in effect, established by private bodies is subject to assessment by 
intergovernmental organizations. 
The growing recognition of the IASB’s standards has also been helped by 
their incorporation into the EU law: EC Regulation n. 1606/2002 (the IAS 
Regulation) refers specifically to the IAS/IFRS (for a more in-depth analysis, see 
infra, Ch. 1.3).  
 
 
2. Materials  
- IASC Foundation Constitution, October 2007 
 (http://www.iasplus.com/resource/2007revisedconstitution.pdf);  
- IASC Foundation Constitution Review, 2003-2005 
 (http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/constreview.htm);  
- Commission’s response to changes proposed to the Constitution of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation (IASCF), 7th 
march 2005, Letter from Alexander Schaub, Director-general, DG Internal Market 
and Services, European Commission and Annex 
 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/accounting/docs/ias/ias-cf-
consultation_en.pdf);  
- IASB Due Process Handbook, April 2006 
 (http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+IASB/IASB+Due+Process.htm); 
- Enlarging the IFRIC - Proposed Amendments to the IASC Foundation Constitution 
and Preface to International Financial Reporting Standards 
 (http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASCF+Constitution+Projects/Enl
arging+the+IFRIC/Comments.htm); 
- European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), Letter of comment, 
Enlarging the IFRIC - Proposed Amendments to the IASC Foundation Constitution 
and Preface to International Financial Reporting Standards 
 (http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASCF+Constitution+Projects/Enl
arging+the+IFRIC/CL21.htm).  
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3. Analysis 
The IASC Foundation Constitution, which outlines the IASB’s structure and 
establishes the rules it must respect in setting its standards, was first approved in 
2000 and then amended in 2001, 2002, 2005, and again most recently in October 
2007 (simply to reflect the expansion of The International Financial Reporting 
Interpretation (IFRIC) to 14 members). In November 2003, the Constitution 
Committee was established and charged with consulting with a large number of 
organizations on several issues addressed by the Constitution. A public 
consultation document was published on 23 November 2004 (the Proposals of the 
IASC Foundation Trustees) and, after a period for comments by the interested 
parties (until 23 February 2005), the new text was approved on 21 June 2005. 
The reform of 2005 modified both the IASB’s structure and its standard-setting 
procedure. 
The IASB’s structure is complex: it is modeled on the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), a private regulator that sets standards for 
the American accounting sector. It is made up of four main constituent bodies. 
The IASB is the standards-setting body of the IASC Foundation (Constitution, 
Art. 1). The Standards Advisory Council (SAC), which represents the 
accountancy industry and profession, is responsible for commenting on the 
IASB’s projects. The IFRIC is charged with interpreting accounting standards; 
these interpretations, however, are valid only if approved by the IASB. The 
Trustees of the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation 
(IASC) appoint the members of the three other bodies (IAS, SAC and IFRIC) 
(Constitution, Art. 15).  
The 2005 revision changed the size and the composition of the board of 
trustees. According to the 2002 text, there were to be nineteen members of the 
board: six to be appointed from North America, six from Europe, four from the 
Asia/Pacific region, and three others from any area. After the revision, the 
number of the trustees was raised to twenty-two, increasing the representation 
from the Asia/Pacific region to six and from other areas to four (Constitution, 
Art. 6; further discussion on this point can be found in the Proposals, para. 31 et 
seq.). The aim of this revision was to introduce a more balanced geographical 
representation, redressing the previous Euro-American dominance. 
The amendments to the IASC Constitution also granted the trustees new 
functions: to establish the operating procedures and due process for the IASB, 
the IFRIC and the SAC, and to review compliance with these procedures 
(Constitution, Arts. 15(f) and (g), 57 and 106 et seq.). In the previous text, due 
process was not mentioned in relation to the ordinary activity of the IASB’s 
bodies, but only in the context of the procedure for reviewing the Constitution 
itself. Article 15(h) of the Constitution establishes that amendments thereto must 
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be approved “following a due process, including consultation with the SAC and 
publication of an exposure draft for public comment”. After the revision of the 
Constitution, due process is intended as a principle that must be respected in a 
greater proportion of IASB activity; not only when amending the Constitution, 
but also in the activity of each of its bodies. This provision was included in the 
IASB’s Due Process Handbook of 2006. 
During the debate concerning the Constitution’s revision, one proposal 
would have allowed alternative funding arrangements for the IASB. The IASC 
Foundation had depended upon voluntary contributions from public and private 
sources. This raised the concern of a conflict of interests, as the standard setting 
procedure might be expected to favour the interests of the largest financial 
contributors. For these reasons, an alternative system was proposed, which 
would have used listing or registration fees (Proposals, para. 68). This attempt to 
promote the IASB’s independence failed, however, and nothing changed 
regarding the financing rules in the text of the Constitution. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Structure and the Functions of Global Private Regulators 
The acceptance and use by public regulators of standards set by private bodies 
raises a number of questions concerning the accountability of such entities. Is it 
possible to increase the accountability of global private regulators? To what 
extent can changing the composition and operating procedure of the IASB, 
through amendments to its Constitution, promote its legitimacy? How can global 
administrative tools, such as notice and comment procedures, be adapted to the 
activity and structure of global regulatory bodies? Do these tools serve the same 
function at both the global and national levels, or do they pursue different ends, 
notwithstanding their similar structures? 
Another set of problems is related to the content of global private accounting 
regulations. As mentioned above, the international institutional structure for 
setting accounting standards is modeled after the American FASB. Moreover, 
there have been several recent meetings between representatives of the two 
regulators (the first one taking place in September 2002), in order to foster 
convergence between the IAS/IFRS and the FASB’s General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Does this suggest that there is an 
Americanization, rather than a globalization, of law? 
 
 
5. Further Reading  
a. S. BOTZEN, “Transnational Expert-driven Standardisation – Accountancy 
Governance from a Professional Point of View”, in J.-C.GRAZ, A. NÖLKE 
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(eds.), Transnational Private Governance and its Limits, London (2007); 
b. S. BOTZEN, “Changes in Professional Standardisation – The Role of Private 
Actors in International Accounting Regulation”, paper presented at the SGIR 
Turin Conference 2007 
(http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Botzem-Botzem_SGIR2007.pdf); 
c. S. BOTZEN, S. QUACK, “Contested Rules and Shifting Boundaries: 
International Standard Setting in Accounting”, in M.L. DJELIC, K. SAHLIN-
ANDERSSON (eds.), Transnational Governance. Institutional Dynamics of Regulation, 
Cambridge (2006), p. 266 et seq.; 
d. J.-C. GRAZ, “Standards and International Relations: Devolution of Power in 
the Global Political Economy” 
 (http://www2.unil.ch/easst2006/Papers/G/Graz.pdf); 
e. K.T. HALLSTRÖM, Organizing international standardization. ISO and the IASC in 
quest of authority, Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA (2004); 
f. D. KERWER, “Rules that May Use: Standards and Global Regulation”, 18 
Governance 611 (2005); 
g. W. MATTLI, “Public and Private Governance in Setting International 
Standards”, in M. KAHLER, D.A. LAKE (eds.), Governance in a Global Economy. 
Political Authority in Transition, Princeton and Oxford (2003), p. 199 et seq.; 
h. W. MATTLI, T. BÜTHE, “Global Private Governance: Lessons from a 
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting”, 68 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 225 (2005); 
i. A. NÖLKE, “The Globalization of Accounting Standards”, 7 Business and 
Politics, No. 3 (2005); 
j. J. PERRY, A. NÖLKE, “International Accounting Standard Setting: A Network 
Approach”, 7 Business and Politics (2005), Issue 3, Article 5 
 (http://www.bepress.com/bap/vol7/iss3/art5); 
k. J. PERRY, A. NÖLKE, “The political economy of international accounting 
standards”, 13 Review of International Political Economy 559 (2006); 
l. H. SCHEPEL, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the 
Regulation of Integrating Markets, Oxford (2005). 
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1.3. Global Private Standards and Public Law: The EU Approach to 
Accounting Harmonization 
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background 
Beginning with the Communication of the Commission on Accounting 
Harmonisation: A New Strategy vis à vis International Harmonisation in 1995, EU 
strategy in the accounting sector has changed steadily in recent years: from an 
approach based on the establishment of binding rules, developed by EU bodies, 
it has moved towards one aimed at incorporating into Community law 
internationally recognized accounting standards and principles, the International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) and the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), established by a private international organization, the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (supra, Ch. 1.2). 
This choice originated from the observation that public rules quickly become 
obsolete (due to the long approval procedure to which they are subjected), in 
contrast to the greater flexibility of standards set by private regulators. 
In particular, EC Regulation n. 1606/2002 (the “IAS Regulation”) provided 
for the systematic incorporation of IAS/IFRS standards. In this way, global 
accounting standards, originally established by private entities, gained binding 
force through their recognition in the European context. Nevertheless, EC 
Regulation n. 1606/2002 does not authorize the straightforward incorporation of 
internationally recognized accounting standards, but rather establishes an 
extremely complex procedure in this regard. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- IASB – European Union 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/index_en.htm); 
- Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 19 July 2002 on the application of international accounting standards, in 
Official Journal of the European Union L 243, 11 September 2002, p. 1 – 4; 
- Working Arrangement between European Commission and EFRAG  
(http://www.efrag.org/images/Efrag/EFRAGEC%20Working%20Arrange
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ment.pdf); 
- Commission Decision 2006/505/EC of 14 July 2006, setting up a Standards 
Advice Review Group to advise the Commission on the objectivity and neutrality of the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group's (EFRAG’s) opinions  
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006D0
505:EN:NOT);  
- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, COM (2000) 359 of June 13 2000, EU Financial Reporting Strategy: 
the way forward  
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0359:F
IN:EN:PDF); 
- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, COM 95(508) of November 1995, Accounting Harmonisation: A 
New Strategy vis à vis International Harmonisation 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/accounting/docs/com-95-
508/com-95-508_en.pdf);  
- Commission Regulation (EC) no. 1725/2003 of 29 September2003 and 
Annexes, Adoption of certain international accounting standards in accordance with 
Regulation (EC)1606/2002, in Official Journal of the European Union L 261, 
13 October 2003, p. 1 et seq.; 
- European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), Adoption of the 
Amended IAS 39, EFRAG Chairman’s Letter of 8 July 2004;  
- EU Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), Opinion on IAS 39, 5 October 
2004; 
- Commission Regulation (EC) no. 2086/2004 of 19 November 2004, 
Amending Regulation (EC) 1725/2003 Adopting Certain International Accounting 
Standards in Accordance with Regulation (EC) 1606/2002 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards the Insertion of IAS 39, in Official Journal of the 
European Union L 363, 9 December 2004, p. 1 et seq.; 
- Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), Proposed Statement of 
Principles of Enforcement of Accounting Standards in Europe, Consultation Paper, 
October 2002, Cesr/02-188b;  
- CESR, Consultation on the Statement of Principles of Enforcement of Accounting 
Standards in Europe, Feedback Statement, 12 March 2003, Cesr/03-074;  
- CESR, Standard No. 2 on Financial Information. Coordination of enforcement activities, 
April 2004, Cesr/03-317c. 
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3. Analysis 
The IAS Regulation requires, from 2005 onward, all publicly traded EU 
companies to prepare their consolidated accounts using the IFRS. According to 
the IAS Regulation, when deciding on the applicability of IAS/IFRS, the 
European Commission must evaluate whether the international standards 
correspond to the criteria set out in the regulation itself: in particular, IAS/IFRS 
standards can be endorsed only if they are conducive to the European public 
good, and if they meet the criteria of understandability, relevance, reliability and 
comparability required of the financial information needed for making economic 
decisions and assessing management. 
When deciding on the adoption of the standards, the European Commission 
is assisted by two committees. The Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), 
established by Art. 6 of the Regulation, is a comitology committee: composed of 
representatives from the Member States, it decides whether the IAS are to be 
adopted, on the basis of the Commission's proposals. 
In the assessment of international accounting standards, a technical 
committee, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), also 
provides support and expertise to the Commission. The EFRAG is an experts’ 
committee, made up of representatives from the private sectors of several 
Member States (for example, the European Federation of Accountants (FEE), 
the European Insurance Organization (CEA), the European Banking Federation 
(EBF), the European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
(UEAPME), and the European Federation of Accountants and Auditors 
(EFAA)). The IAS Regulation provides for support by a technical committee 
(Preamble, Recital 10); later, cooperation with the EFRAG was strengthened by 
the Working Arrangement developed between that body and the European 
Commission. This Committee has a consultative function, providing the support 
and expertise needed to assess the compatibility of the IAS with the criteria set 
forth in the Regulation, and advising the Commission on whether or not to adopt 
the standards. 
Moreover, Commission Decision 2006/505/EC of 14 July 2006 set up a 
Standards Advice Review Group (SARG). The SARG was established to create 
an institutional structure for advising the Commission on the objectivity and 
neutrality of the EFRAG’s opinions, given that the latter is a private body, in 
order to increase the transparency and credibility of the adoption process. The 
SARG is composed of seven members, appointed on the basis of technical 
expertise and independence. 
When the Group identifies a particular concern in an EFRAG opinion, the 
chairman is supposed to enter into dialogue with the EFRAG with a view to 
resolving the matter before the Group issues its final decision. 
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Lastly, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) is charged 
with assisting the Commission in implementing the IAS. 
The approval of the IAS Regulation has been followed by a period of intense 
activity in terms of endorsing accounting standards: by October 2007, seventeen 
adoption regulations had been approved. This separate endorsement procedure 
can, however, create some ambiguities in the field of accounting standards 
harmonization: for example, IAS Standard 39 has been amended several times by 
the IASB, and thus applies only partially in the European legal system. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Relationship between Private and Public Regulators 
The new European strategy for the accountancy sector outlines a hybrid public-
private model, the consequences of which still have to be explored. How does 
the public regulator control the private one? Is it a purely ex post control, or can 
the public regulator play a more active role in the international standard setting 
process? 
The EU makes originally voluntary standards mandatory; moreover, it also 
reviews the compatibility of these standards with European law, and their 
effectiveness. Public enforcement of global private standards thus cannot be 
explained simply in terms of public body’s decision to retreat from the regulation 
of a certain sector (in this case, the accounting sector): the rules are not entirely 
private, but rather take on a hybrid form, including both private and public 
elements. 
Moreover, there is considerable evidence of the EU’s efforts to become more 
engaged in the international standards setting process within the IASB: from this 
point of view, the incorporation of the IAS within European law is offset by the 
more active role played by the EU in the formulation of accounting standards by 
the global private body.  
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. K. ARTSBERG, “International accounting standardisation vis-à-vis European 
accounting harmonization” 
(http://www.snee.org/filer/papers/23.pdf);  
b. S. FEARNLEY, T. HINES, “The Adoption of International Accounting 
Standards in the UK: a Review of Attitudes” 
(http://www.business.uiuc.edu/accountancy/research/vkzcenter/conference
s/gottingen/papers/Fearnley.pdf); 
c. P. LEBLOND, “The International Dimension of the Harmonization of 
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Accounting Standards in the EU”, paper for delivery at the EUSA, Ninth 
Biannual International Conference, March 31st - April 2nd, 2005, Austin, 
Texas 
(http://aei.pitt.edu/2998); 
d. M. SCHMIDT, “On the Legitimacy of Accounting Standard Setting by 
Privately Organised Institutions in Germany and Europe”, 54 Schmalenbach 
Business Review 171 (2002); 
e. K. VAN HULLE, “International Convergence of Accounting Standards”, 12 
Duke J. of Comp. & Int’l L. 357 (2002). 
 
 
 
 
1.4. Control by Public Regulators over a Private Standard-Setter: The IFAC 
and the Establishment of the PIOB within the Auditing Sector  
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background 
The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private international 
organization that establishes standards for auditing: in particular, it sets the 
educational, ethical and professional standards for auditors.  
Founded at the 11th World Congress of Accountants in Munich in 1977, it 
has been based in New York City since its inception. The IFAC has long worked 
closely with the more famous International Accounting Standard Board (IASB), 
and has only recently acquired a measure of independence. Over the past 30 
years, the IFAC has grown from 63 to 155 members. It is composed of private 
entities, representatives of accountants’ professional organizations (for example, 
the Italian Consiglio nazionale dei dottori Commercialisti and the Consiglio nazionale dei 
ragionieri e periti commerciali). Like the IASB, the IFAC is an example of a global 
private regulator; moreover, its standards (the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA)) are also part of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)’s Compendium 
of standards, which brings together internationally recognized standards for 
financial stability, compliance with which is subject to IMF and World Bank 
assessment (see supra, Ch. 1.2). 
According to the IFAC Constitution (in the text last modified in 2006), the 
mission of the Federation is to “serve the public interest”. More specifically, it 
aims at strengthening the accountancy profession in several ways, most 
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importantly through establishing and promoting adherence to high quality 
professional standards and furthering the international convergence of such 
standards (Constitution, Art. 1.4). 
The IFAC’s structure is as follows: the Council consists of one representative 
of each member, and is responsible for deciding constitutional and strategic 
matters, and for electing the Board. The Board, comprised of the President, the 
Deputy President and not more than 20 members (chosen according to the level 
of the financial contribution made to the IFAC), has all of the powers necessary 
to fulfill the IFAC’s mission (including those not explicitly mentioned in the 
Constitution: see Constitution, Arts. 3 and 5). 
There are also ten committees, four of which are charged with a standard 
setting function: the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB), the International Accounting Education Standards Board (IAESB), the 
International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) and the 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB). During the 
standards setting procedure, each of these committees must follow the due 
process rules set out in the IFAC’s Standards-Setting Public Interest Activity 
Committees’ Due Process and Working Procedures. The Compliance Advisory Panel 
(CAP), which another IFAC committee, is charged with assessing members’ 
compliance with the IFAC’s standards.  
 
 
2. Materials and Links 
- International Federation of Accountants 
(http://www.ifac.org); 
- Public Interest Oversight Board 
(http://www.ipiob.org/index.php); 
- IFAC, Reform Proposals, 19 September 2003 
 (http://www.ifac.org/Downloads/IFAC_Reform_Proposals.pdf); 
- Second Public Report of the PIOB, May 2007 
(http://www.ipiob.org/reports.php); 
- First Public Report of the PIOB, May 2006 
(http://www.ipiob.org/reports.php); 
- Press Release, International Regulators and Related Organizations Announce the Public 
Interest Oversight Board for the International Accounting Profession, 28 February 2005 
(http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS83.pdf); 
- IFAC Board, Proposed Revision to the International Federation of Accountants’ 
Constitution, Invitation to comment, October 2005 
 (http://www.ifac.org/Downloads/IFAC_Constitution_DRAFT.pdf); 
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- IFAC, Amended and Restated International Federation of Accountants Constitution, 
November 2005 
(http://www.ifac.org/About/IFAC_Constitution.pdf); 
- IFAC, Constitution, November 2006 
(http://www.ifac.org/Downloads/IFAC_Constitution.pdf); 
- IFAC’s Standards-Setting Public Interest Activity Committees’ Due Process and 
Working Procedures, March 2006 
(www.ifac.org/Downloads/PIAC_Due_Process.pdf).  
 
 
3. Analysis 
With a view to reforming the organization, the IFAC conducted an intense series 
of consultations in 2003 with both global financial regulators (such as the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International Organization of 
Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), and the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)), and the international organizations representing 
the accounting profession. 
The objective of this effort was to strengthen the IFAC’s role in global 
financial governance and to restore confidence (which had been impaired by the 
corporate failures and collapses in the late 1990s) that its activities were properly 
responsive to the public interest and conducive to the establishment of high 
quality standards. Moreover, it was intended to contribute to the convergence of 
international auditing standards.  
The resulting reforms created new bodies, such as the Public Interest 
Oversight Board (PIOB), the Monitoring Group (MG) and the IFAC Leadership 
Group; they also changed the internal structure of the IFAC, and, more 
specifically, the composition and functioning of the Council, the Board and the 
Committees, through the revision of the Constitution and the approval of certain 
by-laws (Reform Proposals, p. 3 and 4). 
The PIOB is particularly interesting, due to its composition and its functions. 
It was established in February 2005, and is based in Madrid, where it operates as 
La Fundación Consejo Internacional de Supervisión Público en Estándares de Auditoría, 
Ética Profesional y Materias Relacionadas (a non-profit Spanish foundation). It has 
eight members, who are nominated by the BCBS, the IOSCO, the IAIS and the 
World Bank. The European Commission names two observers. Global public 
regulators have thus created a private regulatory oversight body. The 
relationships between the PIOB and the transnational networks and international 
organizations mentioned above are not defined exclusively by the PIOB’s 
constitution: on the contrary, the PIOB is subject to a periodic evaluation by the 
Monitoring Group, which has the power to remove its members. 
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The PIOB oversees the IFAC’s activities, which must be carried out in the 
“public interest”. In particular, the current mandate of the PIOB (although it 
might be expanded in the future) allows for the exercise of oversight over all of 
the IFAC’s “public interest activity committees” (PIACs), i.e. the IAASB, IESBA 
and the IAESB, which establish standards for auditing, ethics and education. 
Moreover, the CAP (the body which evaluates members’ compliance with the 
IFAC’s standards) is also subject to the PIOB’s oversight.  
This oversight role implies a number of powers. First, the PIOB can approve 
or reject the nominations of members to all of the bodies that it oversees, and 
can request the removal of the chair if necessary. Thus, one might infer that 
global public regulators such as the BCBS, the IOSCO, the IAIS and the World 
Bank can indirectly affect the composition of the IFAC’s internal committees, 
through the members that they appoint to the PIOB. Moreover, the PIOB 
oversees the internal functioning of the IFAC’s committees, through the 
evaluation of their due process procedures, and even influences the content of 
their regulatory activity, by suggesting issues that might be included in their 
respective work programs. Finally, the PIOB prepares an annual report on its 
own activity, which must be transmitted to the IFAC’s members, to the FSF and 
the global financial regulators, and to the general public through publication on 
its website. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Accountability of Global Private Regulators 
The IFAC’s particular activities, and its expanding role in global financial 
governance, raise core questions surrounding its accountability. 
The recent reforms suggest two complementary methods for improving the 
accountability of global private regulators. 
The first method consists in requiring private regulators to undergo 
organizational changes, which might include the establishment of new bodies, 
public or hybrid, with which the private regulators have to interact. The second 
method focuses on procedural standards, such as those established in the 
Constitution and in the IFAC’s Standards-Setting Public Interest Activity Committees’ 
Due Process and Working Procedures, both amended in 2006. 
But are these instruments genuinely capable of promoting the accountability 
of global private regulators, and of ensuring that their activity is responsive to the 
public interest? 
A second question is implied by the transformations examined above. Given 
the PIOB’s institution, its peculiar composition and its functions, can we still 
consider global auditing regulation as private governance, or is it evolving toward 
a hybrid model, due to the increasing influence of public global regulators? 
During the 2002 meeting in which the reforms were first discussed, the 
GLOBAL STANDARDS 23 
IFAC’s specific purpose was to introduce a hybrid regulation model, in order to 
effectively respond to the financial crisis of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the role of 
the big auditing firms within the IFAC cannot be underestimated: private firms in 
fact have their own committee, the Transnational Auditors Committee (TAC) 
(which includes representatives of Deloitte, Ernst &Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and KPMG). An example of how private regulators can resist efforts by public 
regulators to oversee the sector is provided by the special procedure that was 
established when the PIOB attempted to include the TAC’s activity in its 
mandate. 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. J. CROW, A. JOHN, C. AUBIN, O. KIRTLEY, K. NAKAHIRA, I. RAMSAY, G. 
SAUCIER, G. WARD, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting”, 
report by the Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial 
Reporting, Ifac, 2003 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=556291); 
b. A. LOFT, C. HUMPHREY, S. TURLEY, “In pursuit of global regulation: 
Changing governance and accountability structures at the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC)”, 19 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 428 (2006); 
c. R.W. MCGEE, “Advertising and Solicitation: Some Ethical Problems with the 
IFAC Code of Ethics”, Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 286 (1998);  
d. P. SUTCLIFFE, “The Standards Programme of IFAC’s Public Sector 
Committee”, 23 Public Money and Management 29 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
1.5. The Public Enforcement of Global Private Standard Setting: The Role 
of Credit Rating Agencies in Basel II 
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background 
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are private firms that provide an independent 
evaluation (the rating) of the credit-worthiness of issuers of financial securities. A 
credit rating is an assessment of how likely the issuer is to make timely payments 
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on a financial obligation. Ratings have letter designations such as AAA, B, CC; a 
lower rating corresponds to a greater perceived risk of defaulting on a loan.  
The assessments and opinions of CRAs play an important role in capital 
markets, providing information and enhancing transparency.  
Two of the largest CRAs, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, control eighty 
percent of the ratings market. CRAs offer credit ratings to any kind of issuer: 
companies and banks, but also national or regional governments. 
The rating process is the following. First, the issuer requests the rating and 
agrees to pay for it. The issuer provides much of the information to be used in 
the evaluation process, but the rating agencies also use publicly available 
information in making their evaluation. CRAs do not issue a rating if they feel 
that they do not have sufficient information to do so. The first report is prepared 
by a junior analyst, and then reviewed by senior analysts.  
This procedure has two main features. First, as issuers pay for their own 
ratings, there are real risks concerning the effective independence of the 
evaluation. Second, rating agencies use specific criteria for their evaluations, and 
provide a brief memo giving reasons for each specific assessment. The agencies 
periodically publish the criteria that they use in the rating process. From this 
point of view, rating agencies are genuine, private, financial standard setting 
bodies. 
 
 
2. Materials and Links 
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 (http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm); 
- International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a 
Revised Framework (so-called “Basel II”) 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf); 
- IOSCO, Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies 
(http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf); 
- Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, in 
OJ L 177, 30.6.2006, p. 1–200;  
- Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2006 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions, in OJ L 
177, 30.6.2006, p. 201–255;  
- CESR’s Technical Advice (ref. CESR/05-139b), CESR’s technical advice to the 
European Commission on possible measures concerning credit rating agencies, 30 March 
2005 
GLOBAL STANDARDS 25 
(http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/CESR%20credit%20rating%20agenci
es%20March%2005_tcm29-151345.pdf); 
- IOSCO, Technical Committee’s Report on the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, 
September 2003 
 (http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD153.pdf); 
- Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Consultation Paper on the 
Recognition of External Credit Assessment Institutions 
 (http://www.c-ebs.org/pdfs/CP07.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), established in 1974, 
groups together representatives from the G10 central banks: it is a transnational 
regulatory network, and thus an example of a global public regulator that is not 
intergovernmental in nature (see infra, Ch. 2.7). The BCBS sets standards for 
banking supervision. A particularly interesting example is the International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework (“Basel 
II”); approved in June 2004, it replaces the 1988 Capital Accord. 
One of the main features of this accord is its use of ratings: in this case, a 
global public regulator’s standard incorporates the ratings (i.e. the evaluations and 
underlying criteria) of a private entity into its regulatory activity.  
The new Capital Accord modifies the determination of bank capital adequacy 
requirements. Under the 1988 Accord, one method was used for all banks (the 
amount of capital had to be equal to at least 8 percent of “risk weighted” assets). 
The new Accord allows banks to choose between two methods for calculating 
the capital requirements for credit risks: the standardized approach, based upon 
the ratings of CRAs, and the “internal ratings” method. According to the 
standardized approach, risk weights (and, consequently, the capital requirements 
that a bank has to respect) depend on each bank’s rating. In this way, the capital 
requirements depend on an external criterion, the rating, which is determined by 
a private entity. 
It is important to note that Basel II set forth specific criteria that CRAs must 
fulfill in order for their assessments to be used for regulatory purposes. These 
include the obligation to make objective and independent assessments; to allow 
access by both domestic and foreign institutions to their assessments; to disclose 
assessment methodologies; to have sufficient resources to carry out high quality 
credit assessments; and a general requirement of credibility (paras. 90 and 91). 
National supervisors are responsible for determining whether an external credit 
assessment institution meets these criteria. Similar criteria have been established 
in Directive 2006/48/EC, which implements Basel II within the EU (Annex VI, 
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Part II). 
 
 
4. Issues: Hybrid Public-Private Regulation 
The decisions of a private entity (in this case a CRA) are thus incorporated into 
public regulatory standards. This is an effective example of hybrid regulation. 
Moreover, the rating, which is the most visible of the agencies’ determinations, is 
the final stage of an evaluation process that uses standards created by the agency 
itself. Thus, there is an indirect incorporation not only of the final assessments of 
these private entities, but also of the underlying standards they use in coming to 
these conclusions. 
This is not a completely new technique. Even though it was first adopted at 
the global level with Basel II, it has been used in the national context for a long 
time. The American banking supervision authority, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), began using ratings for regulatory purposes at the beginning 
of the 1970s. 
The tendency of public regulators to use the standards set forth by private 
entities raises a number of concerns about the accountability of these latter 
bodies. Institutional reforms may help to promote accountability, such as the 
establishment of the PIOB, which oversees the public interest standard setting 
activities of the IFAC, a global private regulator (supra, Ch. 1.3). 
The role of CRAs seems even more problematic, however, given that 
oversight by a public regulator might affect the agency’s independence, which is 
at the very core of its reputation. This has been called an “accountability 
paradox”: strengthening the accountability of CRAs might diminish their 
performance and effectiveness. What tools can be used to address the 
accountability gap within these agencies, without affecting their independence? 
And at the same time, how can we ensure their effective independence from the 
interests of borrowers?  
Recently, there have been efforts to improve the accountability of CRAs 
through the establishment of codes of conduct. In December 2004, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a Code 
of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies, aimed at reinforcing the quality 
and integrity of the rating process, promoting the independence of CRAs and 
thus the avoidance of conflicts of interest.  
The same approach is followed at the European level by the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (CESR): in giving technical advice to the 
European Commission on possible measures concerning credit rating agencies, it 
adopted the IOSCO Code of Conduct.  
But are these codes enough to address accountability concerns? Are there 
effective alternative methods of holding credit agencies accountable? In 
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particular, would a system of public recognition and registration, as proposed by 
some European supervision authorities, be effective?  
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LEVEL, INFORMAL 
 
 
 
 
2.1. A Hybrid Public-Private Regime: The Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Governance of the 
Internet 
Bruno Carotti and Lorenzo Casini 
 
 
1. Background 
There are more than one billion internet users. Data traffic has reached 
extraordinary levels: the Internet has become one of the most important means 
of communication. One can use the internet to send electronic mail, acquire 
goods and services, debate with others, and obtain the most varied information. 
Some newspapers, like New York Times, are planning to suspend their printed 
editions in the near future, in favor of the free online version. A new form of 
interactive encyclopedia, Wikipedia, has achieved unprecedented levels of 
popularity.  
 The situation was originally very different. The information exchanged on 
the internet involved only a few servers or university laboratories. It served 
scientific demands and those of military security. The latter, in particular, was the 
starting point of the phenomenon, driven by the need to construct new 
communications equipment capable of functioning even under wartime 
conditions. The project was developed with the aid of grants from the United 
States Government to university research centers (in particular, the Advanced 
Research Project Agency, ARPA, which named the network Arpanet).  
 From a technical point of view, the internet can be defined as a system that 
allows the exchange and communication of data through the use of common 
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technical parameters. This is achieved through the use of technical protocols 
called internet protocols (IPs). The most well known are the TCP/IP and the 
domain names system. These protocols were adopted spontaneously by the early 
internet community of computer engineers. 
The original method for choosing standards and technical protocols is known 
as the Request for Comments (RFC). Every time that a new proposal for the 
adoption of a technical measure was made, the opinion of the embryonic internet 
community was surveyed. The users provided answers and, if a good degree of 
consensus was reached, the technical measure was adopted. The model thus 
developed is founded on consensus and on the development of technical norms 
through bottom-up procedures. No specific institution has imposed these 
technical parameters; rather, they were chosen on the basis of their innovation 
and functionality (as determined by the experts). 
The point of no return for the evolution of the internet was its international 
expansion and the discovery of its commercial potential. In particular, attention 
was turned to domain names, which enable the communication of data. The 
internet is composed of various sites, and to reach one of them (for instance, in 
order to access some information or to send an email), it is necessary to know its 
address. Addresses are made up of a series of four numbers between 0 and 255, 
separated by a dot. It is clearly not practical to have to remember such a series: it 
is easier to use characters or words. The domain names fulfill this function, by 
changing the numerical series into names. For instance, 128.122.255.255 becomes 
www.nyu.edu. 
Domain names are divided into general and national categories: generic and 
country code top-level domain names (gTLDs and ccTLDS). The gTLDs are 
specialized for particular categories of users (“.edu”, for instance, refers to 
educational institutions). The initial rigidity of this subdivision has since given 
way to greater flexibility: currently, an individual may also register as a .com, as it 
is no longer necessary for him to represent a commercial entity. The ccTLDs 
operate in a national context, corresponding to a particular geopolitical area (.es, 
.jp, .in, .us, .uk: there are around 250 of them).  
Domain names are also divided into different levels: in the example given 
above, “.edu” is the first level domain name, and “nyu” is the second level 
domain name. Further levels can also be created. For instance, besides “.org”, 
there can also be “admin.org”; besides “.us”, there can also be “ny.us”. Thus, 
second, third (and so on) level domain names can be added to the first level. 
Every level constitutes a zone: for each zone (every group of letters preceded by 
a “dot”) a different body is responsible for domain name registration (on this 
point see infra, Ch. 5.4). This prevents the centralization of the internet as a 
resource; that there exists a plurality of domestic bodies responsible for domain 
name registration helps to ensure its fair allocation. The system thus creates a 
form of “distributed administration”. 
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It is however still possible to speak of a central authority. This is the 
authoritative root server, which contains the “official” list of the existing first 
level domain names. For instance, if “.edu” were not listed in this server, it would 
not exist. Control of this infrastructure means authority over the internet as a 
whole. 
The increasing commercial importance of domain names has lead to their 
institutionalization. Problems of allocation have arisen, as domain names are a 
scarce resource; there are, for example, important intersections with trademark 
rights (domain names often correspond to corporations’ names). Their 
importance (they are accessible from any computer connected to the internet) 
has created the need to define specific, globally valid rules. 
There have been many controversies related to the control of the 
authoritative root server. The main participants have been the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), groups of experts (through the Internet 
Society, ISOC) and the American Government. The ITU and the expert groups 
proposed a separate, independent international sectoral authority (the 
International Council of Registrars, CORE); the US, on the other hand, proposed 
a model based on private self-regulation and coordination. This latter model is 
the one that finally prevailed: in 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) was established as a non-profit corporation 
under Californian law; it began operating on the basis of a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the US Department of Commerce. 
Nevertheless, the debate on internet governance has not diminished. The 
General Assembly of the United Nations, in a 2001 Resolution, asked the ITU to 
reconsider the issue during the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). 
During the first phase (in Genoa, 2003), a committee dedicated to this task was 
established, the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). 
In the second phase (Tunisia, 2005), the WGIG put forward four proposals 
for reforming the control of the corporate body. But UN involvement has not 
changed the position of the ICANN. Discussion of these issues now continues in 
a new forum, the Internet Governance Forum. 
 
 
2. Materials and Links 
- Working Group on Internet Governance, Report of the Working Group on 
Internet Governance, Château de Bossey, June 2005 
(http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf);  
- Internet Governance Forum 
 (http://www.intgovforum.org); 
- World Summit on Information Society, Declaration on Principles, Geneva, 2003 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 32 
(Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E) 
(http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-
0004!!PDF-E.pdf); 
- General Assembly of the United Nations, Fifty-Sixth Session, Resolution 
A/RES/56/183, adopted 21 December 2001 
(http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/background.asp?lang=en&c_type=res); 
- Bylaws for Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, as 
amended effective 15 February 2008 
(http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm); 
- Memorandum of Understanding between the US Department of Commerce 
and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(http://www.icann.org/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm); 
- Articles of Incorporation of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers, as revised November 21, 1998 
 (http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm). 
 
 
3. Analysis  
The ICANN was originally intended to operate on the basis of private 
coordination. Thus, the internet was left to develop in an autonomous manner. 
This model, however, did not work properly: the interests at stake were not 
adequately represented and protected. 
The ICANN was thus reformed in 2002 to recalibrate the balance between 
users, operators and public bodies, promoting the position of the stronger 
economic actors. The powers of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) 
were also reinforced. National governments participate in this Committee, 
playing an important role in the definition of sectoral policy. The 2002 reform 
thus gave new importance to both the strongest economic actors and to public 
authorities, creating a form of hybrid governance. 
Important innovations also emerged in the international arena. Developing 
countries pressed for reform, asking for UN intervention. They argued that the 
ICANN lacks true legitimacy, and that the internet could not be governed by a 
single body at the global level. Their favoured solution was for a multilateral 
agreement, which would at least grant effective legitimacy to the ICANN. 
The WGIG attempted to address these problems. First, it searched for an 
unambiguous definition of internet governance and came up with the following: 
“internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the 
evolution and use of the internet”. 
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In general, the WGIG’s position is based on the assumption that internet 
governance cannot be assigned to an individual government, making multilateral 
supervision necessary instead. It thus proposed four reforms, which would 
transfer control to the UN in different ways. 
The first proposal suggests the creation of a Global Internet Council (GIC), 
in which States would be represented. The functions of the GIC, which would 
replace the Governmental Advisory Committee, would include the management 
of domain names, the infrastructure and technical parameters; the protection of 
privacy and online security; the promotion of international treaties and 
agreements; and the adoption of new rules for dispute resolution mechanisms. 
The second proposal is to redefine the characteristics of the ICANN and the 
GAC, and is intended to guarantee the effective participation of all national 
governments. 
The third proposal is for the creation of an International Internet Council 
(IIC), which would give governments a predominant role, while civil society and 
private sector actors would have only advisory functions. 
The fourth proposal would have the most significant impact upon the 
current order. It contains a mixture of all the elements outlined in the other 
three, and introduces other innovative features. It envisages the creation of three 
bodies: the Global Internet Policy Council (GIPC), the World Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (WICANN) and the Global 
Internet Governance Forum (GIGF). The first body would be entrusted with the 
definition of new public policy, and would assign a prominent role to national 
governments. The second, which would be directly rooted in the United Nations 
system, would have the function of promoting the internet sector, in relation to 
the technical and economic aspects thereof. The third body would perform a 
coordinating function, in order to contribute to the evolution of the internet: 
specifically, it would be a forum for discussion, but without any decision-making 
power. Here, the private sector would play a leadership role. 
There are three interesting features in this model. First, there is the constant 
presence of national governments. Second, there is the recognition of the public 
nature of the internet governance, or the need for a global public policy on the 
matter. Third, it is important to highlight the proposed use of hybrid solutions, 
through the recourse to different tools and regimes, in order to attain a higher 
degree of efficiency and thus create a system responsive to all the interests 
involved. From this point of view, the problem of legitimacy can be resolved 
with public law tools (i.e. multilateral agreements), while economic development 
can be addressed by other mechanisms, in order to ensure greater flexibility. 
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4. Issues: The Regulatory Functions of Global Private Bodies 
The domain names sector of internet governance is very interesting from the 
institutional perspective, as this sector is closely linked to the presence of a 
particular regulatory body, the ICANN, which has a significant effect upon 
individual interests. 
In this sector, we see the creation of administrative structures that operate 
“beyond the State”. The ICANN raises the question of how international 
administrations can grow to include bodies that do not originate from an 
interstate agreement (as do international organizations). The ICANN is national, 
but it fulfills a function of global importance (related to the diffusion of a new 
medium of communication). And although it is private, national governments 
still participate in it, through the GAC. 
As for the relevant sources of law, there are a significant variety of norms: 
first of all, we see the presence of national law (e.g. the Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Department of Commerce, the Articles of Association). 
However, the rules adopted by the ICANN Board (see Art. III of the Bylaws) 
transcend national law: they are decided with the participation of global actors. 
A different issue relates to the selection of the body entrusted with internet 
governance. This matter is related to the problem of the legitimacy of the 
institutions assigned to regulate global regimes. Does the spread of a new 
medium of communication, with a global reach, necessarily require governance at 
the international level? Can a national corporate body legitimately fulfill functions 
of global importance? What would happen, from an efficiency perspective, if the 
structure or the supervisory mechanisms of the regime were to be transformed? 
To address the question of which legal instruments ought to be created, it is 
first necessary to evaluate the interaction between public international law and 
other different regimes, norms and mechanisms. The involvement of several 
governments would suggest the adoption of a multilateral treaty; there is, 
however, the alternative of applying global administrative law principles to the 
ICANN (see infra, Ch. 5.4 and 5.5). Some specific mechanisms might be 
incorporated: participation, through notice and comment procedures (art. III 
Bylaws); complaint to internal bodies, entrusted with the review of Board 
decisions (Reconsideration Committee, Ombudsman, Independent Review Panel, 
Arts. IV and V Bylaws); and, finally, the possibility of appeal to national courts, 
which functions as a kind of relief valve, as it brings the task of supervising the 
regulatory body back into the national legal order. 
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5. Similar Cases 
Certain problems have arisen relating to the existence of conflicting standards in 
the field of internet governance. One example of this concerns the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard ISO-3166 and the RFC 1591 
(one of the most important and still in use), adopted by the Internet Names 
Assigned Authority (IANA), the predecessor of the ICANN. Such standards 
define the categories of domain names and also apply to national administrations. 
Thus, private determinations also stand apart from the national public powers. 
The following question thus arises: can a private organization like the IANA 
impose its standards on national agencies? 
Relevant links where materials regarding these issues can be found are the 
following: 
- International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
(http://www.iso.org); 
- ISO 3166-1 and country coded Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs) 
(www.iso.ch/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/list-
en1.html); 
- Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) 
(http://www.iana.org); 
- Request for Comment 1591 
(http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1591.txt?number=1591); 
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2.2. Hybrid Public-Private Bodies within Global Private Regimes: The 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 
Lorenzo Casini 
 
 
1. Background 
In August 2008, in Bejing, over 10,000 athletes from 205 States – more than the 
192 UN Members – will compete for medals at the most important sports event 
in the human history: the Olympics Games.  
The Olympics provide us with the most significant example of the universal 
value of sport. Since the end of the 19th century, an incredibly complex system 
has been created to regulate this: the Olympic Movement. It is governed by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), and finds in the Olympic Charter its 
very own “Constitution”, in which the fundamental principles and rules of the 
Olympic Games are set forth (see for instance the “Fundamental Principles of 
Olympism”, in which it is proclaimed that “the practice of sport is a human 
right”). 
Beside the IOC, the system is built upon two categories of institutions: the 
International Federations (IFs) – which set the “rules of the game” for each 
sport, acting like global standard setters – and the National Olympic Committees 
(NOCs). The IOC recognizes only one IF for each sport, and only one NOC for 
each country. The National Federations (NFs, charged with the regulation of 
each sport in a national context) are then associated to the IFs and to the NOC 
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of their own country. This structure has been described as a “double pyramid”, 
one related to IOC and NOCs, the other related to IFs and NFs; but the system 
appears rather as a series of “multiple pyramids”, formed by that between the 
IOC and the NOCs, on one hand, and by the many IFs of different sports (35, to 
count only those IFs that are within the Olympic Movement) and the respective 
NFs on the other. Moreover, these pyramids are linked together by several ties, 
both vertical and horizontal: for instance, to be recognized by the IOC, NOCs 
must include every NF affiliated to an IF (Olympic Charter, Art. 29). 
The field of sports regulation has thus generated a very complex set of 
subjects and norms, even with a specific dispute settlement body (the Court of 
Arbitration of Sport): it is for this reason that some talk of “International Sports 
Law”, “Global Sports Law” or a lex sportiva. Many scholars, then, have taken 
sports regulation as a paradigmatic example for addressing the broader issue of 
the coexistence of many legal orders (following the theory of Santi Romano). 
There exists, in fact, one Olympic regime, ruled by the IOC, and many other 
international sports regimes (as many as there are international sports) ruled by 
each IF; most of the latter are within the Olympic Movement, but some fall 
outside the IOC’s jurisdiction (such the International Cricket Council and the 
Federation International de l’Automobile). 
The main characteristic of sports regimes is that they are private and 
voluntary; therefore, they don’t belong to the field of public international law. 
The IOC is a non-governmental organization, based in Lausanne; and the IFs 
governing different sports are likewise all private bodies.   
In spite of this, and in connection with the increasing relevance of sport in 
many fields (political, economical, and social), States and public authorities play 
an increasingly important role in global sports regulation. Moreover, NOCs are 
national bodies under the jurisdiction of their own States, and are even, in some 
circumstances, themselves public administrations (as in France and in Italy, for 
example). 
The relationships between the sports regimes, and the Olympic regime in 
particular, and States can be categorized in terms of at least four different basic 
types. 
The first is acquiescence, e.g. when the International Community recognizes de 
facto the IOC, in the absence of a formal act that gives this body an international 
legal status: two examples are the protection of the Olympic symbol (see the 
Nairobi Treaty signed in 1981), and the Olympic truce (the “ekecheiria”: see the 
resolution UN A/RES/62/4 Building a peaceful and better world through sport and the 
Olympic ideal, adopted in 2007 by the General Assembly). 
The second type is that of reciprocal influences. There are many examples of how 
sports can produce effects on States: the “ping-pong diplomacy” between the 
USA and China in the 1970s; the fight against the apartheid and the exclusion of 
South Africa from the Tokyo Olympic Games in 1964; the reciprocal “boycotts” 
COMPLEX GOVERNANCE FORMS: HYBRID, MULTI-LEVEL, INFORMAL 39 
between U.S.A. and U.R.S.S. during the Cold War. Moreover, the recent story of 
the journey of the Olympic torch to Bejing provides an other example of this 
relationship, albeit one that is political rather than legal in character: following 
European protests against the violent repressive action of the Chinese 
government in Tibet, the President of the IOC emphasized the incompatibility 
between the Olympic values and any form of violence, and went on to ask China 
to reach a quick and peaceful solution to the controversy. Sometimes, however, it 
is States that influence the sports regimes, and not vice versa: this happens, for 
example, when the latter make use of concepts or tools taken from international 
or national legal orders, such the right of due process in disciplinary proceedings. 
The third type is that of conflict. When States (including, on occasion, public 
NOCs) act in violation of the Olympic Charter or the regulations of the relevant 
IF, a conflict between public authorities and international sports institutions 
emerges. More common, however, is where the global regulation of sports begins 
to impact upon fields subject to the jurisdiction of States, as happens when 
sports norms affect fundamental rights or economic activities granted or 
regulated by law (on this, referring to the EU Law, see infra, Ch. 7.1). 
The last type is that of cooperation. Examples of this can be found in the fight 
against the HIV virus led by the IOC and the UN, or by the agreements 
concluded by the ILO and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) intended to promote the fight against the use of child labour. The most 
important example of this kind of relationship between States and a sports 
regime, however, comes from the field of anti-doping. Acting in concert, States, 
sporting institutions and the international community more generally have 
created a body that is emblematic of the emergence of new forms of hybrid 
public-private governance in the global sphere: the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA). 
 
 
2. Materials and Links 
- Olympic Charter 
(http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf);  
- Constitutive Instrument of Foundation of the Agence Mondiale Antidopage-
World Anti-Doping Agency 
(http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/constitutive_instrument_-
foundation_En.pdf); 
- Declaration adopted by the World Conference on Doping in Sport, 
Copenhagen, Denmark, 5 March 2003 
(http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/copenhagen_en.pdf);  
- WADA World Anti-Doping Code 
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 (http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code_v3.pdf); 
- International Convention against Doping in Sport adopted by the General 
Conference of United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), 19 October 2005  
(http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/UNESCO_Convention.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis  
In response of the increase of cases of doping in sport (such as, for example, the 
scandal that shocked the cycling world in the summer of 1998), the IOC 
convened a World Conference on Doping in Sport. Held in Lausanne in 
February 1999, the Conference produced a Declaration on Doping in Sport, in 
which the creation of “an independent international anti-doping agency” was 
proposed. Pursuant to the terms of the Declaration, the WADA was created on 
10 November 1999 in Lausanne to promote and coordinate the fight against 
doping in sport internationally. 
From the legal perspective, WADA is a private foundation governed by its 
Constitutive Instrument, and by Articles 80 et seq. of the Swiss Civil Code. It has 
been set up under the initiative of the IOC, with the support and participation of 
intergovernmental organizations, governments, public authorities, and other 
public and private bodies fighting against doping in sport. 
The “equal partnership between the Olympic Movement and public 
authorities” is reflected by the structure of the Foundation Board (of up to 40 
members, up to 18 of whom are appointed by the Olympic Movement, with 
another maximum of 18 appointed by public authorities, and 4 appointed jointly 
by the two), and is clearly expressed in the Article 7 (“Organization of the 
Board”) of the WADA Constitutive Instrument of Foundation, in which it is also 
provided that “to promote and preserve parity among the stakeholders, the 
Foundation Board will ensure that the position of chairman alternates between 
the Olympic Movement and public authorities, and that in particular this occurs 
after two three-year terms, unless no alternative nomination is made. To further 
maintain equal partnership between the Olympic Movement and the public 
authorities, the vice chairman must be a personality nominated by the public 
authorities if the chairman is a person nominated by the Olympic Movement, and 
vice versa”. 
WADA has the typical structure of most foundations, with a Board, an 
Executive Committee, and an Auditing Body. This notwithstanding, however, it 
carries out public functions, such as 1) promoting and coordinating at the 
international level the fight against doping in sport in all its forms, including 
through in- and out-of-competition tests (to this end, the Foundation cooperates 
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with intergovernmental organizations, governments, public authorities and other 
public and private bodies fighting against doping in sport, and seeks from all of 
them the moral and political commitment to follow its recommendations); 2) 
reinforcing, at the international level, ethical principles for the practice of doping-
free sport, and helping protect the health of the athletes; 3) encouraging, 
supporting, coordinating and, where necessary, actually undertaking, in full 
cooperation with the public and private bodies concerned (in particular the IOC, 
IFs and NOCs), the organization of unannounced out-of-competition testing; 4) 
devising and developing anti-doping education and prevention programmes at 
the international level; and 5) promoting and coordinating research in the fight 
against doping in sport. 
However, the most important activity of WADA in terms of its “public” 
function is its role as a global standard setter. In particular, it is charged with 
carrying out three main tasks: 1) to establish, adapt, modify and update, at least 
yearly, for all the public and private bodies concerned the list of substances and 
methods prohibited in the practice of sport; 2) to develop, harmonize and unify 
scientific, sampling and technical standards and procedures with regard to 
analyses and equipment, including the homologation of laboratories, and to 
create a reference laboratory; 3) to promote harmonized rules, disciplinary 
procedures, sanctions and other means of combating doping in sport, and 
contribute to the unification thereof, taking into account the rights of the 
athletes. 
The most significant outcome of these activities has been the World Anti-
Doping Code, which was adopted in 2003 and entered into force on January 1, 
2004 (a revised version of the Code will entered into force on January 1, 2009). 
On March 5, 2003, at the second World Conference on Doping in Sport, over 
1000 delegates representing 80 governments and international and national sports 
institutions unanimously agreed to adopt the Code as the basis for the fight 
against doping in sport (the Copenhagen Declaration). 
The Code works in conjunction with four International Standards aimed at 
encouraging harmonization between anti-doping organizations: the Prohibited 
List, the International Standard for Testing, the International Standard for 
Laboratories, and Therapeutic Use Exemptions (TUEs). These Standards have 
been the subject of lengthy consultation among WADA’s stakeholders and are 
mandatory for all signatories of the Code. 
The Code is the core document that provides the framework for the 
harmonization of anti-doping policies, rules, and regulations within sports 
organizations and among public authorities. For example, for the first time, 
universal criteria were set for considering whether a substance or method may be 
banned from use. Moreover, the Code sets the standard for minimum and 
maximum sanctions (two years for a first serious doping violation; a lifetime ban 
for the second), while providing flexibility for the consideration of circumstances 
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of each individual case (moreover, the revised version of the Code will introduce 
a more flexible mechanism for determining sanctions). In addition, the Code 
provides important procedural guarantees, such the right to a fair hearing granted 
to any person who is asserted to have committed an anti-doping rule violation 
(Code, Art. 8, which establishes requirements such as that of a timely hearing 
before a fair and impartial body).  
More than 570 sports organizations, including all 35 IFs of Olympic sports 
and the IOC itself, have thus accepted the World Anti-Doping Code. In addition, 
States have played an important role in improving the binding force of the Code. 
In October 2005, an international treaty, the International Convention against 
Doping in Sport, was unanimously approved by 191 governments at the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s General 
Conference. In particular, the Convention enables governments to align their 
domestic policy with the Code, thereby harmonizing global sports regulation and 
public legislation in the fight against doping in sport. 
The UNESCO Convention against Doping, until now ratified by 80 States, 
refers explicitly to the WADA and its Code, providing an illustration of one good 
practice of cooperation between public and private authorities within the global 
context. In the fight against doping in sport, standards and rules set by a private 
body have gradually been accepted as binding by States; a process made possible 
mostly as a result of the particular hybrid structure of the WADA.  
 
 
4. Issues: The Role of States within Global Private Regimes 
The structure and the functions of the WADA within international sports 
regimes give rise to several kinds of issues. 
The first concerns the emergence of global private regimes and of global 
private regulators. From this perspective, the World Anti-Doping Code is an 
important example of global norms set by a hybrid public-private body. The 
specific relevance of this case, however, is due to the peculiar hybrid public-
private structure of the WADA. It provides us with a very significant institutional 
model for enabling a private regime to work together with public authorities. 
Moreover, considering the success of the Code, this model seems to work quite 
well. Could it be usefully extended to other fields? And might the WADA hybrid 
public-private organization be a suitable option for making global regulators 
more accountable? 
The second set of issues refers to the contents of the Code and to its binding 
force. The Code establishes procedural requirements and principles, such as the 
right to a fair hearing, thereby harmonizing the activity of more than 500 bodies, 
both public and private. Is this an example of “global” due process? Moreover, 
what is the real binding force of the Code? The UNESCO International 
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Convention against Doping in Sport expressly refers to WADA and its Code: 
does it mean that only the “traditional” treaty law was capable of making the 
Code genuinely binding? 
Lastly, the WADA example is particularly useful in illustrating the 
development of a global administrative space, in which both public and private 
bodies act together in furtherance of a common goal – in this case, the fight 
against doping; but it could equally be applicable to the fields of environmental 
or health regulation, in other circumstances. It seems clear, then, that the WADA 
is an example of genuine global public administration, and its existence provides 
us with real evidence of the development of a global administrative law.  
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
There are other international bodies and regimes that might be compared with 
the WADA and the regulation of international sports more generally. 
Referring to the IOC’s structure, some similarities exist with that of the 
International Federation of the Red Cross, and in particular with the network of 
national bodies governed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, a 
private institution located in Geneva. Other resemblances between these two 
regimes exist with regard to the international protection of their symbols. 
A second comparable example comes from the International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) and, more generally, any kind of global private 
standard-setter (see supra, Ch. 1). The technical rules set by IFs, as well as the 
WADA Code itself, recall the global standards created within such private 
regimes. 
Finally, a third similar case is the governance of internet (see supra, Chs. 2.1, 
5.3, and 5.4). Both the ICANN and the IOC are private bodies; and the Domain 
Names System, with the rule of only one country-code top domain name 
(ccTLD) for each State, bears resemblance to that of the NOCs. Moreover, other 
interesting comparisons can be made with regard to the role played by States and 
public authorities within these regimes: this is the case, for instance, between the 
ICANN’s GAC and the composition of the WADA Board.  
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2.3. Multipolar Conflict: The Chinese Textile Affair 
Antonella Albanesi 
 
 
1. Background  
On January 1, 2005, the textiles and clothing sector was brought under the 
general regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This 
lifted the quotas that, for almost forty years, had limited the exports from many 
developing countries. 
The liberalization of trade in textiles has been gradual. The textiles sector had 
been regulated through bilateral agreements and subjected to special regimes 
since the 1970s.  
Temporary agreements allowed GATT Member States to impose import 
quotas in order to protect their own industries. Within the GATT regime, the 
Short Term Cotton Arrangement (1960-1961) was the first agreement to regulate the 
textiles and clothing sector; the subsequent Long Term Cotton Arrangement (1962-
1973) included some 30 countries. In 1974, the European Community, United 
States, Canada, Austria, Norway and Finland signed the Multifiber Agreement 
(MFA), which imposed quotas for textile imports from some developing 
countries. The MFA was in force until December 31, 1994, and grew to include 
44 countries (including even China). The MFA set up a special regime that was 
ultimately incompatible with the GATT, because it violated the most favoured 
nation principle, discriminated against developing nations and did not guarantee 
transparency.  
Following the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
1995, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was completed. The main 
purpose of the ATC was to remove import quotas by December 31, 2004; it was 
to be implemented in four steps, each one partially removing the quotas. 
During the negotiations for the accession of China to the WTO (signed in 
2001), a specific Textiles-Specific Safeguard Clause (TSSC) was concluded. This 
clause can be found in paragraph 242 of the Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, which is an integral part of the Chinese WTO adhesion 
protocol. This transitional clause allowed Member States, under certain 
circumstances, to introduce specific safeguard measures in the form of 
quantitative restrictions on Chinese textiles exports until December 31, 2008, 
forming an exception to the general incorporation of the textiles sector into the 
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GATT regime on January 1, 2005.  
The TSSC is exceptional for two reasons: firstly, because safeguard measures 
in general, and quantitative restrictions in particular, are usually proscribed in free 
trade areas; and secondly, because the clause has no connection with other 
safeguard provisions or procedures in the WTO regime.  
Community law acknowledges the TSSC through Council Regulation (EC) n. 
138/2003, implementing article 10a of Council Regulation (EC) n. 3030/93. The 
Regulation provides for adhesion to the protocol, and clarifies that the 
Commission, before commencing formal consultations with China to reduce 
trade restrictions, must submit, in accordance with standard committee 
procedures a draft of the proposed measures to the textile committee (itself 
established in Art. 17 of Regulation (EC) n. 3030/93).  
According to the European rules, safeguard clauses can be applied where 
textile products imported into the Community have come from China, and are 
governed by the ATC. The imported textile products must also trigger a market 
disruption that jeopardizes the balance of trade in these products. In evaluating 
whether the balance of trade in textile products has been jeopardized, the 
Commission considers two factors. The first is the speed at which imports 
increase: a slight modification cannot be sufficient to justify the application of the 
safeguard clause. The increase has to be rapid enough and clear enough as to 
modify the trade system. The second factor is the price trend of imports: a 
relevant decrease in the cost of imported goods relative to that charged by other 
suppliers can be considered as a threat to market balance. 
 
On December 13, 2004, a few days before the ATC deadline and the subsequent 
transition to the general GATT regime, the European Union enacted Council 
regulation (EC) n. 2200/2004, setting up an ex-ante surveillance system for 35 
categories of textile products already affected by liberalization. This system 
provided for the institution of an early warning system for monitoring Chinese 
imports: when certain “alert levels” were reached, the Commission, on its own 
initiative, could commence an investigation in order to invoke the TSSC.  
On April 6, 2005, the Commission adopted specific guidelines to inform the 
interested parties of the criteria and procedures to follow in order to invoke the 
TSSC. These “soft” legal norms allow for private participation in the decision to 
adopt safeguard measures. Various forms of private participation are provided 
for in this process, which unfolds in three steps – initiation, preliminary 
investigation and decision. The private party directly affected by a market 
disruption can request the Commission to commence proceedings in the first 
place. Private parties can also make a comment within a specific time limit during 
the preliminary investigation, through an appropriate notice and comment 
procedure. 
On May 27, 2005, the European Commission requested and obtained the 
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opening of consultations with China, arguing that some categories of Chinese 
textile imports jeopardized market balance. The Consultations were completed 
on June 10, 2005: the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce signed a Memorandum of Understanding on exports of 10 categories 
of products. The quantitative limits fixed upon the imports in the Memorandum 
were not, however, sufficient to avoid market disruption for a number of 
different categories. As a result, Chinese imports were detained in European 
Community ports.  
To resolve this problem, the European Commission and the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce began new negotiations and, on September 5, 2005, they 
decided to increase the quotas and introduce more flexibility for the categories of 
textiles and clothing which exceeded the quotas fixed in the memorandum. 
Moreover, Community quantitative limits on Chinese imports were increased by 
1% in January 2007, to allow for the release of the textiles and clothing products 
detained in European ports. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- Agreement between the EU and China on Chinese Textiles, Beijing, 5 
September 2005 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/china_sa
feguards.htm); 
- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the European Commission 
and the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Export of Certain Chinese Textile and Clothing Products to the European 
Union, 12 June 2005 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/mou_te
x_china_en.htm); 
- European Commission, Statement of Reasons and Justification for the Request for 
Formal Consultations with China Concerning a Textiles-specific Safeguard Clause, 9 
June 2005 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/china_sa
feguards.htm); 
- European Commission, Guidelines for the Use of Safeguards on Chinese Textiles 
Exports to the Eu, Brussels, 6 April 2005 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/memo0
60405_en.htm); 
- Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/texti_e/texti_e.htm); 
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- Accession of China to WTO, Textiles-Specific Safeguard Clause (TSSC) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm); 
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1478/2005, of 12 September 2005 
amending Annexes, V, VII and VIII to Council Regulation (EEC) 3030/93 
on Common Rules for Imports of Certain Textile products from Third 
Countries, OJ L 236, of 13 September 2005, pp. 3 et seq. 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:236:000
3:0011:EN:PDF); 
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1084/2005, of 8 July 2005 amending 
Annexes, II, III and V to Council Regulation (EEC) 3030/93 on Common 
Rules for Imports of Certain Textile products from Third Countries, OJ L 
177, 09 July 2005, pp. 19 et seq. 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:177:001
9:0026:EN:PDF);  
- Council Regulation (EEC) No 3030/93, of 12 October 1993 on Common 
Rules for Imports of Certain Textile products from Third Countries, OJ L 
275, 08 November 1993, pp. et seq. 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993R30
30:EN:HTML);  
- Council Regulation (EC) No 54/2007, of 22 January 2007, amending Council 
Regulation (EEC) 3030/93, on Common Rules for Imports of Certain 
Textile products from Third Countries, OJ L 18, 25 January 2007, pp. et seq. 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:018:000
1:0005:EN:PDF).  
 
 
3. Analysis and Issues: Global Limits on National Administrations 
This case sheds light on how global administrative law can bind national 
administrations. The Chinese WTO adhesion protocol gives national authorities 
the power to determine the conditions under which safeguard measures can be 
taken. However, the evaluation of each Member State (or, in this case, of the 
European Union) is limited by both substantive criteria (such as the need for 
market disruption) and procedural ones (such as the duty to consult the Member 
State authority affected by the proposed measures, and the duty, based upon the 
principle of transparency, to provide appropriate reasons for the need to take 
safeguard measures). 
This case highlights some other important issues.  
The first concerns the effects of the TSSC within a system aiming to secure 
progressive trade liberalization. Within the European textiles market, there are 
three different types of interests involved: first, there are countries with a large 
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manufacturing industry (Portugal, France, Italy, Spain) that have a strong interest 
in limiting Chinese imports; second: there are nations with a well-developed 
service industry (Great Britain, Germany, Holland), which would prefer to offer 
favorable terms to Chinese textile importers; and third, there are manufacturers, 
importers and retailers that suffer significant economic losses from restrictions 
on Chinese products. Does the adoption of protective measures allow for the 
well-balanced development of international trade? What are the best means for 
limiting the market disruption triggered by an influx of cheap products from 
Asia? 
The second issue pertains to private participation in the administrative 
procedure. At the global level, the TSSC provides that only interested States can 
participate in the procedure for the adoption of safeguards measures. The 
international agreement does not provide for a right for private actors (such as, 
for example, Chinese textiles producers, European importers, etc.) to participate 
in the decisions of national administrative authorities concerning whether to 
implement safeguard measures. The remedy to this problem, in this context at 
least, comes from national and European law: the European Union, through the 
use of soft law guidelines, has introduced a notice and comment mechanism that 
allows the participation of private parties – and also of third countries, like China 
– whose interests will be affected by a proposed safeguard measure. Therefore, 
the European Commission guidelines allow for parallel consultations between 
private parties and the Chinese government. What if, however, other legal 
systems do not allow private parties a similar opportunity to participate? If the 
EU system has introduced such measures from the “bottom-up”, is there a risk 
of normative asymmetry between different national legal orders? Is there a 
remedy for this asymmetry, perhaps through imposing private participation in a 
“top-down” fashion?  
This leads to a third problem: that of private jurisdictional protection. The 
introduction of a safeguard measure is an administrative act that limits the 
economic freedom of private parties, who may be importers in the country 
applying the restriction, or private Chinese exporters. In the latter case, private 
Chinese exporters are bound by a set of limits decided in a country other than 
their own. While a private party can always bring a claim against domestic 
administrative decisions before national courts, there is no parallel right to do so 
against those of foreign administrative bodies. Is this a sign of the 
incompleteness and immaturity of global administrative law? 
 
 
4. Further Reading 
a. H. BAYLEY, J. BOOZMAN, “An Emerging China and the Transatlantic 
Economy”, Report, Nato Parliamentary Assembly, Formerly North Atlantic 
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Assembly, International Secretariat, 19 October (2005) 
(www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=794); 
b. E. IANCHOVICHINA, W. MARTIN, “Trade Liberalization in China’s Accession 
to the World Trade Organization”, Working Paper, Development Research 
Group, World Bank, June (2001); 
c. H. KYVIK NORDAS, “The Global Textile and Clothing Industry post the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing”, WTO – Discussion Paper, n. 5 (2004) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers5_e.pdf); 
d. S. MACDONALD, T. VOLLRATH, “The Forces Shaping World Cotton 
Consumption after the Multifiber Arrangement, Economic Research 
Services/USDA”, 15 April (2005) 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/cws/apr05/cws05c01). 
 
 
 
 
2.4. Shared Powers: Global and National Proceedings under the 
International Patent Cooperation Treaty 
Manuela Veronelli 
 
 
1. Background 
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is a multilateral treaty, the implementation 
of which is overseen by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
This Treaty establishes the rules that enterprises must follow when filing for 
international patents, in a procedure that is, at least partially, carried out at 
international level. The PCT was signed in Washington in 1970, and amended 
many times during the 1980s and 1990s. It did not enter into force until 1984. 
The PCT and its implementing regulations outline in detail the procedure for 
issuing international patents. Other implementing rules are found in the 
administrative instructions issued by the Director General of WIPO (Art. 58, § 4 
of the PCT and Art. 89 of the implementing regulations) and in the annual 
WIPO guidelines for filing applications under the PCT. The Treaty also provides 
that the International Bureau and national or regional administrations should 
enter into agreements to define the “minimum common rules” for the 
implementation of each procedure (Articles 16.b, 16.c, 17.1, 34.1).  
The international rules set up a networked, polycentric organizational 
structure, involving an International Bureau based in Geneva (Art. 55) – which 
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receives the applications filed by residents of PCT countries – and the patent 
offices of the PCT Member States. However, residents of PCT countries that are 
also parties to regional agreements – such as the European Patent Convention – 
may also file an international application with the patent offices established by 
these regional agreements (e.g. the European Patents Office in Italy).  
The PCT procedure also involves other international bodies: the Assembly 
(Art. 53 of the PCT), made up of representatives of the contracting States, which 
is charged with approving (or otherwise) the agreements executed between the 
International Bureau and national administrations concerning the implementation 
of individual procedures; an Executive Committee (Art. 54) that works together 
with the Assembly; and a Committee for Technical Cooperation (Art. 56 of the 
PCT). Finally, the PCT Treaty provides that all controversies relating to the 
enforcement of the implementing regulations and the Treaty itself, if not settled 
by means of international negotiations, may be submitted to the International 
Court of Justice by any of the States concerned (Art. 59 of the PCT). 
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- Patent Cooperation Treaty 
 (http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf); 
- Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty  
(http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct_regs.pdf); 
- Administrative Instructions under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/ai_6.pdf); 
- PCT Applicant’s Guide - Introduction to the International Phase 
(http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol1/pdf/gdvol1.pdf); 
- PCT Applicant’s Guide - Introduction to the National Phase 
(http://www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/gdvol2/pdf/gdvol2.pdf); 
- Filing of Demand for International Preliminary Examination 
(http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct_mia_vi/pct_mia_vi_5.pdf) 
- New International Preliminary Examination Procedures at the European 
Patent Office 
(http://www.epo.org/); 
- Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office 
(http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/guidelines.html); 
- WIPO – Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, First 
Session, Geneva, November 12 to 16, 2001, “Improved Coordination of 
International Search and International Preliminary Examination and the Time 
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Limit for Entering the National Phase” 
(http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/pct/en/pct_r_wg_1/pct_r_wg_1_2.doc). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The PCT procedure is a composite or mixed administrative procedure that takes 
place partly at the international level and partly at the national level. A company 
wishing to file a patent application may commence the PCT procedure either 
directly with the International Bureau or, as is more often the case, with a 
national office acting as part of the global patent regime (in which case, if there 
are competing applications, that which was filed first with a national office in a 
State Party to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property is 
entitled to claim priority). The procedure concludes in the “designated States” set 
forth in the original application, i.e. in those States in which the company has 
originally requested that the patent be registered.  
The International Bureau and the national or regional offices cooperate in a 
close relationship: in fact, according to the Treaty and the implementing 
regulations, national offices are required to “assist” the International Bureau and 
the other administrative authorities involved at the international level (the 
International Searching Authorities and the International Preliminary Examining 
Authorities) in carrying out their tasks under the Treaty (Art. 55 of the PCT). The 
administrative bodies in charge of the procedure at the international level are 
required to forward all documentary materials (including any statements 
submitted by applicants during the international search or the preliminary 
examination) to the designated national patent offices (Art. 20.1 and 20.2 of the 
PCT and Rules 41, 44 and 47 of the implementing regulations). In other words, 
the international phase of the procedure deals with the examination of the claims; 
the national phase takes the actual decision on whether to award a patent.  
The international phase of the procedure is divided into two stages. The first 
stage is mandatory, and consists of an international search aimed at discovering 
the “relevant prior art” with respect to the invention that is the subject of the 
application (Art. 15 of the PCT and Rules 33 and 34 of the implementing 
regulations). The second stage is optional, and is commenced only upon request 
of the applicant. It consists of a detailed examination by the competent authority 
to determine whether the invention is novel, involves an “inventive step” and is 
industrially applicable, having regard to the existing prior art (Art. 33 of the PCT 
and Rules 64 and 65 of the implementing regulations). 
During both stages of the international procedure, applicants may make 
verbal and written statements and comments before a deadline indicated by the 
administrative authorities (appropriate to each circumstance), that in any case 
shall not be less than one month (Rule 66 of the implementing regulations). This 
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exchange with applicant can become more intense if the administrative authority 
in charge of preparing the search report or performing the international 
preliminary examination raises certain doubts (resulting in a written opinion) 
regarding the application for patent registration (Rules 19, 34(d) and 66(2)(d) of 
the implementing regulations). In these circumstances, applicant companies can 
be required to pay an additional fee in order to submit comments or amendments 
(Arts. 17(3) and 34(d) of the PCT and Rules 40 and 68 of the implementing 
regulations) to the competent office. The fee in question is reimbursed only if the 
applicant’s reply proves to be supported by adequate documentary evidence.  
When the international phase of the procedure has concluded, with the 
issuing of an opinion by the International Bureau, applicant companies must 
commence the national phase within 30 months from the priority date of the 
international application.  
 
 
4. Issues: Multilevel Governance and its Effects 
As the preliminary examination takes place at the global level, the PCT procedure 
gives rise to certain issues concerning the right to defense (or participation) and 
the justiciability of the relevant claims.  
How is the company’s right to participate in the global examination stage 
conceived? Which entities should be contacted? Only those directly concerned? 
Should there be a more inclusive stage in which the representatives of collective 
or diffuse societal interests may intervene as well? What is the scope of the 
consultation obligation and how does it affect administrative actions? Might the 
requirement of payment of a fee in order to file a comment discourage 
companies from participating and thus impair their participation rights?  
What is the underlying principle of the consultation obligation incumbent 
upon administrative authorities in general? What purpose do participation rights 
serve in an international context? Does global participation take on a different 
and new “value” compared to the traditional, domestic paradigm?  
Last but not least, how can the question of a right to appeal be resolved? If a 
comment is disregarded by one of the relevant administrative authorities, the 
applicant company cannot appeal to any international tribunal. Only signatory 
States may appeal to the International Court of Justice, if they cannot settle a 
controversy by means of international negotiations. However, it should be kept 
in mind that final decisions are taken at the national level. Is it possible, 
therefore, for a national court to evaluate the legitimacy of the final decision 
(itself often based upon the opinions of the international authorities) in the light 
of international regulations? 
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2.5. Mutual Recognition: The Free Movement of Professionals  
Benedetto Cimino 
 
 
1. Background  
The free movement of professionals can be strongly affected by the existence of 
differing national standards relating to the level of education, experience or 
certification legally required in order to provide certain services. 
These national rules constitute regulatory barriers that are not formally 
discriminatory: as such, they cannot be addressed through recourse to the classic 
liberalization techniques (such as the national treatment requirement or the 
abolition of market access restrictions). There are, however, two feasible 
approaches for tackling the de facto protectionist effects of different standards: the 
harmonization of the relevant regulations, or mutual recognition. Harmonization 
is very difficult to achieve in practice: there is strong opposition in every State to 
modifying the educational system and the regime of professional qualifications. 
Until now, the mutual recognition approach has achieved better results, 
sometimes in combination with a basic coordination of substantive requirements. 
For a better understanding of these mechanisms, it is useful to compare two 
supranational legal systems: the EC and the WTO. 
The EC law on professionals has undergone a continuous evolution since the 
1970s. The initial tendency was to adopt sectoral directives for different regulated 
professions, in which the recognition of qualifications and diplomas depended on 
the prior, basic harmonization of the national educational systems. However, 
difficulties emerged due to the complex requirements of harmonization, the 
problem of reaching consensus between governments and the number of 
regulations necessary. Consequently, the EC institutions adopted a new 
approach, based on a general framework for mutual recognition. This area is now 
governed by Directive n. 2005/36/EC, which consolidates, modernizes and 
simplifies fifteen directives approved between 1977 and 1999. This new 
instrument aims to create a more uniform, transparent and flexible legal regime. 
It also introduces a number of important innovations in terms of procedural and 
organizational simplification. 
The global WTO regime followed a very different approach. The free 
movement of services, and professional services in particular, was long neglected 
in multilateral negotiations until 1994, when its increasing relevance to trade 
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made it an issue in the Uruguay round. States retain more autonomy in this than 
in other areas of WTO law, making the relevant regulation less uniform. 
The main provisions for mutual recognition are set forth in Articles VII and 
VI.6 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Member States can 
conclude agreements for the mutual recognition of “education or experience 
obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certificates granted”. These 
agreements can, in theory at least, produce “external” discriminatory effects in 
prima facie violation of GATS Article II (the Most Favoured Nation clause); they 
are, however, considered lawful and indeed encouraged, provided that they are 
open to the accession of other parties.  
Article VI.6 requires Member States to adopt “adequate procedures” for 
verifying the competence of professionals from any other member, in order to 
assess the equivalence of the relevant foreign and national standards. This norm 
performs two functions. First of all, by leaving recognition under national 
control, it protects higher health and quality standards and acts against any 
national “race to the bottom”. Secondly, by introducing supranational control 
over the reasonableness of national decisions in this context, it protects 
economic operators from unjustified discrimination. 
 
 
2. Materials  
- European Court of Justice, Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos, C-
330/03, Judgment of 19 January 2006, Rec. 2006, p. I-801; 
- European Parliament and Council, Directive No. 2005/36/EC of the 7 
September 2005,Recognition of Professional Qualifications, as amended by Council, 
Directive No. 2006/100/EC of 20 November 2006 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/consleg/2005/L/02005L0036-
20070101-en.pdf); 
- Commission of the European Communities, Report to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the State of Application of the General System for the Recognition of 
Higher Education Diplomas Made in Accordance with Article 13 of Directive 
89/48/EEC, COM (1996) 46, 15 February 1996 
(http://aei.pitt.edu/3995/01/000088_1.pdf); 
- Guidelines for Mutual Recognition Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy 
Sector, S/L/38 (28 May 1997) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres97_e/pr73_e.htm); 
- Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/L/64 (17 Dec. 1998) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/accountancy_e/accountancy
_e.htm); 
- Disciplines on Domestic Regulation pursuant to GATS Article VI:4. Informal Note 
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by the Chairman, Room Document, 18 April 2007 
(http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=98264). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The EC mutual recognition regime for professionals is illustrated well by the case 
of Colegio de Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos, decided by the European Court 
of Justice in 2006. Mr. Imo, an Italian hydraulic engineer, sought to practice his 
profession in Spain; however, his particular specialization was not a recognized 
field there. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Economic Development held Imo’s 
diploma to be equivalent to that of a Spanish civil engineer. The national 
association of Spanish engineers appealed this decision. The Tribunal Supremo, 
noting the substantial differences between the Italian and the Spanish 
specializations, made a preliminary reference to the European Court of Justice.  
According to the ECJ, the mutual recognition of titles and diplomas under 
EC law is founded on “mutual trust” between Member States. Education and 
training need not be strictly similar. Such mutual recognition is triggered every 
time a diploma bestows the right to take up a regulated profession.  
Differences in the organization or content of education and training are not 
sufficient to justify a refusal to recognize a professional qualification. At most, 
where those differences are substantial, they may justify the host Member State in 
requiring that the applicant satisfy one or more compensatory measures, as set 
forth in the directives (e.g. further examinations or experience).  
These measures, however, are lawful only when they are applied in a non-
discriminatory way, justified by overriding reasons that are based on the general 
interest, that are suitable and necessary for securing the attainment of their 
objective, and that are not unduly restrictive.  
In the case of Mr. Imo, any such compensatory measures would have been 
heavily burdensome, which meant that alternative solutions had to be found. The 
Spanish authorities were ordered to consider partial recognition of his 
qualifications and allow the provision of engineering services at least in the field 
of hydraulics, even though Spanish law did not provide for such an alterative.  
In the WTO context, case law is still lacking in this area. Recognition of 
professional qualifications, however, is under the careful attention of the Council 
for Trade in Services (CTS) and its main subsidiary body: the Working Party on 
Domestic Regulation (WPDR) (known, until 1999, as the Working Party on 
Professional Services (WPPS)). 
To take the example of the accountancy sector, it is clear the efforts of the 
WPDR have been oriented in two directions: the preparation of a set of 
Guidelines for future bilateral or multilateral negotiations on mutual recognition 
COMPLEX GOVERNANCE FORMS: HYBRID, MULTI-LEVEL, INFORMAL 57 
agreements; and the approval of binding disciplines to regulate national 
procedures for unilateral recognition.  
Regarding the first issue, the Guidelines suggest the adoption of a standard 
format for such agreements, in order to strengthen the effectiveness and the 
predictability of the parties’ obligations; moreover, they include 
recommendations for the conduct of successful negotiations, and to respect 
duties of cooperation towards the other States.  
In terms of the binding disciplines, to date specific regulations have only 
been approved for the accountancy sector. In this field, the so-called 
Accountancy Disciplines require Members States to take qualifications acquired 
in another State into account, on the basis of equivalency of education, 
experience and/or examination requirements. Moreover, they provide for 
procedural protections for the interested parties: for example, establishing time 
limits for the evaluation procedure, or, in the case of a refusal of recognition, 
imposing a duty to identify which additional qualifications, if any, should be 
attained. Currently, further negotiations are underway to strengthen these 
disciplines and to extend them to all sectors. According to current proposals, 
national agencies would be asked to make predictable decisions on objective 
grounds; allow service providers to fulfill additional requirements in their home 
country or in a third country; and give positive consideration to professional 
experience and membership in professional associations as a substitute for or 
complement to academic qualifications. 
 
 
4. Issues: Multiple Regimes and Extraterritorial Application of National Administrative 
Decisions 
The above considerations illustrate nicely the peculiarity of this area. First of all, 
at the supranational level, there is no one law on mutual recognition, but rather 
several overlapping regimes. Recognition may be pursuant to, or entirely distinct 
from, previous harmonization agreements. It may be based on bilateral 
agreements or national decisions reviewed by supranational authorities. It may 
operate in a highly institutionalized framework, including administrative and 
judicial review; it may also be based on a traditional international treaty, in a weak 
regulatory regime, lacking effective means of enforcement. It may be automatic 
or subject to complex substantive conditions and costly administrative 
procedures. It may operate at the inter-state level or be based on more informal 
agreements between private organizations, professional associations and sub-
national bodies. What are the effects of this complex overlapping of norms? 
Should we expect to see the emergence of antinomies, unjustifiable 
discrimination, and uncertainty and trade distortions? How do the national, 
regional and global regimes interact with each other?  
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What institutional, social and economic conditions are necessary to create a 
mutual recognition regime? The effective functioning of recognition is based on 
mutual trust between administrative authorities, economic operators and 
consumers, rather than on substantive legal homogeneity. What technical 
solutions should be adopted to facilitate the creation of a cooperative context 
and to minimize controversy and unpredictability? Would it be useful to increase 
administrative cooperation, the circulation of best practices and crosschecks? 
A third interesting issue is that the regulation proceeds by trial and error. This 
seems evident in the three generations of directives on professional titles in the 
European context, as well as in WTO efforts to provide more methods of 
recognition, testing solutions in certain sectors before generalizing the disciplines. 
Given this modus procedendi, analysis of the negotiating history and subsequent 
amendments of recognition agreements is a useful tool for understanding both 
the limits of the existing regulation, and the probable future developments. What 
area should negotiators focus on? Is there evidence of an increasing interest in 
procedural and organizational reform? If so, what is driving this?  
The last issue is perhaps the most important. Mutual recognition and the 
principle of equivalence directly imply, in effect, the extraterritorial application of 
national administrative decisions. The sanitary system approved by the German 
Bundestag, the law course as defined by the Senato Accademico of the University of 
Rome, or the professional license granted by Colegio de ingenieros in Spain – all 
automatically affect the legal systems of other European States and, under certain 
conditions, other members of the GATS. How do these affect the national right 
to regulate? What checks and balances are necessary? What tools are available to 
ensure responsibility, control and accountability?  
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. J.E. DE COCKBORNE, Professional Services in the European Union, in OECD, 
Liberalisation of Trade in Professional Services, Paris (1995); 
b. J. DIVIS, “The International Labor Market: Professional Recognition of 
Qualification”, Centre for International Recognition and Certification 
(CIRC), The Netherlands Enic/Naric in The Hague, November 2004 
(http://www.aic.lv/rigaseminar/documents/Haaksman.pdf); 
c. S. ENEMARK, “Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications, FIG Task 
Force on Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications February” (2002) 
(http://www.fig.net/admin/ga/2002/mutual_rep.pdf); 
d. V. HATZOPOULOS, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de reconnaissance 
mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services, Athènes – Bruxelles (1999); 
e. K. NICOLAIDIS, “Globalization with Human Faces: Managed Mutual 
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Recognition and the Free Movement of Professionals”, in F. KOSTORIS 
PADOA SCHIOPPA (ed.), The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European 
Integration Process, Basingstoke (2004); 
f. K. NICOLAIDIS, G. SCHAFFER, “Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: 
Governance without Global Government”, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 
263 (2005) 
(http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/10120509_NicolaidisShaffer.pdf); 
g. K. NICOLAIDIS, J. TRACHTMAN, “Liberalization, Regulation and Recognition 
for Services Trade”, in S.M. STEPHENSON (ed.), Services Trade in the Western 
Hemisphere: Liberalization, Integration and Reform, Washington DC (2000); 
h. K. NICOLAIDIS, J. TRACHTMAN, “From Policed Regulation to Managed 
Recognition in GATS, in P. Sauvé and R. Stern”, (eds.), GATS 2000: New 
Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, Washington, DC (2000); 
i. J. NIELSON, “Trade Agreements and Recognition”, in OECD, Quality and 
Recognition in Higher Education (2004) 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/7/33729996.pdf); 
j. H. SCHNEIDER, “The Recognition of Diplomas in the European 
Community” 
(http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/eurecom/PDF/Paperschneider.PDF). 
 
 
 
 
2.6. Decision-Making Procedures in Fisheries Governance: The Role of the 
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM)  
Nicola Ferri 
 
 
1. Background  
The realization that fish stocks had been overexploited led States to create 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations or Arrangements (RFMOs) in 
order to govern international fisheries and to fill regulatory gaps in the global 
regime. RFMOs can be viewed as fora for cooperation among States. There are 
17 RFMOs in existence at present, each one responsible for establishing 
management measures within its jurisdiction. Conflicts between different 
RFMOs with overlapping competences tend not to occur: when common issues 
are at stake, the RFMOs involved normally look to adopt co-management 
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strategies. 
The majority of RFMOs were set up as a series of post-1945 fisheries 
conventions negotiated between two or more States to curtail the exploitation of 
particular species, usually within a given geographic area. States approached the 
process of fisheries management in an evolutionary manner: first, initiatives for 
international cooperative research in marine fisheries were launched (the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, for example, was created as 
far back as 1902, with a mandate to promote research on marine living 
resources). Subsequently, the first rudimentary management systems, dealing with 
issues such as mesh size limits (e.g. the 1937 Convention for the Regulation of 
the Meshes of Fishing Nets and Size of Fish for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries) and closed seasons (e.g. the 1950 International Convention for 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, precursor to the existing RFMO Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization, set up in 1978) were adopted.  
The negotiation of key international fisheries instruments has improved 
fisheries management, significantly impacting upon the role of the RFMOs: the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provided 
guidelines for managing living marine resources and established the exclusive 
economic zone within which coastal States have certain exclusive rights, 
including fishing. When the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
(UNFSA) emerged to better define high-seas fisheries management, RFMOs 
were involved in the design. Since the adoption of these Conventions (and other 
international agreements, such as the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the 
1995 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries and its subsequent International Plans of Action), some 
RFMOs have been partly retrofitted to accommodate the new rules, while still 
maintaining their original mission and independence. As evidence of this, the 
UNFSA mandates that any fishing nation can join an RFMO at any time. More 
specific requirements are, however, necessary to join some RFMOs.  
 
 
2. Materials and Main Sources 
- Food and Agriculture Organization portal to RFMOs 
(http://www.fao.org/fi/website/FIRetrieveAction.do?dom=topic&fid=294
0); 
- 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overvi
ew_convention.htm); 
- 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overvi
ew_fish_stocks.htm); 
COMPLEX GOVERNANCE FORMS: HYBRID, MULTI-LEVEL, INFORMAL 61 
- GFCM portal 
(www.gfcm.org). 
  
 
3. Analysis 
In the case of the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), 
the rules on membership are as follows: participation in the GFCM is open to 
members and associate members of the FAO and, subject to approval by two-
thirds of existing members, any non-members that are members of the United 
Nations, any of its Specialized Agencies or the International Atomic Energy, that 
are (i) coastal States or associate members situated wholly or partly within the 
region; (ii) States or associate members whose vessels engage in fishing the region 
for stocks covered by the agreement; or (iii) regional economic integration 
organizations of which any State that would qualify for membership as above is a 
member, and to which that State has transferred competence over matters within 
the purview of the GFCM (e.g. the European Union). 
The GFCM was established by an international agreement in 1949, pursuant 
to article XIV of the FAO Constitution (and subsequently amended in 1963, 
1976 and 1997), to promote the development, conservation, rational 
management and best use of living marine resources, as well as the sustainable 
development of aquaculture in the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and connected 
waters. Like other RFMOs, the GFCM performs a number of functions, and has 
the power to adopt management measures to fulfill its responsibilities. 
Management measures are agreed upon in accordance with the decision-making 
procedure of the RMFO in question (by consensus, or by simple or qualified 
majority). The most important feature of these measures is their binding nature, 
as they are mandatory for members that have not exercised the right to object, 
normally provided for in the regulations of the RFMO (the opt-out procedure). 
RFMOs are usually competent to (i) collect and distribute fishery statistics; (ii) 
provide evaluations of the state of fish stocks; (iii) determine the total allowable 
catch (TAC) quotas for members; (iv) set limits on the number of vessels allowed 
to exploit fisheries; (v) allocate fishing opportunities to members (using such 
measures as area and seasonal closures, by-catch limits, and limitations on fleet 
capacity and fishing gear); (vi) regulate the types of gear used; and (vii) ensure 
compliance with the management measures it adopts.  
GFCM management measures generally aim at encouraging members to take 
action on specific objectives, based on the precautionary approach and taking 
into account the best scientific evidence available. According to Article III of the 
GFCM Agreement, management measures can be formulated and recommended 
for the conservation and rational management of living marine resources; the 
regulation of fishing methods and fishing gear; the prescription of the minimum 
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size for individuals of specified species; the establishment of open and closed 
fishing seasons and areas; and the regulation of the amount of total catch, fishing 
effort and their allocation among members. These measures must be adopted by 
a two-thirds majority of the members of the GFCM (present and voting). They 
are thereafter communicated by the GFCM to each member. Members, for their 
part, undertake to give effect to them from the date determined by the GFCM, 
which shall not be before the period for objection has elapsed (any member may 
object within 120 days from the date of notification of the adoption of a 
measure, and will then not be obliged to give effect to that measure). If an 
objection is lodged within the 120-day period, any other member may similarly 
object at any time within a further period of 60 days. A member may also 
withdraw its objection at any time and give effect to the measure. If objections 
are made by more than one-third of the members, the other members are not to 
give effect to that measure. Once adopted, however, they become obligatory for 
the members. An example is provided by that establishing a GFCM record of 
vessels over 15 meters authorized to operate in the GFCM area. All vessels larger 
than 15 meters not entered into the record were not authorized to fish, and 
members were supposed to take all necessary actions to ensure the compliance of 
their recorded vessels with this rule. In order to achieve this, it was specifically 
provided that all members “shall take measures, under their applicable 
legislations, to prohibit the fishing of, the retaining on board, the transshipment 
and landing of species in the GFCM area by the vessels larger than 15 meters in 
length overall which are not entered into the GFCM record.” This rider is typical 
of RFMO management measures, in that they are addressed to members but it is 
usually the fishing fleets themselves that must comply with them. For compliance 
purposes, RFMOs therefore need members to follow-up with management 
measures of their own at the national level 
In managing the living marine resources of their area, RFMOs have also the 
duty to cooperate with other organizations in matters of mutual interest. As an 
example of this, the GFCM has recently stressed the need for close collaboration 
with another RFMO, the 1966 Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (ICCAT), which is charged with maintaining the population of tuna and 
tuna-like species found in the Atlantic at levels permitting the maximum 
sustainable catch for food. ICCAT adopts measures that are then to be 
implemented by its members. For the better management of bluefin tuna stocks 
in the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the GFCM asked its members to 
implement an ICCAT measure concerning the establishment of a multi-annual 
recovery plan for bluefin tuna in January 2007. Some GFCM members expressed 
concern over this request, as they are members of the GFCM but not of ICCAT. 
Such a procedure, which is not novel within the context of the GFCM, can create 
binding effects on members even though the measure in question was actually 
adopted in another forum. 
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4. Issues: The Enforcement of Regional Decisions within the Global Administrative Space 
An underlying problem for high seas fisheries management is that States that are 
not signatories or members of the RFMOs are not subject to their measures. 
Article 8(3) of UNFSA requires States to become members of RFMOs in order 
to give effect to the general duty of cooperation. Alternatively, States can agree to 
apply management measures of RFMOs without joining them. Participation in 
RFMOs thus imposes a number of obligations on the fishing fleets of member 
States. Furthermore, owners and captains of fishing vessels must comply with 
management measures, and the national provisions enacted to implement them, 
or they will incur sanctions, such as fines or the seizure of vessels.  
Incentives have to be created by RFMOs for States fishing within the remit 
of their mandates to encourage them to become members. When States decide to 
fish outside the management measures of the RFMOs, the persistent problem of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing arises. IUU fishing can be 
described as any fishing that takes place within the jurisdiction of an RFMO in 
breach of its management measures. Such practices seriously undermine the 
regulatory powers of RFMOs. To prevent this, membership rights have been 
revised by RFMOs in order to include distant-water fishing States (Japan became 
a GFCM member in 1997). In addition, framework provisions on cooperation 
with non-members have been adopted to allow access to resources to States that 
agree to comply with the RFMOs’ management measures. For instance, the 
GFCM may confer the status of “cooperating non-contracting party” on non-
members known to be fishing in the GFCM area. Applicants for this status are 
required to provide information to the GFCM (data on historical fisheries in the 
GFCM area, and on current fishing presence), to confirm their commitment to 
respect the GFCM management measures and to report to the GFCM on how 
they are ensuring the compliance of their fleet with those measures.  
Generally speaking, the cooperating status, once conferred, involves the 
application of positive measures to cooperating non-contracting parties, such as 
participation in the fisheries (allowing access to a “cooperation quota”) and in 
RFMOs meetings as observers. Benefits to cooperating non-contracting parties 
from participation are usually commensurate with their commitment to comply 
with management measures. Will the persistent incidence of IUU fishing severely 
undermine the management measures adopted by RMFOs? To avoid this, will 
States apply for this new status, thus ensuring compliance with the regime in 
question? Or will States prefer to fish outside the scope of RFMOs, and forfeit 
the benefits of cooperation? 
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5. Further Reading 
a. B. APPLEBAUM, A. DONOHUE, “The Role of Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations”, in E. HEY (ed.), Developments in International Fisheries Law, The 
Netherlands (1999); 
b. R. BARSTON, “The law of the sea and Regional Fisheries Organizations”, 14 
The international Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 333 (1999); 
c. H. COLE, “Contemporary challenges: globalisation, global interconnectedness 
and that ‘there are not plenty more fish in the sea’. Fisheries, governance and 
globalisation: is there a relationship?”, 43 Ocean & coastal management, 77 
(2003); 
d. L. JUDA, “Rio Plus Ten: The Evolution of International Marine Fisheries 
Governance”, 33 Ocean & coastal management, 109 (2002); 
e. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
(http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm); 
f. M. LODGE, “Managing International Fisheries: Improving Fisheries 
Governance by Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations”, Chatman House briefing paper (2007) 
(http://www.illegal-fishing.info/item_single.php?item=document&item_id= 
181&approach_id=16); 
g. Report of the Joint Meeting of Tuna RFMOs (Kobe, Japan, January 2007) 
(http://www.tuna-org.org/Documents/other/Kobe%20Report%20English-
Appendices.pdf); 
h. J. SWAN, “Decision-making in Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements: the 
evolving role of Regional Fishery bodies and international agreement on 
decision-making processes”, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 995, FAO, Rome 
(2004); 
i. United Nations Atlas of Oceans 
(http://www.oceansatlas.org). 
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2.7. An Unaccountable Transgovernmental Branch: The Basel Committee  
Mario Savino 
 
 
1. Background: “Vertical” and “Horizontal” Transgovernmental Networks  
The global legal order rests upon a dense cluster of transgovernmental bodies, 
composed of fragments of national administrative systems. From a structural 
viewpoint, those bodies can be divided into two broad categories.  
The first is composed of “horizontal” transgovernmental bodies, which have 
three main features. To begin with, these committees are autonomous or 
“headless”, as they are not incorporated into an international organization (IO). 
In addition, they are not regulated by treaties, but rather by informal agreements 
between independent or quasi-independent national agencies. They do not make 
formal decisions, binding upon States. Finally, they exist for different reasons – 
for example, to coordinate or facilitate information-sharing among national 
regulators, to draft guidelines and spread best practices, or to set (legally non-
binding) international standards. The most well-known examples of such bodies 
are the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the G-10 committees, 
such as the Committee on the Global Financial System, the Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems, and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (hereafter, Basel Committee; see supra Ch. 1.5).  
The other category comprises “vertical” transgovernmental bodies. These 
are, by contrast, auxiliary or secondary bodies operating within IOs to set 
harmonization or standardization rules or to monitor the correct implementation 
of decisions. These bodies are typically composed not only of national (middle or 
high-level) officials but also of supranational officials, i.e. civil servants working 
within international secretariats. As a consequence, these fora open up national 
systems not only “laterally”, to promote dialogue between domestic 
administrations, but also “vertically”, to foster cooperation among supranational 
and national bodies. This group of “mixed” or “vertical” transgovernmental 
networks includes most of the EU committees (comitology or executive 
committees, Council or legislative committees, and expert governmental 
committees, assisting the Commission), and most IO auxiliary bodies (to name 
but a few, WTO secondary bodies administering multilateral or plurilateral 
agreements; the UN “functional committees”, exercising consultative functions; 
and the so-called Codex Committees, assisting the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission in the drafting of food-safety standards). 
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2. Materials  
Global consultation on the proposed “Basel II” standard: 
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Basel II: International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework 
(June 26, 2004) 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm); 
- BCBS, A New Capital Adequacy Framework - Consultative Paper (June 3, 1999) 
(http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.pdf);  
- BCBS, Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord - Second Consultative Paper (January 
2001) 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp2.htm); 
- BCBS, Basel II: The New Basel Capital Accord - Third Consultative Paper (April 
2003) 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/bcbscp3.htm); 
- BCBS, The New Basel Capital Accord: Comments received on the Second Consultative 
Package 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cacomments.htm); 
- BCBS, The New Basel Capital Accord: Comments received on the Third Consultative 
Package 
(http://www.bis.org/bcbs/cp3comments.htm). 
 
 
Domestic consultation on the proposed “Basel II” standard: 
 
1) In the United States 
- Federal Reserve Announcement, Agencies to accept comments on Basel proposal to 
amend capital adequacy framework (January 16, 2001) 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/2001/20010116/); 
- Federal Reserve Announcement, Request for public comment on implementation of 
the New Basel Capital Accord in the United States, and on related draft supervisory 
guidance (July 11, 2003) 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/bcreg/2003/20030711/); 
- Proposed framework for risk-based capital guidelines; implementation of new Basel capital 
accord, 68 Federal Register 149 (August 4, 2003) 
(http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/14mar20010800/edocket.access.
gpo.gov/2003/03-18977.htm); 
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- U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services, The New Basel 
Accord: In Search of a Unified U.S. Position (June 19, 2003) 
(http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/16jan20041230/www.access.gpo
.gov/congress/house/pdf/108hrg/91770.pdf). 
 
2) In the European Union 
- European Commission, Working Document of the Commission Services on Capital 
Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, Cover Document 
(November 18, 2002) 
(http://www.tbb.org.tr/turkce/abf/15/BIS%202.pdf); 
- European Commission, Review of Capital Requirements for Banks and Investment 
Firms – Commission Services Third Consultation Paper, Explanatory Document 
(July 1st, 2003), and related consultative documents 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/cp3/200307-
workingdoc/explanatory-doc_en.pdf) 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/cp3/2003-
consultpaper3_en.htm); 
- Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit 
institutions 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_177/l_1772006063
0en00010200.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis of the Basel Process  
The Basel Committee is a “horizontal” transgovernmental body that was 
established in 1974. Assisted by the Secretariat of the Bank for International 
Settlements, this Committee carries out an important function in the 
internationalization of banking standards. The standards it develops are not 
legally binding. However, important IOs – such as the World Bank and the IMF 
– require the implementation of those standards as a precondition for accessing 
the benefits of their respective regimes. This policy conditionality helps explain 
why the Basel standards are implemented to a greater or lesser degree by more 
than 100 States. Despite the worldwide impact of its decisions, the Basel 
Committee has a very restricted make-up: its members are the heads of the 
central banks and banking regulatory agencies of only twelve countries 
(Luxembourg, plus the eleven members of the G-10 – Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United States).  
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The tension between the restricted composition of the body and the global 
influence of its standards emerged after the conclusion of the 1988 Basel Accord, 
known as “Basel I”. The standards thereby established were implemented not 
only by the Committee members, but also by many other States. However, these 
standards have attracted criticism for two related reasons. Firstly, the final 
agreement largely reflected the wishes and needs of the US regulator. Secondly, it 
produced very different compliance costs in the various national banking sectors: 
according to some accounts, Japanese banks were forced to withdraw so much 
money from circulation that the Japanese recession of the nineties was triggered.  
To address these criticisms, the Basel Committee launched a revision of the 
1988 Accord, and adopted an informal decision-making procedure aiming at 
increasing transparency and strengthening the participation of regulators and 
regulated parties. On June 3, 1999, the Committee published a consultative paper 
on “A New Capital Adequacy Framework”. This was accompanied by a call for 
comments. In this first stage of the procedure, the Committee received 250 
comments. Before the final approval (June 2004), the new agreement, known as 
“Basel II”, was subjected to two more notice and comment exercises. The 
second draft standard received 148 comments, the third 200. Most of the 
commentators were banks, self-regulation organizations and national regulators. 
This “global” consultation was mirrored by similar national consultations. In 
the US, the regulatory agencies of the banking sector invited all interested parties 
to comment on both the draft agreement before its final discussion in Basel and 
on the subsequent national implementing measures. The US Congress was also 
involved in the internal process for the definition of the national position to 
defend in Basel. 
An analogous procedure was followed in the European Union. The 
Commission, which sits on the Basel Committee as an observer, adopted notice 
and comment procedures on the developing regulation. In so doing, it pursued 
the twofold goal of promoting dialogue between the regulators in Member States 
and financial actors, and helping to determine the implementing measures 
necessary for complying with the international standards. Moreover, the full 
scrutiny of both the Council and the European Parliament was guaranteed by the 
incorporation of the Basel II Accord into EU law through a legislative act 
(Directive 2006/48/EC), instead of a secondary regulatory measure (as in the 
US).  
 
 
4. Issues: Notice-and-Comment as a Global Model? 
A vast array of international rules and standards are defined by 
transgovernmental networks, both horizontal and vertical in nature (the main 
institutions of IOs, usually entrusted with formal decision-making power, often 
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merely rubber-stamp the agreements reached at committee level). 
Transgovernmental fora exercise a de facto decision-making power beyond the 
reach of the accountability mechanisms traditionally associated with domestic or 
international law. Firstly, the decision-makers are not representative members of 
national governments or plenipotentiary diplomats; they are, rather, bureaucrats, 
operating largely outside the traditional avenues of political responsibility. 
Secondly, the resulting international rules and standards, even when they are 
legally non-binding, are de facto implemented by national regulators and, given their 
frequently informal nature, often circumvent the need for parliamentary 
ratification. Thirdly, many global transgovernmental “colleges” are less than 
plenary in nature: the need for decision-making efficiency implies that 
committees should be composed of a limited number of participants; however, 
this weakens the consensus-based legitimacy of the decision (consensus requires 
a plenary composition, i.e., the involvement in the negotiation of all those 
national regulators that must later implement the result of the administrative 
process). Herein lie the accountability gaps endemic to most transgovernmental 
decision-making processes. How ought these problems to be addressed? 
As mentioned above, the Basel Committee has mainly relied upon notice and 
comment procedures. This procedure, borrowed from the US administrative law 
tradition, provides the interested parties with information regarding a draft 
measure and with the opportunity to express their views to the decision-making 
authority. With the internet, this mechanism has become quite successful in 
opening up the global decision-making process to the public. However, the 
adoption of the notice and comment procedure at the global level raises serious 
doubts. The first, general, one relates to the relation between the quantity and the 
quality of participation: is the number of commenters a reliable indicator of the 
effectiveness or the efficacy of participation? Is there any relation between that 
number and the impact of the comments on the final decision? If so, how can 
this impact be measured?  
A second doubt pertains to the coherence between the means (notice and 
comment) and the end (accountability). The affirmation that global institutions in 
general and transgovernmental bodies in particular, are not accountable needs to 
be qualified. As has been noted, they are often much more accountable to the 
States and bodies that create and fund them, and to other powerful economic 
actors, than they are to diffuse societal interests, or those of weaker actors. The 
problem does not consist in a generalized accountability deficit, but rather in the 
global regulator’s responsiveness to less influential States and private parties. The 
key questions are thus the following: are notice and comment-like procedures the 
appropriate means to resolve this specific responsiveness problem? Since they 
evolved in adversarial legal systems, such as the American one, and given that 
American (and other Anglo-Saxon) regulators and regulated actors are already 
trained for this kind of procedural exercise, doesn’t the cure risk making the 
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patient worse? This doubt arises from the previous one. If direct participation 
through notice and comment would strengthen the legitimacy of global 
regulation (legitimacy-enhancing) rather than the accountability of global 
regulators (responsibility-enhancing), should we search for alternative or 
complementary ways to fill the gap? One possible solution – as the Basel II 
process shows – is the adoption of national consultative procedures to 
complement the global consultation. In the EU, as well as in the US, internal 
procedures exist through which national positions take shape, although 
procedures of this sort are lacking in most national legal systems. 
In addition, the EU has set up a “neo-corporatist” system of participation, 
where socio-economic positions are “filtered” in the European decision-making 
process through sectoral interest committees. Similar interest-representing bodies 
operate in various IOs. Given the shortcomings of a global notice and comment 
procedure, outlined above, what if this pluralistic model were to be combined 
with or supplemented by a neo-corporatist paradigm? What are the pros and 
cons of each option? Does the EU composite system provide us with any 
meaningful indications in this regard?  
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. M.S. BARR, G.P. MILLER, “Global Administrative Law: The View from 
Basel”, 17 European Journal of International Law 15 (2006); 
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Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law”, 43 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2002) 
 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=333381);  
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(http://ssrn.com/abstract=283976); 
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3. GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR NATIONAL PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Legality: The Aarhus Convention and the Compliance Committee 
Marco Macchia 
 
 
1. Background  
In 2002, Green Salvation – an NGO working in the field of environmental 
protection – was denied access to a feasibility study originally requested by the 
National Atomic Company (Kazatomprom) of Kazakhstan. The President of the 
company wanted to use the feasibility study to ask Parliament to allow the 
importation and disposal of radioactive waste from foreign countries on Kazakh 
territory. After a number of attempts, the NGO decided to litigate the 
controversy before the national courts. In the end, Green Salvation’s petition to 
file a suit in its own name was denied.  
The NGO brought the issue to the Compliance Committee, a subsidiary 
body of the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of the Aarhus Convention (AC). The 
Compliance Committee was called upon to decide whether a private company, 
the National Atomic Company, which performs public functions under public 
control and is fully owned by the State, falls within the category of “public 
authority”, as set out in Article 2(2) of the AC. Moreover, it was asked to rule on 
whether access to environmental information should also be required when 
information does not concern a decision-making process already under way, but 
only proposals; and, finally, it had to decide whether an NGO was entitled to 
such information.  
The Committee affirmed that an obligation to guarantee access to 
environmental information also applies to private companies that perform 
administrative functions (and operate under the control of public authorities), 
and that these entities are required to meet requests for information, even where 
detailed reasons behind the request are not provided. Moreover, under the AC, 
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any procedure for appealing denial of access to information must be expeditious.  
Thus, as a result of having failed to guarantee access to an expeditious 
procedure and denied standing to bring a lawsuit, Kazakhstan was held to be in 
breach of its obligations under the AC. The Committee recommended that the 
MOP request the Government of Kazakhstan to develop a strategy, “including a 
time schedule”, to bring its administrative practice into conformity with the 
provisions of the Convention. This measure was accompanied by other 
recommendations, namely to engage the judiciary and public officials involved in 
environmental matters in training and capacity-building activities. The MOP 
implemented the Compliance Committee’s findings in Decision II/5a. In follow-
up to the recommendation, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of the Environment sent the 
Compliance Committee its implementation plan in March 2006, acknowledging 
the measures required of it in the MOP Decision.  
This case describes a national government that was held accountable for the 
non-conformity of its national law with its international commitments. This took 
place through a compliance procedure that could be initiated by a private person, 
under an international treaty.  
This cooperation system involves different players. States and private persons 
can raise non-compliance issues; the Committee reviews the compliance of 
national measures with the international rule; the MOP is responsible for making 
a final decision on the Committee’s findings; and the Committee later verifies the 
national implementation plan “for transposing the Convention’s provisions into 
national law and developing practical mechanisms and implementing legislation 
that sets out clear procedures for their implementation”.  
 
 
2. Materials  
- Compliance Committee Decision II/5a Compliance by Kazakhstan with its 
obligations under the Aarhus Convention 
(http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2005/pp/ece/ece.mp.pp.2005.2.ad
d.7.e.pdf); 
- Findings and Recommendation Adopted by the Aarhus Convention’s 
Compliance Committee 
(http://www.unece.org/env/pp/compliance/C2004-01/C01findings.pdf);  
- Communication ACCC/C/2004/01 of NGO Green Salvation (Kazakhstan); 
- Fourth Meeting Compliance Committee, Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2004/4, 
para. 18; 
- Report on the Seventh Meeting, Compliance Committee, Findings and 
Recommendations, 11 March 2005, Doc. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2005/2/Add.1; 
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- Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties, Decision II/5a, Compliance by 
Kazakhstan with its obligations under the Aarhus Convention, 13 June 2005, Doc. 
ECE/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.7;  
- Kazakhstan, Draft Findings and Recommendation, ACCC/C/2004/06; 
- Report of the First Meeting of the Parties Decision I/7 Review of 
Compliance 
(http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf); 
- Report of the First Meeting of the Parties, 17 December 2002 
(http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2002/pp/ece.mp.pp.2.e.pdf); 
- The Aarhus Convention 
(http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html).  
 
 
3. Analysis  
The Compliance Committee, a subsidiary body of the MOP, was established 
under the provisions of Article 15 AC. This Article provides that the MOP can 
establish, on a consensual basis, procedures of a “non-confrontational, non-
judicial and consultative nature for reviewing compliance with the provisions of 
this Convention”. In further describing the character of these procedures, it is 
added that appropriate public involvement is allowed, which “may include the 
option of considering communications from members of the public on matters 
related to this Convention”. 
This “review of compliance” system does not replace, but rather is an 
alternative to, the dispute settlement mechanism, providing for the submission of 
conflicts between two or more States concerning the interpretation or application 
of the Convention to the International Court of Justice or an arbitration panel.  
The Committee is made up of nine members who are selected on the basis of 
their specific expertise in environmental, legal and non-legal issues, taking into 
consideration the geographical area from which they come. The members are 
elected “by consensus or, failing consensus, by secret ballot” by the MOP, which 
helps to insulate the selection process from government pressure. A significant 
role in the process is also afforded to NGOs. The intention was clearly to have a 
balanced and unbiased body responsible for compliance review.  
The Compliance Committee is responsible for monitoring procedures and 
reviewing compliance. In monitoring procedures, the Committee examines the 
regular reports of the State Parties, which provide useful information on the 
particular context of each national legal system. Compliance review can be 
triggered by a request called “submission”, “referral” or “communication”, 
depending on the entity submitting the request – Member States, Secretariat or 
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citizens, respectively. The request must be made in written form, can be sent 
electronically and must be accompanied by relevant information or adequate 
evidence. There is no time limit within which such requests must be made.  
Private individuals enjoy broad access to the procedure; however, there are 
some admissibility requirements. The Committee may make a “preliminary 
determination”, in which it declares the inadmissibility of anonymous, abusive, 
unreasonable or otherwise incompatible communications. At the same time, the 
Committee “should at all relevant stages take into account any available domestic 
remedy unless the application of the remedy is unreasonably prolonged or 
obviously does not provide an effective and sufficient means of redress”.  
An exchange between the Compliance Committee and the State concerned 
commences as soon as the request is made. Once the State has been informed, it 
has up to five months to send the Compliance Committee written notes or 
necessary documents. The Compliance Committee can gather information in the 
territory of the State concerned, with its consent; it can consider information 
from different sources, guaranteeing confidentiality to those who would 
otherwise risk being discriminated against or penalized; and it can seek the 
services of experts and advisers. At the end of the review, the Committee 
presents its Findings and Recommendations, including its assessment of the 
alleged violation and proposal of measures to be adopted. These Findings and 
Recommendations are then sent to the MOP.  
The findings are decided upon on the basis of the cause, degree and 
frequency of non-compliance. The Committee may a) “provide advice and 
facilitate the implementation” of the Convention; b) “make recommendations”; 
c) “request the Party concerned to submit a strategy, including a time schedule, to 
the Compliance Committee regarding the achievement of compliance with the 
Convention and to report on the implementation of this strategy”; d) “issue 
declarations of non-compliance”; e) “issue cautions”; f) “suspend, in accordance 
with the applicable rules of international law concerning the suspension of the 
operation of a treaty, the special rights and privileges accorded to the Party 
concerned under the Convention”.  
In cases of communications from private actors, the MOP must urge the 
State to commit to a plan, to be sent to the Compliance Committee, with a view 
to reaching full compliance with the international provisions through the 
introduction of “specific measures to address the matter raised by the member of 
the public”.  
 
 
4. Issues: The Accountability of Governments for Their International Commitments 
In the international legal system, the absence of a central authority traditionally 
makes it very difficult to determine illegality, and often leads to a lack of effective 
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sanctions for violations. The problem of state non-compliance with international 
norms was first addressed through bilateral mechanisms of self-help and the 
threat of sanctions. After a time, these instruments were replaced with a 
multilateral system aimed at supporting and facilitating compliance with 
international obligations and preventing litigation. Within such frameworks, 
States are no longer able to determine the legality of their own conduct or that of 
third parties for themselves; rather, this task falls to independent global bodies. 
And particularly interesting are the consequences of these instruments when locus 
standi is granted to private actors.  
From the perspective of private individuals or enterprises, when international 
provisions have a mandatory and binding nature, the task of monitoring whether 
public entities abide by their requirements is usually entrusted to national judicial 
authorities. However, this option is not always available. It is, therefore, crucial 
that the interested parties are assured a further remedy in cases of rule violation. 
These developments have resulted in the emergence of different compliance 
systems, or, more accurately, systems aimed at realizing compliance: at bringing 
about the full and proper implementation of obligations arising from 
international rules. Such compliance systems are useful due to the insufficiency 
or lack of effectiveness of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.  
This case highlights a new feature of the international system: private citizens 
can request that governments be held accountable for their international 
commitments. The adoption of these tools, aimed at assuring the compliance of 
public powers, is increasing within international organizations, both regional and 
universal.  
This might imply a risk of overlapping jurisdictions, between national, 
regional or international entities, which might in turn result in conflicting or 
mutually conditioned decisions. Moreover, there is not even a general prohibition 
on one body reviewing requests which have already been dealt with in another 
international forum. In any event, there is no equivalent to the rule adopted by 
the European Court of Human Rights, according to which “States are dispensed 
from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had 
an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system”.  
The Aarhus Convention has introduced an innovative system for reviewing 
compliance, which deserves attention for two closely related reasons. The 
Convention sets out obligations that directly bind public administrations, in order 
to increase levels of environmental protection. These obligations, from access to 
information to participation rights and review requirements, represent some of 
the core elements of administrative law. Moreover, this procedure allows any 
individual to request that an independent, international body review whether the 
national public authority has correctly applied the global regulation in question.  
This mechanism raises a number of questions. What are the criteria 
informing the operation of such a compliance procedure? Are there risks that it 
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might overlap and conflict with other dispute resolution bodies? Can this 
procedure require the national authority to comply with the international rule? 
Are the Committee’s decisions de facto, though not formally, binding? Lastly, does 
this procedure help make national governments more accountable?  
 
 
5. Further Reading  
a. J. BRUNNÉE, “Copying with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements”, Leiden Journal of International Law 1 (2002);  
b. ID., “The United States and International Environmental Law: Living with an 
Elephant”, 15 Eur. J. Int. L. 637 (2004);  
c. S. CHARNOVITZ, “Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International 
Governance”, 18 Mich. J. Int’L L. 183, 268 (1997);  
d. G. HANDL, “International “Lawmaking” by Conferences of the Parties and 
Other Politically Mandated Bodies”, in R. WOLFRUM, V. RÖBEN (eds.), 
Developments of International Law in Treaty Making, Berlin-Heidelberg (2005), pp. 
127 et seq.; 
e. S. KRAVCHENKO, Strengthening Implementation of MEAS: The Innovative Aarhus 
Compliance Mechanism, Seventh International Conference on Environmental 
Compliance and Enforcement, 9-15 April 2005, Morocco, 257 
 (http://www.inece.org/conference/7/vol1/Kravchenko.pdf); 
f. N.A. ROBINSON, “Enforcing Environmental Norms: Diplomatic and Judicial 
Approaches”, 26 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, 387 (2003); 
g. J. WATES, “NGOs and the Aarhus Convention”, in Civil Society, International 
Courts and Compliance Bodies 183 (Tullio Treves, Marco Frigessi di Rattalma, 
Attila Tanzi, Alessandro Fodella, Cesare Pitea, Chiara Ragni eds., 2005).  
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3.2. The Disclosure of Information: Anti-Dumping Duties and the WTO 
System 
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background: The Facts, the Law, and the Parties 
In April 1999, following an application lodged by the Defence Committee of 
Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings Industry of the European Union, the European 
Communities commenced an anti-dumping investigation into this kind of pipe 
fittings originating in Brazil, China, Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand. 
The only Brazilian producer investigated was Industria de Fundicao Tupy Ltda. 
(“Tupy”). In the course of the investigation, a verification visit took place at 
Tupy’s premises in September 1999; moreover, there were many communications 
and exchanges between the European Communities and both Tupy's legal 
counsel and Brazilian officials. 
On February 28, 2000, the European Communities imposed provisional anti-
dumping duties (Reg. n. 449/2000), and, on August 11, 2000, adopted the 
definitive Regulation (Reg. n. 1784/2000) on imports of malleable cast iron tube 
or pipe fittings from, inter alia, Brazil. Following this, Brazil requested 
consultations with the European Communities, as provided for by the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and, 
after the failure of the negotiations, it further requested the establishment of a 
panel. 
The Panel concluded that the EC had acted inconsistently with its obligations 
under Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement in “zeroing” negative 
dumping margins in its dumping determination, and under Articles 12.2 and 
12.2.2, as it did not explain why it did not take into account, in deciding to 
introduce anti-dumping duties, certain “injury factors” listed in Article 3.4 (which 
sets out the various elements that must be taken into consideration when 
determining whether there is a causal link between the alleged dumping and the 
injury to the domestic industry). The Appellate Body upheld most of the Panel’s 
findings, except one. Unlike the Panel, the AB found that the European 
Communities had also acted inconsistently with the Anti-Dumping Agreement 
by failing to disclose to interested parties all information that could be necessary 
for the defense of their interests in the anti-dumping investigation. 
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The 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement 
on the Implementation of Article VI of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (the Anti-dumping Agreement) were the legal instruments applicable 
in this case. 
According to GATT Article VI.1, dumping occurs when “products of one 
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the 
normal value of the products”; this practice is prohibited by the WTO only when 
“it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of 
a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry” 
(Art. VI.1). In this case, anti-dumping duties may be applied in order to offset or 
prevent dumping (Art. VI.2). 
The Anti-dumping Agreement was approved during the Uruguay Round in 
order to implement GATT Article VI and identify the criteria and procedures for 
quantifying the level of dumping and of the injury to the domestic industry. More 
specifically, Articles 5 and 6 of the Anti-dumping Agreement set rules for the 
investigation procedure.  
 
The parties were Brazil, the appellant, and the EU, the appellee. Chile, Japan, 
Mexico and the USA intervened as third parties.  
According to Article 6.11 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, “interested 
parties” in the anti-dumping investigation (carried out by the importing country’s 
authorities, and aimed at verifying the dumping and at determining the 
appropriate anti-dumping measures) include both public and private parties: the 
Government of the exporting Member is included, as are “an exporter or foreign 
producer or the importer of a product subject to investigation, or a trade or 
business association”, and “a producer of the like product in the importing 
member or a trade and business association”. The agreement does not preclude 
the Member States from hearing domestic and foreign parties other than those 
explicitly mentioned.  
 
 
2. Materials 
- WTO Appellate Body 
 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm);  
- WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, 
WT/DS/219/AB/R, adopted on July 22 2003. Brazil, Appellant; European 
Communities, Appellee; Chile, Japan, Mexico and US, Third Participants. 
Division: Ganesan, Baptista and Sacerdoti 
 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds219_e.htm); 
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- WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Anti Dumping Duties on 
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R, March 
7 2003 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds219_e.htm);  
- Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htm); 
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm); 
- Council Regulation (EC), no. 436/2004, of March 8 2004, amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1784/2000 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and 
collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain 
malleable cast iron tube or pipe fittings originating in Brazil, the Czech 
Republic, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and 
Thailand, in Official Journal L 072, 11 March 2004, p. 15 et seq. 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R04
36:EN:HTML). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The Panel rejected Brazil’s claim that the EU investigation violated Articles 6.2 
and 6.4 of the Anti-dumping Agreement, according to which all interested parties 
in an anti-dumping investigation “shall have a full opportunity for the defence of 
their interests”, and the authorities “shall whenever practicable provide timely 
opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the 
presentation of their cases”. 
Brazil had argued that the European Communities had failed to disclose the 
information contained in an internal “note for the file” submitted by the EC to 
the Panel, Exhibit EC-12, which showed the evaluation of the injury factors 
listed in Article 3.4. The Panel found that the European Communities had not 
violated Articles 6.2 and 6.4 with respect to the information on injury factors 
referred to exclusively in Exhibit EC-12, because the data it contained were 
consistent with other data (which had been disclosed); had no “value added” for 
the investigation; were not relevant to the case; and were not specifically relied 
upon by the EC in reaching its anti-dumping determination. 
The AB reversed the Panel’s findings, deciding that the information 
contained in Exhibit EC-12 should have been disclosed; this conclusion was 
reached by articulating a more precise set of requirements for the disclosure of 
documents under Art. 6.4. of the Anti-dumping Agreement. 
According to this provision, interested parties must be given a full 
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opportunity to see information that is relevant, not confidential, and was used in 
the anti-dumping investigation. The EU had never argued that the document was 
confidential, although it did contest the other two requirements. The AB, in 
claiming that the document was both relevant and used in the investigation, gave 
a more precise definition of these two requirements. 
First, it explained that it was necessary to examine whether the information 
was “relevant” to the presentation of the cases of the interested parties, and not 
simply the perspective of the investigating authority (AB Report, para. 145). 
 Second, it held that, in order to meet the third requirement, the information 
need not have been specifically relied upon in reaching the determination, nor 
have an “added value”; it is sufficient that it was used during the anti-dumping 
investigation (para. 147, AB Report).  
Moreover, the Appellate Body stated that the obligations contained in 
Articles 6.2 and 6.4 establish a framework of procedural and due process 
obligations, which apply throughout the course of the anti-dumping investigation 
(par. 138, AB Report).  
 
 
4. Issues: Global Review of National Administrative Processes 
In the AB’s view, the obligation to disclose information is an authentic due 
process requirement. But how far does this procedural duty go within the WTO 
system? And is it imposed on States alone, or also on private parties?  
In this case, national authorities were held to have an international treaty 
obligation to disclose information, subject to review by a global tribunal. 
Although only States can request a panel, the disclosure of information 
requirement also serves the interest of the private parties subjected to the anti-
dumping investigation and affected by the anti-dumping duties: the category of 
“parties interested in the investigation” (who have the right to present in writing 
all evidence they consider relevant thereto) covers not only the government of 
the exporting State, but also includes the producers and exporters themselves. 
Moreover, the evaluation of whether the information is relevant or not (the 
requirement on which the very existence of the disclosure duty depends) is to be 
made from the perspective of ensuring that the interests of the private parties 
involved are fully represented. 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. K. ADAMANTOPOULOS, D. DE NOTARIS, “The Future Of The WTO And 
The Reform Of The Anti-Dumping Agreement: A Legal Perspective”, 24 
Fordham Int'l L.J. 30 (2000); 
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b. R. BHALA, New WTO Antidumping Precedents (Part One: The Dumping Margin 
Determination), 6 Sing. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 335 (2002); 
c. R. BHALA, D. A. GANTZ, “WTO Case Review 2003”, 21 Arizona Journal of 
International & Comparative Law 317 (2004); 
d. J. BOURGEOIS, “WTO Dispute Settlement in the Field of Anti-Dumping 
Law”, 1 J. Int'l Econ. L. 259 (1998); 
e. R. CUNNINGHAM, “Five Years Of The WTO Antidumping Agreement And 
Agreement On Subsidies And Countervailing Measures”, 31 Law and Policy in 
International Business 897 (2000);  
f. L. D. HAMILTON, “US Antidumping Decisions and the WTO Standard of 
Review: Deference or Disregard”, 4 Chi. J. Int'l L. 265 (2003); 
g. H HORN, P.C. MAVROIDIS, “EC-Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron 
Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil”, in H. HORN, P.C. MAVROIDIS (eds.), The 
WTO Case Law of 2003, Cambridge (2006), p. 87 et seq.; 
h. A. PERFETTI, “Sviluppi dell’antidumping all’OMC: l’illiceità del metodo dello 
«zeroing»”, Dir. comm. int. 935 (2004);  
i. P. ROSENTHAL, R. VERMYLEN, “The WTO Antidumping And Subsidies 
Agreements. Did The United States Achieve Its Objectives During The 
Uruguay Round?”, 31 Law and Policy in International Business 871 (2000); 
j.  J. TRACHTMAN, “Case Note on European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties 
on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil” 
(http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr43.pdf); 
k. E. VERMULST, The WTO Antidumping Agreement. A commentary, Oxford 
Commentary on the GATT/WTO Agreements, Oxford (2005). 
 
 
 
 
3.3. A Duty to Provide Reasons: Definitive Safeguards Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Products 
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background 
On the request of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in June 2001 
the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) initiated a safeguard 
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investigation to determine whether certain steel products were being imported 
into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of 
serious injury (or threat thereof) to the domestic industry. At the end of the 
investigation, the USITC made affirmative injury determinations for eight steel 
products, and forwarded its remedy recommendations in a report to the US 
President. Under Proclamation No. 7529 of 5 March 2002, the President 
imposed ten definitive safeguard measures on imports of certain steel products, 
for a period of three years.  
Alleging that these measures were a breach of US obligations under the 
Agreement on Safeguards and GATT 1994, on March 7, 2002 the European 
Communities requested consultations and, on June 3, 2002, the establishment of 
a panel. The Panel issued eight Reports – in the form of a single document – and 
concluded that all ten US safeguard measures were inconsistent with both the 
Agreement on Safeguards and the GATT 1994. The US appealed the Panel 
report, but lost its appeal before the Appellate Body. 
 
Under the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), safeguards 
measures were permitted under Article XIX (the GATT “escape clause”). The 
exceptions and obligations contained in Article XIX and the conditions under 
which States can establish safeguards measures were refined and elaborated 
during the Uruguay Round in the Agreement on Safeguards. 
According to Article XIX, a Member State can adopt safeguard measures 
(i.e., can suspend an obligation or withdraw or modify a tariff concession) under 
the following conditions: when “any product is being imported into the territory 
of that contracting party in such increased quantities as to cause or threaten 
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly 
competitive products”, and when such an increase is the result of “unforeseen 
developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting 
party” under the Agreement. 
The Agreement on Safeguards sets rules for the procedures through which 
States check that all the preconditions necessary for the legal application of such 
measures have been met. According to Article 3.1 of this Agreement, “[a] 
Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an investigation by the 
competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures previously 
established and made public”. This investigation shall include “reasonable public 
notice to all interested parties and public hearings or other appropriate means in 
which importers, exporters and other interested parties could present evidence 
and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the presentations of 
other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the 
application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest”. Moreover, 
the competent authorities shall “publish a report setting forth their findings and 
reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law” (emphasis 
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added). 
 
The parties to this dispute were the EU (complainant) and the US (respondent). 
Later, pursuant to Article 9.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 
the Dispute Settlement Body referred to the Panel complaints on the same 
matter brought by Japan, Korea, China, Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand and 
Brazil.  
 
 
2. Materials 
- WTO Appellate Body 
 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm);  
- WTO Appellate Body Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 
254, 258, 259/AB/R, adopted on December 10, 2003. United States, 
Appellant/Appellee; Brazil, China, European Communities, Japan, Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, Appellant/Appellees; Canada, Cuba, 
Mexico, Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, 
Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela, Third Participants. Division: Bacchus, Abi-
Saab and Lockhart 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds248_e.htm); 
- Panel Report, US – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products, WT/DS 248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259/R, July 11 
2003 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds248_e.htm); 
- Agreement on Safeguards 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg_e.htm);  
- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. IX, X, XIX 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/06-gatt_e.htm); 
- Dispute Settlement Understanding – DSU, Art. 11 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The Panel found that the US had violated the duty to “provide a reasoned and 
adequate explanation” in connection with many of the requirements necessary 
for the adoption of safeguards measures under the WTO Agreement. More 
specifically, it had failed to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of how 
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“unforeseen developments” resulted in “increased imports”, of the “causal link” 
between the alleged increased imports and serious injury to the relevant domestic 
producers, and of “parallelism” (between the scope of the safeguard investigation 
and the scope of the measures imposed as a result thereof). 
The US argued that the USITC might have violated Article 3.1, but that a 
failure to provide a “reasoned and adequate explanation” of certain findings 
cannot constitute a violation of other articles of the Agreement on Safeguards or 
of Article XIX of GATT 1994, contrary to what the Panel had concluded (para. 
18, AB Report). Moreover, it argued that it was not necessary to provide a 
reasoned and adequate explanation of the unforeseen developments requirement, 
as these are mentioned in Article XIX GATT, but not in the Agreement on 
Safeguards (para. 273-274, AB Report). 
In the Appellate Body’s view, the same standard of review – namely, the duty to 
provide a reasoned and adequate explanation – applies generally to all of the 
obligations under the Agreement on Safeguards as well as to the obligations 
contained in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 (para. 276, AB Report). The AB 
stated that the Panel should have checked whether national authorities had 
respected this standard for each obligation of the safeguard investigation under 
the Agreement on Safeguards (and also for the “unforeseen developments” 
requirement, which is not in the Agreement, but comes from Article XIX of the 
GATT). 
The Appellate Body both extended the requirement for a “reasoned and 
adequate explanation” and made it more precise.  
First, it argued that both Articles 3.1 and 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards 
require States to provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of their findings in 
a published report (para. 273 - 277 and 289, AB Report). 
It also argued, on the basis of Article 11 of the DSU, that the Panel was 
required to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an 
objective assessment of the facts of the case”. According to the AB, if the 
competent authority had not provided a “reasoned and adequate explanation”, 
the Panel would not have been able to make an objective assessment of the 
matter before it (para. 278 – 279, AB Report). As the AB stated, “a panel must not 
be left to wonder why a safeguard measure has been applied”, and “this is all the 
more reason why they must be made explicit by a competent authority” (para. 
297 - 299, AB Report). 
 
 
 4. Issues: The Duty to Give Reasons as a Global Principle? 
What, then, is the basis for the duty to provide reasons? Is there a specific rule in 
the Agreement on Safeguards that requires it (and is it therefore limited to this 
sector), or is it rather a general principle of law, applicable universally?  
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Through the creative interpretation of an international treaty, the duty to 
provide reasons seems to be recognized as a general principle of WTO law, 
subject to global judicial review. 
But what is the purpose of the duty to provide reasons in this case? Is it for 
the benefit of States, private entities (i.e., in this case, producers affected by the 
safeguard measures), or both? More generally, what is the function of the duty to 
provide reasons at the global level, in a context very different from that in which 
it was first developed?  
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. M. BESHKAR, “Trade Skirmishes and Safeguards: A Theory of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement”, July 7, 2007 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006257); 
b. M.A. CROWLEY, “Why are Safeguards Needed in a Trade Agreement?”, July 
2006, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper No. 2006-06 
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=931215); 
c. G.M. GROSSMAN, A.O. SYKES, “WTO Case Law: The American Law 
Institute Reporter's Studies, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Products”, 6 World Trade Review 89 (2007); 
d. D.A. IRWIN, “Causing problems? The WTO review of causation and injury 
attribution in US Section 201 cases 1”, 2 World Trade Review 297 (2003); 
e. Y. JUNG, E.J. KANG, “Toward an Ideal WTO Safeguards Regime–Lessons 
from the US-Steel”, 38 International Lawyer 919 (2004); 
f. R. READ, “The EU–US WTO Steel Dispute: the Political Economy of 
Protection and the Efficacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding”, 
in R. READ, N. PERDIKIS (eds.), The WTO and the Regulation of International 
Trade: Recent Trade Disputes Between the European Union and the United States, 
Cheltenham (2005), p. 135 et seq.; 
g. ID., “The Political Economy of Trade Protection: The Determinants and 
Welfare Impact of the 2002 US Emergency Steel Safeguard Measures”, 28 
The World Economy 1119 (2005); 
h. R.H. STEINBERG, “Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, 98 The American Journal of 
International Law 247 (2004); 
i. A.O. SYKES, “The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel 
Dispute” (May 2004), U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper 
No. 212, 7 Journal of International Economic Law 523 (2004); 
l. J. TRACHTMAN, “Case Note on United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
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Imports of Certain Steel Products” 
(http://www.ejil.org/journal/curdevs/sr45.pdf). 
 
 
 
 
3.4. Reasonableness and Proportionality: The NAFTA Binational Panel 
and the Extension of Administrative Justice to International Relations 
Marco Macchia  
 
 
1. Background 
In the summer of 1999, the Canadian Commissioner of Customs and Revenue, 
acting under Subsection 38 of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), began an 
investigation to ascertain the existence of dumping in the importation of 
radiographic contrast media. The Canadian company petitioning the Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) was Mallinckrodt, the only domestic 
manufacturer of the goods in question. Two US exporters, Nycomed and Bracco, 
were accused of dumping.  
The Canadian system provides for two monitoring bodies – the CCRA and 
the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) – to protect the domestic 
industry from dumping practices and State subsidies that distort international 
trade competition. The two bodies operate simultaneously, though they institute 
two distinct proceedings. The CCRA’s proceedings aim at determining the 
normal value of the goods, the export price and the dumping margins. The 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal is responsible for establishing whether the 
practice in question has caused damage to the domestic market. In order to make 
this decision, the Tribunal has to hold public hearings with the participation of all 
concerned parties. 
In this particular case, Mallinckrodt claimed that the exporting companies 
were selling their products at an excessively low price and giving excessive 
rebates to their customers, thus damaging the domestic market. Nycomed and 
Bracco defended themselves by arguing that the problems in the domestic market 
were due to factors independent of their business practices, citing, for example, a 
general market crisis, the higher quality of the imported product, and excessive 
domestic controls. In addition, it was not certain that the Canadian company was 
suffering injury as a result of the alleged dumping, because its losses on the 
domestic market were compensated for by its exports.  
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At the end of the proceedings, the CCRA determined the existence of 
dumping. The CITT found (with one dissenting opinion) that the importing 
companies had caused material injury to the domestic industry, and that, 
although both domestic and (up to a point) foreign companies were entitled to 
engage in a “price war” (aggressively pricing their products in order to maintain 
or increase market share), “once the imported product is offered at dumped 
prices which cause injury to the domestic industry, the line is crossed”. Also, it 
found that the quality of the imports in question, relative to those produced 
domestically, was not sufficiently high to account for the increased purchases of 
the imported products at the expense of the Canadian company. The extra level 
of control exercised over the product in Canada by the Patent Medicine Prices 
Review Board did not influence price trends, because it only aimed at establishing 
a ceiling price that must be respected by any company intending to enter the 
market. Lastly, the Tribunal found that the exports of the domestic company 
were not relevant. 
When a foreign company is faced with anti-dumping sanctions, there is 
usually just one available remedy: to appeal the decision made by the national 
administrative agency. However, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), a regional agreement establishing a free-trade area between Canada, 
Mexico and the United States, signed in 1992 and in force since 1994, provides 
for an additional remedy. Under the rules of Chapter 19, a NAFTA binational 
panel, made up of representatives from the countries involved in the controversy, 
can review national decisions in the fields of anti-dumping and export subsidy. 
This international level review of national administrative decisions is therefore 
aimed at ensuring the full implementation of the free movement of goods and 
services between NAFTA Member States.  
The final determinations of the CCRA and the CITT were challenged by 
Nycomed and Bracco before a NAFTA binational panel. The Panel ruled that 
the determination of the CCRA was not in compliance with Canadian law, and 
remanded the decision to that body for reconsideration. It upheld the 
determination of the CITT.  
After reviewing the evidence and identifying the exporters and export price, 
one key issue was determining the standard of review to apply in this particular 
case. Theoretically, Canadian law provides three possible criteria for the review of 
administrative decisions: correctness, unreasonableness and patent 
unreasonableness. Under the correctness standard, the degree of deference 
afforded to the administrative decision is minimal; while under the patent 
unreasonableness standard it is very large. Generally speaking, under Canadian 
law, the standard applied to questions of fact is that of patent unreasonableness, 
while questions of law are evaluated according to the standard of 
unreasonableness. In any event, the role of binational panels in reviewing 
national administrative decisions is well illustrated by these cases. 
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2. Materials and Sources 
- NAFTA Binational Panel 
(http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org);  
- Decision on Review of the Final Determination of the Commissioner of 
Customs and Revenue, Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, January 8, 2003, 
No. CDA – USA – 2000 – 1904 – 01 
(http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta19/media-dumping-nafta19.pdf); 
- Decision on Review of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Finding, 
Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, January 8, 2003, No. CDA – USA – 2000 
– 1904 – 02 
(http://www.worldtradelaw.net//nafta19/media-injury-
nafta19.pdf#xml=http://www.worldtradelaw.net/searchnafta/DisplayRepor
t.asp?cmd=pdfhits&idoc=0&hc=36&req=Certain%20Iodinated%20Contrast
%20Media); 
- Overview of the Dispute Settlement Provisions of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (and Glossary) 
(http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=331);  
- Finding and Statement of Reasons, Canadian International Trade Tribunal – 
CITT, Inquiry No. 99-003-2000, Ottawa, May 1, 2000;  
- Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, File No. 4240-21, Case No. AD/1234 
(Final Determination – Iodinated Radiographic Contrast Media, March 30 
2000) 
(http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1234/ad1234f-eng.html); 
- Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, File No. 4240-21, Case No. AD/1234 
(Decision on Remand – Iodinated Radiographic Contrast Media, July 10 
2003) 
(http://cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/sima-lmsi/i-e/ad1234/ad1234sor-eng.html);  
- NAFTA Binational Panel, Decision and Order Review of the Determination 
on Remand, Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, May 26, 2003, No. CDA – 
USA – 2000 – 1904 – 01 
(http://www.worldtradelaw.net//nafta19/media-dumping-remand-
nafta19.pdf#xml=http://www.worldtradelaw.net/searchnafta/DisplayRepor
t.asp?cmd=pdfhits&idoc=4&hc=36&req=Certain%20Iodinated%20Contrast
%20Media); 
- NAFTA Binational Panel, Decision and Order Review of the Determination 
on Remand, Certain Iodinated Contrast Media, September 23, 2003, No. 
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CDA – USA – 2000 – 1904 –01 
(http://www.worldtradelaw.net//nafta19/media-dumping-remandII-
nafta19.pdf#xml=http://www.worldtradelaw.net/searchnafta/DisplayRepor
t.asp?cmd=pdfhits&idoc=3&hc=36&req=Certain%20Iodinated%20Contrast
%20Media);  
- Canada Customs and Revenue Agency Act (1999, c. 17), available at 
(http://www.canlii.org/ca/as/1999/c17/); 
- Special Import Measures Act – SIMA (R.S. 1985, c. S.-15) 
(http://www.cbsa.gc.ca/menu/D14-e.html); 
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Article 1904, Review of 
Final Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations 
(http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=152#A1904); 
- Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews 
(http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta/1904rules.pdf).  
 
 
3. Analysis 
As noted above, NAFTA promotes investment and trade in Member States, but 
it does not require them to change their domestic state subsidy and anti-dumping 
laws, provided that they comply with some minimum standards set forth in the 
Agreement and in the anti-dumping codes. However, Members must accept the 
dispute settlement mechanism under NAFTA Chapter 19.  
This mechanism combines traditional judicial review (which can also be 
requested by foreign exporters, and was introduced for the first time by the 
United States with the 1979 Trade Agreement Act) with the review carried out by 
a binational panel made up of panelists drawn from a roster of qualified 
Canadian, Mexican and US citizens (including, “to the fullest extent possible”, 
judges and former judges). This kind of review can be accessed by all parties that 
would otherwise have standing in a national court, under their own domestic law. 
In practice, binational panels remove the exclusive review of domestic 
administrative decisions from national courts. When a national provision is 
challenged before a binational panel, it cannot then be challenged in a national 
judicial proceeding. There is no national appeal against a Panel’s decision.  
Binational panels are responsible for reviewing the case documents, and 
establishing whether the decision made by the national administration is generally 
supported by evidence, and legal according to the domestic law in question 
(rather than according to international trade rules). The Panel is required to apply 
the law of the importing country, including statutes, regulations, administrative 
practices, and judicial precedents, to the same extent that a national court would. 
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This serves to create pressure for legal harmonization.  
In addition to this, the panelists are required to respect the interpretative 
parameters existing in the country in question; they cannot “create law”, and 
must observe the importing country’s standards of review. These standards are 
described in Annex 1911. For Canada, for instance, the administrative activity is 
unlawful when, inter alia, it violates a principle of natural justice, when it has erred 
in law or fact in reaching its decision, or where it has acted without jurisdiction, 
under the provisions of Article 18 of the Federal Court Act. In contrast, the 
criteria used in the United States are different: in most cases an administrative 
decision is unlawful when “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law”. 
After the preliminary investigation, the panel can choose to confirm the 
administrative decision, or to remand it to the domestic authority in question 
order for reconsideration in the light of the panel’s prescriptions. Unlike most 
international dispute settlement mechanisms, decisions of binational panels are 
binding upon national governments. 
The only mechanism for appealing against the decision of a panel is the 
extraordinary challenge procedure, to which a part can have recourse if it alleges 
that, firstly, a member of the panel was guilty of bias, gross misconduct or serious 
conflict of interests, or that the panel exceeded its powers or departed from a 
fundamental rule of procedure (for instance, by failing to apply the appropriate 
standard of review); and, secondly, that one of these actions has materially 
influenced the panel’s decision or has threatened the integrity of the proceedings.  
 
 
4.  Issues: Global Judicial Review of National Decisions 
In order for international trade to function, a consistent international anti-
dumping system should be maintained. It is therefore important to promote the 
wide acceptance of a common anti-dumping code, and to ensure that national 
laws comply with it. This can best be achieved through an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism, which induces governments to respect their international 
obligations. This might not, however, be sufficient. At present, anti-dumping 
measures depend on the decisions made by national agencies and are based on 
proceedings in which national administrations generally have wide discretion. 
There are few guarantees that they will apply the letter of the law, and often even 
fewer guarantees that they will conform to the general principles of legitimacy 
and due process. Thus, in order to effectively implement an anti-dumping code, 
we must address the key issue of administrative practice.  
For this purpose, NAFTA Chapter 19 establishes a sort of judicial review for 
anti-dumping decisions taken by national administrative agencies. A mechanism 
of this sort clearly functions best where there is some degree of homogeneity in 
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the administrative laws of the Member States involved, both from a procedural 
perspective (in that the members of the panel have to apply the law of another 
country) and from a substantive perspective (if the rules differ significantly 
between countries, exporters from different countries might receive differential 
procedural treatment).  
Such a system is not immune from the risk of allowing for differential 
treatment. For instance, as highlighted earlier, the Canadian and American 
standards of administrative review are different, in that Canadian courts are more 
deferential to administrative discretion than are their American counterparts. For 
this reason, practically speaking it is more difficult to obtain a negative review of 
a Canadian measure than it is an American one. 
 
 
5. Further Reading  
a. J.F. COLARES, “NAFTA’s Double Standards of Review”, 42 Wake Forest Law 
Review 199 (2007); 
b. K. JONES, “Does NAFTA Chapter 19 make a difference? Dispute settlement 
and the incentive structure of U.S./Canada unfair trade petitions”, 18 
Contemporary Economic Policy 145 (2000);  
c. H.E. MOYER JR., “Chapter 19 of the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade 
Courts of Last Resort”, 27 International Law 707 (1993);  
d. G.R. WINHAM, “NAFTA Chapter 19 and the Development of International 
Administrative Law”, 32 Journal of World Trade 65 (1998). 
 
 
 
 
3.5. National Regulatory Autonomy within the GATS: The Gambling 
Dispute 
Maurizia De Bellis 
 
 
1. Background 
On March 21, 2003, Antigua and Barbuda requested consultations with the US 
regarding American federal and state laws affecting gambling and betting 
services. Antigua and Barbuda argued that the cumulative impact of the US 
measures resulted in the “total prohibition” of the cross-border supply of 
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gambling and betting services from WTO members to the United States, and that 
this violated the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  
On 12 June 2003, Antigua and Barbuda requested the establishment of a 
panel, which found that the GATS Schedule of the United States (under the sub-
section entitled “Other recreational services (except sporting)”) included specific 
commitments for gambling and betting services, and that three US federal laws 
(the Wire Act, the Travel Act and the Illegal Gambling Business Act) and four 
out of the eight state laws it examined (enacted in Louisiana, Massachusetts, 
South Dakota and Utah) violated US commitments under Article XVI 
concerning market access. The Panel also found that the US had failed to make 
out a defense under Article XIV, which sets forth the general exceptions to the 
GATS regime.  
Both the United States and Antigua and Barbuda appealed. The Appellate 
Body limited its findings to the three federal laws (holding that the Panel should 
not have ruled on the eight state laws, because Antigua had not made a prima facie 
case of inconsistency with the GATS). The Appellate Body reversed many of the 
Panel’s findings, so that in the end the US was compelled to modify only one of 
the contested federal laws. 
The implementation of the decision proved difficult. As the parties failed to 
agree on what would constitute a reasonable period of time for implementation, 
Antigua and Barbuda requested that this be determined through binding 
arbitration pursuant to Article 21.3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
The arbitrator determined that the US had to adapt its legislation to the Dispute 
Settlement Body’s findings by 3 April 2006. After this date had passed, Antigua 
and Barbuda requested the establishment of another panel (according to Article 
21.5 of the DSU) to evaluate the consistency of measures taken by the US to 
comply with the recommendations of the DSB. The Panel concluded that the US 
had failed to comply, and Antigua and Barbuda then requested authorization 
from the DSB (pursuant to Article 22.2 of the DSU) to suspend the application 
to the United States of concessions and related obligations under the GATS and 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). On 23 July 2007, the US objected to the level of suspension of 
concessions and obligations proposed by Antigua and Barbuda, and the DSB 
agreed that this matter be referred to arbitration.  
 
Article XVI of the GATS, which concerns market access, requires that each party 
“shall accord services and service providers of other Parties treatment no less 
favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions 
agreed and specified in its schedule”. This provision only applies when a State 
has made a specific commitment in its schedule. This is why it was so important 
to verify whether the US had made such a commitment in terms of gambling and 
betting services. The measures that a State must not maintain or adopt under the 
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market access provision are defined as “limitations on the number of service 
suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service 
suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test”. This means that 
Article XVI only addresses quantitative, not qualitative, measures. 
National regulations deviating from the GATS may be justified by Article 
XIV and XIV bis of the agreement. These exceptions apply to both general 
obligations and specific commitments. They recognize the right of WTO 
Member States to deviate from their obligations in order to pursue certain 
national policies. Article XIV provides that, “[s]ubject to the requirement that 
such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member” of 
several types of measures, including those that are “necessary to protect public 
morals or to maintain public order” (Art. XIV(a)). In this case, the US expressed 
regulatory concerns relating to organized crime, money laundering and fraud in 
the context of the services from Antigua at issue in this dispute, basing their 
argument on the public morals exception set forth in Article XIV(a). 
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- WTO Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-
Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (complaint by Antigua and 
Barbuda), WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted on the 7th of April 2005 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm); 
- WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services (complaint by Antigua and Barbuda), 
WT/DS285/R, circulated November 10 2004 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm); 
- General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats.doc); 
- Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ARB-2005-2/19, 19 August 2005 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm); 
- Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, Report of the 
Panel, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW, 30 March 2007 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm). 
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3. Analysis 
The AB report upheld the Panel’s finding that the United States had acted in a 
manner inconsistent with Article XVI. It reasoned that Article XVI only applies 
when the State has made a specific commitment, and the AB found that the 
United States’ Schedule did include a commitment to grant full market access in 
relation to gambling and betting services (AB Report, paras. 162-213). Moreover, 
the US measures, albeit of a qualitative nature in that they prohibited the 
“remote” supply of gambling services (by requiring a “face to face” supply), 
resulted in a quantitative restriction on market entry: therefore, the AB held that 
“limitations amounting to a zero quota are quantitative limitations and fall within 
the scope of Article XVI:2” (AB Report, paras. 238 and 251).  
This is a very controversial issue: Article XVI of the GATS prohibits market 
access restrictions (such as import quotas or limitations of the number of services 
suppliers); in contrast, domestic regulations (insofar as they provide for 
qualitative restrictions) are in principle permitted, on condition that they do not 
discriminate against foreign suppliers of services. Under Article VI:4 (the GATS 
provision on domestic regulation), the Council for Trade in Services is to develop 
further disciplines, which should ensure, inter alia, that national requirements are 
no more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service. To put 
it differently, the GATS negotiators refused to impose a general necessity test for 
non-discriminatory domestic regulation in the Agreement itself, leaving it to 
subsequent negotiations under Article VI.4. 
In the Gambling case, the Appellate Body adopted a broad interpretation, 
considering even qualitative national measures as market access restrictions, due 
to the fact that qualitative measures also have quantitative effects. In this way, it 
narrowed the scope of national regulatory autonomy: domestic service 
regulations that were considered to be safe, and subject only to future disciplines 
as envisaged by Article VI.4, could already be prohibited by the GATS as market 
access restrictions under Article XVI. 
The Appellate Body reversed some of the Panel’s findings concerning 
whether the US measures could be justified under the Article XIV “public morals 
exception”. In particular, it reversed the finding that the US had not shown that 
the three federal statutes were “necessary” to protect public morals or to 
maintain public order, within the meaning of Article XIV, while partially 
upholding the Panel’s claim that the US had violated the chapeau of Art. XIV, 
which provides that measures adopted under the exception clause have to be 
applied in the same way to foreign and domestic suppliers of services alike (i.e. 
they cannot be discriminatory). 
In order to evaluate whether the statutes are necessary to protect public 
morals or maintain public order, the AB engaged in a “process of weighing and 
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balancing a series of factors”. Some of the factors taken into account in the 
weighing process were the contribution of a measure to the goal it was intended 
to further; the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce; and 
a comparison between the challenged measures and possible alternatives (AB 
Report, paras. 305-308). Moreover, it stated that if the complainant raises a 
WTO-consistent alternative measure that it believes the other party should have 
taken, the respondent must demonstrate why the proposed alternative is not 
available (paras. 310-311).  
 
 
4. Issues: Global Procedural Requirements for National Administrations 
What limits does GATS impose upon national regulatory autonomy over trade in 
services? What kinds of procedural requirements must States respect? The 
interpretation of GATS in the Gambling case may have much broader 
consequences than those foreseen by the negotiating parties. 
The first consequence is driven by the (mis)interpretation of the distinction 
between market access and domestic regulation. Considering qualitative measures 
as market access restrictions effectively subjects them to a discipline that is more 
burdensome on States, and therefore restricts their sovereignty. 
The AB in the Gambling case relied upon a very strict interpretation of the 
public morals exception, through its analysis of the “necessity test”. In setting 
forth the conditions that a State must respect in order to demonstrate that a 
measure is necessary to protect public morals, the AB restricted the autonomy of 
WTO Member States. Compared to the Panel report, however, the AB also took 
one step back: in arguing that the United States was required to consult or 
negotiate with Antigua before taking a measure to protect public morals, in order 
to verify that there were no alternatives available, the Panel had sought to impose 
a general procedural requirement beyond that which was stipulated in the 
Agreement. 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. S. BATTINI, G. VESPERINI (eds.), Global and European Constraints Upon National 
Right to regulate: the Service Sector (February 2008) 
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b. A. CHANDER, “Globalization and Distrust”, 114 Yale Law Journal 1193 
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3.6. Global Standards, States of Necessity and the Review of Discretionary 
Power 
Paolo Mautino 
 
 
1. Background 
In the late Eighties, a major economic crisis hit Argentina. The Government 
undertook an important privatization program involving the major State-owned 
utilities companies, including those in the areas of gas production and 
transportation. Equity stake acquisition was offered to foreign investors with the 
goal of promoting the success of the privatization program. Bilateral treaties 
were concluded that included guarantees concerning the treatment to be 
accorded to foreign companies. Regulations were also approved in order to allow 
investing companies to receive reasonable rates of return on their investments. 
This regulatory system was based on a guaranteed tariff system, which was 
governed by an independent agency, the Ente Nacional Regulador del Gas 
(ENARGAS), which was also the body responsible for reviewing the tariffs every 
six months and adjusting them to adjustments in the United States Production 
Price Index (PPI adjustments). Government permits became licenses; moreover, 
unilateral modifications of agreements were prohibited. This system was further 
implemented by Decree No. 2255/92, entitled “Basic Rules of the License”, by 
which the Argentine Government agreed to indemnify licensees for all losses 
resulting from changes in the guaranteed tariff system. Finally, Law No. 23928 of 
1991 (the “Convertibility Law”) set a fixed exchange rate for the local currency, 
by pegging it to the US Dollar. 
A further slump hit Argentina again at the end of the 1990s. Starting in 2000, 
the Government entered into two agreements with sectoral companies to 
postpone all tariff increases. The first agreement, postponing increases for six 
months, was then followed by an ENARGAS resolution approving all tariffs 
with no increase, therefore confirming the validity of the existing tariff system. 
The second agreement, approved by Decree No. 669/00, further postponed all 
increases until June 2002. Again, in this Decree, the government confirmed that 
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all privatization regulations had been left unchanged. The worsening economic 
crisis reached its peak in December 2001: the Gross Domestic Product shrunk 
by 15% in comparison with the previous year, while unemployment increased 
exponentially, and many people emptied their bank accounts, fearing the collapse 
of the whole banking system. In order to prevent a total financial collapse, 
Argentina passed Law No. 25561, of January 6, 2002, (the “Emergency Law”) 
which, together with the implementing decrees, profoundly altered the previous 
regulations by suspending both possible tariff changes and the one-to-one 
pegging of the Argentine currency and the US dollar, and by forcibly 
renegotiating all contracts with gas-supplying companies. 
LG&E, a US company with an equity stake in one of the privatized gas 
companies involved, appealed to the Arbitral Tribunal created within the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. This appeal was 
filed on the basis of Article VII(2)(i) of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
signed between Argentina and the United States in 1991, which then entered into 
force when Argentina joined the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between the States and Nationals of other States (the ICSID 
Convention) in 1994. The petition challenged the measures adopted by the 
Argentine Government in 2002 as violating many of the obligations undertaken 
in the BIT, including the duty to respect the “fair and equitable treatment” 
standard, and the prohibition on discriminatory and arbitrary action against 
foreign investment. 
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. 
Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1) 
(http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&a
ctionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Cases_Home); 
- ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules 
(http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp); 
- Bilateral Investment Treaty between the US and Argentina 
(http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf); 
- Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_19
69.pdf). 
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3. Analysis 
This case concerned the enforcement of different regulations contained in the 
BIT between Argentina and the United States, entered into with the intent of 
encouraging mutual foreign investment, particularly of US companies in 
Argentina, which had recently suffered a major economic crisis. The provisions 
of the BIT are intended to regulate the actions of the host State by subjecting 
them to specific substantive and procedural standards. In this case, LG&E did 
not challenge an individual decision for violating these standards, but rather a 
whole set of legal and administrative acts that sought to create a sectoral policy. 
Among the relevant BIT provisions was its preamble, which stated that all 
activities of the Parties had to act in a fair and equitable manner towards foreign 
investors, in order to preserve a stable and comfortable investment climate. 
Article II(2)(b) forbade States from adopting arbitrary or discriminatory 
measures. Finally, the treaty provided that all relationships with companies must 
respect the transparency principle, which requires that all regulations, 
administrative procedures and judicial decisions that could have an impact upon 
investments be publicized. 
The decision of the Arbitral Tribunal interpreted the relevant treaty standards 
and evaluated Argentina’s respect for them during its economic crisis. 
The Tribunal held that the fair and equitable standard had been breached, 
thus rejecting the argument of the Argentine Government that this standard 
represents the international minimum standard of treatment owed to an investor 
under customary international law, such that it is only violated “when it is shown 
that an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbitrary manner that the 
treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the international 
perspective” (para. 113). 
The Tribunal held instead that the standard had to be interpreted in a 
dynamic, contextual manner, taking into account the object and purpose of the 
Parties in concluding the treaty, the actual provisions on fair and equitable 
treatment that it contains, and the evolution of the standard in the decisions of 
previous investment treaty arbitrations. 
The Tribunal held that the provision of a stable legal and business 
environment is a crucial element of fair and equitable treatment, as are the 
justified expectations of companies when deciding to invest in Argentina. The 
transparency principle was also held to apply to all relationships between 
companies and the State, implying that the latter must make investors aware of 
the whole regulatory system in which they will operate. 
The Tribunal also stressed that Argentina had discriminated against the 
predominantly foreign-owned companies operating in the gas production and 
transportation sector. Its measures, such as the complete freezing of the tariffs 
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during the crisis period, were targeted specifically at those sectors, and had been 
adopted as early as two years before the approval of the Emergency Law. Such 
conduct was held to be discriminatory due to its effects alone, regardless of any 
discriminatory intent. 
Concerning the prohibition against arbitrary action, the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
interpretation of the regulation was strictly procedural. The goal of attracting 
foreign investments set forth in the BIT preamble was taken as the purpose of 
the whole treaty. The Tribunal reasoned that attracting foreign investments is 
only possible if the State fully respects the due process of law. Any measure that 
might affect investors’ interests must therefore be adopted on the basis of a 
rational decision-making process in which such interests may be balanced against 
legitimate public aims. The Tribunal also noted that, when the Emergency Law 
was enacted, Argentina clarified all of the reasons behind the introduction of the 
different measures. Its main aim was to avoid further economic collapse; by 
starting negotiations with the companies in order to come to a reasoned 
judgment, it thus respected the due process of law. 
After examining the State’s actions in the light of the global standards 
embodied in the BIT, the Tribunal held that such measures were justified by the 
economic and social crisis. The determination of a state of necessity, as a 
condition for being relieved of all responsibility for the infringement of treaty 
rules, is contained in Article XI of the BIT, which provides that the Treaty does 
not hinder the enforcement of those measures necessary to maintain public order 
and protect national security. The Tribunal held that the existence of such 
“necessity” had to be determined by the Arbitration Tribunal, not by the State 
itself. As a consequence, the Tribunal examined all of the economic and social 
events since the appearance of the first crisis signals in 1998, and up to the 
months following the election of President Kirchner on April 26, 2001. From 
that date on, there were significant improvements in the economic indicators, 
leading the Tribunal to conclude that Argentina then began to emerge from the 
state of necessity. It examined the conditions upon which the Argentine decision 
to introduce emergency measures had been based, and evaluated the adequacy of 
such measures to cope with the crisis. It thus concluded that Argentina was 
excused from its obligations under the BIT until the election of President 
Kirchner; but that it must be held responsible for violations of those obligations 
in the period that followed, as the emergency measures had been kept in place, 
even though those conditions justifying them were no longer present. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Limits of the State of Necessity 
The LG&E case is typical investment treaty arbitration. Appeal to this kind of 
arbitration model has increased significantly along with the increased number of 
GLOBAL PRINCIPLES FOR NATIONAL PROCEDURES 101 
Bilateral Investment Treaties in the last 15 years. Investment treaty arbitration 
originated with the use of international commercial arbitration. This is used in 
business relationships among private parties, or in cases in which the State acts as 
a private party. The incorporation of arbitration mechanisms into treaties 
modifies the nature of the arbitration itself, turning it into an instrument for 
controlling the exercise of public authority. These investment treaties enable 
States to give their general consent to the use of international arbitration 
tribunals for settling disputes between companies and themselves, and therefore 
allowing judicial review over a significant proportion of their actions, be they 
legislative or administrative in nature. 
The LG&E decision raised important procedural and substantive questions 
concerning investment treaty arbitration. All of the standards used by such 
tribunals are fixed by the treaties themselves, meaning that the States have 
effectively consented to these limits themselves, albeit framed in very flexible 
terms. All interpretations are issued by arbitration tribunals, making the role and 
function of these global “judges” very important. The tribunals can even require 
the losing party to pay for all damages ensuing from the infringement of the 
treaty’s terms and conditions, as a public law remedy. Such assertive arbitration 
decisions necessitate a systematic theory of the different standards applicable, 
which must be studied particularly in relation to the legal limits upon the exercise 
of power by public authorities. From this perspective, the fair and equitable 
standard may be considered as an expression of the rule of law principle as 
determined in those countries with liberal-democratic systems. As highlighted in 
the LG&E decision, requirements such as the stability and predictability of the 
law of foreign investments arise out of more general principles such as the 
certainty of law, and the protection of legitimate expectations; as such, they all 
ultimately fall under the broad category of “rule of law requirements”. National 
decision-making procedures are therefore limited by the need to respect the rule 
of law whenever making any changes in sectoral regulations. This gives rise to 
some important questions. First of all, what are the features of rule of law 
principles as applied in the global system? What is the role of global “judges” in 
interpreting these standards? Does the interpretation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard always genuinely correspond to the will of States, as 
expressed in the BITs in question?  
Furthermore, the goal of BITs of protecting the legitimate expectations of 
foreign investors raises another question. Might administrative activities and 
decisions not strictly pertaining to economic investments, such as those relating 
to city planning, the environment, public tendering and fiscal policy, also be 
subject to this kind of judicial review? If so, investment treaty arbitration might 
simply open up too many possibilities for review, of too great a scope, creating 
tensions with States. Judicial review of the state of necessity and the adequacy of 
the particular measures taken can influence the discretionary power enjoyed by 
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national administrative authorities and by States more generally. In the LG&E 
case, the Tribunal ordered the company in question to prove that Argentina 
might have taken different measures. The Tribunal moreover held that it had 
jurisdiction to determine the existence and duration of a state of necessity; and 
that it need not defer to any such determinations made by States themselves. The 
Tribunal held the state of necessity must be an exceptional situation. What, then, 
are the limits upon such review?  
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
- CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No.ARB/01/8, May 12, 2005 
(http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Cases_Home). 
 
In the LG&E decision, the Tribunal required the company in question to 
demonstrate that Argentina might have taken different measures from those 
actually adopted. This, of course, was a very difficult task. In a previous decision 
in the CMS case, by contrast, it was the State that bore the burden of proof in 
establishing that the measures taken were those most appropriate to the 
situation. In that case, the Tribunal found that the measures adopted did not 
represent the best way to address the crisis. Furthermore, it also held Argentina 
responsible for its decisions leading up to the emergency situation. In so doing, 
the Tribunal’s review went to the very core of the State decision-making process. 
On the basis of such considerations, Argentina’s appeal to the state of necessity 
clause was rejected, even though the Tribunal did not go as far as to suggest itself 
what other measures might have been taken. The Arbitral Tribunal thus declared 
itself competent to review directly important elements of the Argentine political 
system, provoking serious tensions with the State in question. These 
inconsistencies can, of course, be explained by the fact that different ICSID 
Arbitration Tribunals are composed of different arbitrators, and that there is no 
doctrine of binding precedent in respect of previous decisions. 
 
 
6. Further Reading 
a. R. DOLZER, “The Impact of International Investment Treaties on 
Domestic administrative Law”, 37 Journal of International Law and Politics 
953 (2006); 
b. D. FOSTER, “Necessity Knows no Law: LG&E v. Argentina”, 9 
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International Arbitration Law Review 149 (2006); 
c. OECD, “Fair and Equitable Standard in International Investment Law”, 3 
Working Paper on International Investment (2004); 
d. A. REINISCH, “Necessity in International Investment Arbitration- An 
Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comment on 
CMS and LG&E”, 8 Journal of World Investment and Trade 191 (2007); 
e. S.W. SCHILL, “International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power 
to Handle Economic Crises, Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E 
v. Argentina”, 37 Journal of International Arbitration 265 (2007); 
f. ID., “Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an 
Embodiment of the Rule of Law”, IILJ Working Paper 2006/6 (Global 
Administrative Law Series) (2006) 
 (http://iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-GAL-Schill-web.pdf); 
g. G. VAN HARTEN, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford 
(2007); 
h. G. VAN HARTEN, M. LOUGHLIN, “Investment Treaty Arbitration as a 
Species of Global Administrative Law”, 17 European Journal of International 
Law 121 (2006); 
i. M. WAIBEL, “Two World of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and 
LG&E”, 3 Leiden Journal of International Law 637 (2007). 
 
 
 
 
3.7. Transparency and Proportionality: Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 
Sandro Mento 
 
 
1. Background 
The first ruling examined here is that in the Unites States - Imposition of 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products 
Originating in the United Kingdom case.  
The dispute arose from the privatization of a British State-owned enterprise 
(the British Steel Corporation, or BSC), which created, in 1986, United 
Engineering Steels (UES) as a joint venture with a privately-owned company 
(Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds – GKN) for the production of certain hot-rolled 
lead and bismuth carbon steel bars. In 1988, BSC was privatized “for fair market 
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value”, and renamed British Steel plc (BSplc), meaning that both parent 
companies of UES were now private enterprises. In 1995, BSplc took full control 
of UES, buying out GKN and renaming the company British Steel Engineering 
Steels (BSES). 
Specifically, the issue was whether certain benefits paid to BSC by the UK 
Government prior to privatization could be held to have “travelled” from BSC to 
UES and later to BSES through the various changes in ownership; and if so 
(taking into consideration the fact that the purchasers had bought the company 
shares at fair market value, and did not benefit from any “discount” derived from 
the earlier subsidies) whether these benefits amounted to “countervailable 
subsidies”. The WTO dispute arose from the 1993 imposition, after an 
investigation initiated by the US Department of Commerce (USDOC), of 
countervailing duties on the products of UES and later BSES, which, according 
to the US Authorities, had benefited from subsidies equivalent to 12.69 % of 
their import value. These duties were reaffirmed in a series of annual 
administrative reviews in the US. In January 1999, after failing to reach 
agreement through consultations, The EC requested the establishment of a panel 
to review the compatibility of the countervailing duties with WTO law. 
After a careful review of the facts (including the doctrine of State subsidies), 
the WTO Panel and Appellate Body concluded that “the ‘financial contributions’ 
bestowed on BSC between 1977 and 1986 could not be deemed to confer a 
“benefit” on UES and BSplc/BSES (AB Report, para. 68). 
 
The second ruling concerns the 1993 US imposition of countervailing duties on 
the import of carbon steel from Germany. The measure was adopted following an 
investigation initiated by the USDOC, which suspected that certain German 
producers were benefiting from subsidies (equivalent to about 0.60 % of the 
production value) from five subsidy programs. On September 1, 1999, USDOC 
automatically initiated a “sunset review” of these countervailing duties. In the 
course of this review, USDOC determined that the revocation of the 
countervailing duties “would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of a 
countervailable subsidy” with respect to carbon steel, and transmitted this finding 
to the United States International Trade Commission (USITC). Based on its 
finding that two of the original five subsidy programs had been terminated, the 
likely rate of the continuation or recurrence of such countervailable subsidies was 
determined by USDOC to be 0.54 percent ad valorem. Following an affirmative 
determination of the likelihood of the continuation or recurrence of injury by 
USITC, USDOC published a notice of the continuation of the countervailing 
duties on 15 December 2000.  
The Panel Report of 3 July 2002 found that (a) the US law imposing 
countervailing duties was consistent with Articles 10, 21.1 and 21.3 of the SCM 
Agreement in respect of the application of evidentiary standards to the self-
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initiation of sunset reviews; (b) the law imposing countervailing duties was, 
however, inconsistent with Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement in respect of the 
application of a 0.5 per cent de minimis standard to sunset reviews, and therefore 
violated Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement and, consequently, also Article XVI.4 
of the WTO Agreement; (c) the United States, in applying a 0.5 per cent de minimis 
standard to the instant sunset review, acted in violation of Article 21.3 of the SCM 
Agreement; (d) the law imposing countervailing duties was consistent with Article 
21(3) of the SCM Agreement in respect of the obligation to determine the 
likelihood of continuation or recurrence of subsidization in sunset reviews; (e) and 
that the US, in failing to properly determine the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence of subsidization in the sunset review on carbon steel, acted in violation 
of Article 21(3) of the SCM Agreement.  
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s finding that, in not applying a less 
than 1 percent de minimis standard in sunset reviews, the US law was inconsistent 
with Article 21.3 and, therefore, with Article 32.5 of the SCM Agreement, and 
consequently was also inconsistent with Article XVI of the WTO Agreement. It 
upheld the findings that US law was consistent with Articles 10, 21.1 and 21.3, of 
the SCM Agreement, and that it was not inconsistent with the obligation 
contained in Article 21.3 of the SCM Agreement to determine the likelihood of 
continuation or recurrence of subsidization in sunset reviews. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-rolled 
Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom 
(WT/DS138/AB/R) 
 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds138_e.htm); 
- United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon 
Steel Flat Products from Germany (WT/DS213/AB/R) 
 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds213_e.htm).  
 
 
3. Analysis and Issues: Requiring Transparency of National Administrations 
The first ruling is of great interest to global law because it establishes that, in the 
national administrative procedures that impose or review countervailing duties, 
“the investigating authority must address those issues that have been raised 
before it by the interested parties or, in the case of an investigation conducted on 
its own initiative, those issues which warranted the examination” (AB Report, 
para. 63). 
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Furthermore, in review procedures, the Authorities must decide, on the basis 
of the information presented to them by the interested parties, “whether there is 
a continuing need for the application of countervailing duties”. The Authorities, 
in this instance, cannot ignore the any element of fact or law upon which the 
request for review is based (“[t]he investigating authority is not free to ignore 
such information. If it were free to ignore this information, the review 
mechanism under Article 21.2 would have no purpose”, para. 61). Reasons must 
be given for any refusal to revoke the countervailing measures. Such 
requirements not only promote the transparency of public decisions and the 
clarification of government actions, but they also allow the WTO to verify the 
legitimacy of national measures.  
The WTO generally allows Member States to react to the provision of 
benefits by other States to their domestic industries through the imposition of 
tariffs to countervail their subsidizing effects. This issue is regulated by Article 
XIX of GATT 1994 and by the WTO law relating to safeguard measures. These 
measures require that the tariffs introduced to counterbalance the subsidies be 
justified by giving reasons to the importers, exporters, and to the other interested 
parties, which can include foreign governments. As already stated, Member States 
have the obligation to give reasons for their decisions; they must also allow access 
to the proceedings for interested parties. This ruling reinforces and clarifies the 
substance of the transparency principle, which must be respected by the States 
when adopting measures that produce an effect on the movement of goods. As 
noted above, the regime regulating the imposition of countervailing duties 
establishes global principles to which national procedures should conform. How 
should States enforce these principles in their national law? Should global 
standards modify national decision-making?  
For example, Article 23 of the SCM Agreement states that “such tribunals or 
procedures shall be independent of the authorities responsible for the 
determination or review in question” (of the need to impose countervailing 
duties). This Article is particularly interesting for the purposes of our 
investigation. It requires Member States to have an independent judicial system. 
The WTO thus contributes to the spread of the rule of law and principles of 
democracy. Within the field of global administrative law, this phenomenon has 
recently been described as the “circulation of legal institutions” in the global and 
national legal systems. 
 
The second ruling points out that the right to initiate an investigation and 
establish countervailing measures requires, according to Article 11.2 of the SCM 
Agreement, sufficient evidence (to be provided by the authority seeking to 
impose the measures) of the existence of “three substantive conditions 
(subsidization, injury, and a causal link between the two) and on compliance with 
its procedural and substantive rules, notably the requirement that the 
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countervailing duty cannot exceed the amount of the subsidy” (para. 73).  
This ruling is of a great interest because it examines the SCM Agreement, 
paying particular attention to the public notice obligations that must be adopted 
by Member States in order to enable the participation of the interested parties in 
the adoption of the trade countermeasure procedures. This refers in particular to 
Article 22 of the Agreement: “Article 22.1 imposes notification and public notice 
obligations upon Members that have decided, in accordance with all the 
requirements of Article 11, that the initiation of a countervailing duty 
investigation is justified. Article 22.1 does not itself establish any evidentiary rule, 
but only refers to a standard established in Article 11.9” (para. 111). 
The Appellate Body also took Article 11 of the SCM Agreement into account 
because it “sets forth the evidentiary standards that apply to the initiation by 
authorities of a countervailing duty investigation” (para. 113). According to the 
AB, the rules in part V of the SCM Agreement (Arts. 10-23, which regulate the 
countervailing measures) provide “the right to impose countervailing duties to 
offset subsidization that is causing injury, and the obligations that Members must 
respect in order to do so” (para. 74). Member States’ obligations mainly consist in 
respect for procedural standards. To promote the requirement of sufficient 
evidence, Article 11 SCM sets forth the contributions that governments and the 
other parties involved in the dispute might give to the State authorities. 
It should be noted that in the proceeding for the adoption of countervailing 
measures, prior public notification of the initiation of the investigation increases 
the transparency and the accountability of the public administration, which is also 
required to provide substantial reasons (should it adopt a measure). The 
Appellate Body also asserted that any eventual countermeasures should respect 
the proportionality principle. The obligation to provide reasons not only 
promotes the transparency of public decisions, it also allows the WTO judicial 
body to review the legitimacy of national choices (WTO Appellate Body, 
WT/DS 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259/AB/R). 
A number of open questions remain. How can we ensure, in practice, the 
enforcement of the decisions of the WTO? What institutional tools would we 
need to develop in order to do so?  
 
 
4. Further Reading 
On the first ruling: 
 
a. A.E. APPLETON, “Amicus curiae submissions in the Carbon Steel case: 
another rabbit from the appellate body’s hat?”, 3 Journal of International 
Economic Law 691 (2000); 
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b. L. BARTELS, “The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial 
Activism”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 861 (2004); 
c. J. DUNNE, “Delverde and The WTO’s British Steel Decision Foreshadow 
More Conflict Where The WTO Subsidies Agreement, Privatization, and 
United States Countervailing Duty Law Intersect”, 17 American University 
International Law Review 79 (2001); 
d. C.D. EHLERMANN, M. GOYETTE, “The Interface between EU State Aid 
Control and the WTO Disciplines on Subsidies”, 4 European State Aid Law 
Quarterly, 695 (2006). 
 
 
On the second ruling: 
 
a. D. PRUZIN, “WTO Appellate Body Overturns Ruling Against U.S. Sunset 
Review on Steel Duties”, 19 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2098 (2002); 
b. R.H. STEINBERG, “Judicial lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints”, 98 The American Journal of 
International Law 247 (2004). 
 
  
 
 
 
4. DUE PROCESS IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 
 
 
 
 
4.1. The War on Terror and the Rule of Law 
Mario Savino 
 
 
1. Background: The Global and European Regimes for the Freezing of Terrorists’ Assets 
The main international legal tool currently used to combat terrorism is the 
freezing of the assets of suspected terrorists. The Sanctions Committee, an 
auxiliary body of the UN Security Council, administers this mechanism. 
Established by UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999), the Sanctions 
Committee is made up of representatives of all the Security Council Member 
States. Its task is to draft and update the list of persons and organizations 
suspected of funding terrorist activities (the “global black list”). Once a person is 
included in the list, all UN Member States are obliged to freeze his assets. The 
listing process is triggered on the initiative of a Member State (the “designating 
government”) and requires the unanimous approval of the Sanctions Committee. 
If objections are raised, the UN Security Council takes the final decision.  
The global regime does not provide for procedural safeguards or judicial 
remedies to protect the affected party, and thus infringes upon fundamental 
rights such as the right to property, the right to administrative due process and 
the right to an effective judicial review. The listed person may only petition the 
UN Security Council directly (by means of the newly established procedure 
establishing a UN “focal point”), or his government of residence or citizenship to 
request review of the case, providing justification for the delisting application. If 
after one month, no Committee member recommends delisting, it shall be 
deemed rejected (see UN Security Council Resolutions 1730 and 1735 (2006) and 
Art. 8 of Guidelines of the 1267 Committee for the Conduct of its Work, as 
amended in February 2008). 
The European law on terrorist asset freezing is set forth in Council common 
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position 2001/931/CFSP. According to Article 1(2) of the common position, the 
EU Council may include a private party on the “European black list” on two 
different grounds: a) on the basis of precise information or material indicating 
that a decision of investigation, prosecution or condemnation for a terrorist act 
has been taken by a competent authority and that the decision is “based on 
serious and credible evidence or clues”; b) on the basis of a UN Security Council 
Resolution, in which the listing of the concerned party is confirmed. In both 
cases, the EU Council adopts the listing decision by consensus. The European 
regime does not explicitly provide the concerned parties with any meaningful 
protection. 
Furthermore, we can observe the gradual growth of a complex UN system 
for dealing with terrorism-related issues. In addition to involving Member States 
as implementing authorities, the system includes different international actors: 
international organizations, such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, on 
money-laundering), Interpol, and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(UN Res. 1617/05), together with regional organizations (UN Res. 1526/04). 
Accordingly, a global structure is emerging, composed of several 
transgovernmental bodies: the Counter Terrorism Committee; the Committee 
established by UN Security Council Resolution 1540/2004; the Monitoring 
Group; the Sanctions Enforcement Support Team; the Analytical Support and 
Sanctions Monitoring Team; and the above-mentioned Sanctions Committee, 
which is at the center of this composite network, made up of States and regional 
and international organizations. 
 
 
2. Materials 
Main case: 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber),Organisation des 
Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran (OMPI) v Council, Case T-228/02, 12 December 
2006 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:331:002
8:0028:EN:PDF). 
 
UN Documents: 
 
- Resolution 1267 (1999), on measures against the Taliban (setting up the 
Sanction Committee) 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/300/44/PDF/N9930
044.pdf?OpenElement); 
- Resolution 1373 (2001), on international cooperation to combat threats to 
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international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (setting up the 
Counter-terrorism Committee) 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155
743.pdf?OpenElement); 
- Resolution 1730 (2006), on general issues relating to sanctions 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/671/31/PDF/N0667
131.pdf?OpenElement); 
- Resolution 1735 (2006), on threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/680/14/PDF/N0668
014.pdf?OpenElement); 
- Guidelines of the 1267 Committee for the Conduct of its Work, adopted on 
7 November 2002, as amended on 10 April 2003 and revised on 21 
December 2005, 29 November 2006 and 12 February 2007 
(http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf). 
 
European and Community Measures: 
- Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:009
3:0096:EN:PDF); 
- Council Common Position 2003/651/CFSP of 12 September 2003 updating 
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures 
to combat terrorism and repealing Common Position 2003/482/CFSP 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003E06
51:EN:HTML); 
- Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view 
to combating terrorism 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R25
80:EN:HTML); 
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 745/2003 of 28 April 2003 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific measures directed against 
certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:106:002
2:0023:EN:PDF); 
- Council Decision 2002/460/EC of 17 June 2002, implementing Article 2(3) 
of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism and 
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repealing Decision 2002/334/EC 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002D0
460:EN:HTML). 
 
Other European cases on the same issue: 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, extended composition), 
Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission, Case T-306/01, 21 September 2005, ECR 2005 p. II-3533 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62001A03
06:EN:HTML); 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber, extended composition), 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission,Case T-315/01, 21 September 
2005, ECR 2005 p. II-3649 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62001A03
15:EN:HTML); 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber), Faraj Hassan v Council 
and Commission, Case T-49/04, 12 July 2006, ECR 2006 p. II-52 
(http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm); 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber), Chafiq Ayadi v Council, 
Case T-253/02, 12 July 2006, ECR 2006 p. II-2139 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62002A02
53:EN:HTML); 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber),Jose Maria Sison v Council, 
Case T-47/03, 11 July 2007 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:199:002
7:0027:EN:PDF); 
- European Court of First Instance (Second Chamber), Stichting Al-Aqsa v 
Council of the European Union, Case T-327/03, 11 July 2007 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:199:002
9:0029:EN:PDF); 
- ECJ (First Chamber), Osman Ocalan, on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) and Serif Vanly, on behalf of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) v Council, 
Case C-229/05 P, 18 January 2007, ECR 2007 p. I-445 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J02
29:EN:HTML); 
- ECJ (First Chamber),Jose Maria Sison v Council, Case C-266/05 P, 1 February 
2007 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J02
66:EN:HTML); 
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- ECJ (Grand Chamber), Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al v Council,Case C-354/04 P, 
27 February 2007 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J03
54:EN:HTML); 
- ECJ (Grand Chamber),Segi et al v Council,Case C-355/04 P, 27 February 2007 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004J03
55:EN:HTML). 
 
 
3. Analysis: The OMPI Case 
The Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran (OMPI), founded in 
France in 1965, aimed to replace the Shah of Iran, and then the Mullahs, with a 
democracy. The OMPI originally had an armed branch operating inside Iran, but 
since June 2001 it has expressly renounced all military activity. A few months 
earlier, however, the UK Secretary of State for the Home Department had listed 
the OMPI as an organization to be banned under the 2000 Terrorism Act. The 
OMPI brought two cases against the Home Secretary’s order, both of which 
were dismissed. As a consequence, the EU Council included the OMPI in the 
European black list (Council common position 2002/340/FCSP and Council 
decision 2002/334/EC). The OMPI challenged these EU decisions before the 
European Court of First Instance (CFI), maintaining that it violated its right to a 
fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article 253 EC, and 
the right to effective judicial protection. The CFI upheld the action brought by 
the OMPI and annulled the EU Council decision. 
The CFI judgment is important for two reasons. Firstly, it is the first time 
that a European Court has agreed to review a listing measure for compliance with 
EU legal standards and principles. The previous cases (Yussuf, Kadi, Hassan and 
Ayadi: see infra, Ch. 3.5) had rejected that possibility. Here, however, the 
European measure in dispute had been adopted in application of a UN Security 
Council resolution and thus was a non-discretionary act. According to the Court 
of First Instance in those cases, it would have been inappropriate to carry out a 
scrutiny of that international measure under European law. The Court, therefore, 
reviewed the contested measures with exclusive reference to jus cogens obligations, 
and found it to be consistent with these. In the OMPI case, on the contrary, the 
European measure was not obliged by any international decision. It was, rather, a 
discretionary Council measure, based on a national (British) judicial order. As 
such, the measure had to be consistent with Community law and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
This judgment is also important because it provides a comprehensive 
framework of the due process guarantees in place to protect suspected terrorists: 
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the right of defense, the duty to state reasons and the right to an effective judicial 
protection are carefully balanced against (and reconciled with) public security 
demands. 
As far as the right of defense is concerned, the CFI acknowledged that ex ante 
(that is, prior to the adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds) notification 
of the evidence and a hearing for the parties concerned would jeopardize the 
effectiveness of the sanction, as it would forfeit the element of surprise. 
However, it also held the alternative cannot be the complete absence of such 
protections. In order to preserve the effectiveness of the sanction it is sufficient – 
according to the Court – that notification of the evidence and the hearing take 
place not before, but either simultaneously with or as soon as possible after the 
adoption of the initial decision to freeze the funds of the individual or 
organization in question. The same caution does not apply to subsequent decisions 
to confirm the freezing measure after re-examination of the case: in such cases, 
the funds are already frozen and it is accordingly no longer necessary to ensure a 
surprise effect (paras. 127-132). A more general limit arises when “overriding 
considerations concerning the security… or the conduct of… international 
relations” are at stake: that being the case, similar considerations “may preclude 
the communication to the parties concerned of certain evidence adduced against 
them and, in consequence, the hearing of those parties with regard to such evidence, 
during the administrative procedure” (para. 133, emphasis added).  
Turning to the duty to state reasons, the CFI found that, in order to prevent 
the circumvention of defense rights based upon vague security concerns, it could 
not accept a statement of reasons merely consisting of a “general, stereotypical 
formulation”. On the contrary, “the grounds for such a measure must… indicate 
the actual and specific reasons why the Council considers that the relevant rules 
are applicable to the party concerned” (para. 143). It is clear that considerations 
of public interest and the legitimate interests of the parties in question may 
prevent the public disclosure of specific reasons. However in such cases an 
exceptional, yet balanced, solution would consist in a “two-level” statement of 
reasons: a general one, together with the operative part of the decision, must 
appear in the published version of the measure, while an actual and specific 
statement of reasons for the decision may brought to the knowledge of just the 
parties concerned (para. 147). 
Finally, as far as the right to an effective judicial protection is concerned, here 
again the main restriction stems from security considerations that often induce 
the Council to raise objections that the relevant evidence and information is 
secret or confidential. The CFI softened this restriction, on the basis that an 
effective judicial protection “is all the more imperative because it constitutes the 
only procedural safeguard ensuring that a fair balance is struck between the need 
to combat international terrorism and the protection of fundamental rights”; and, 
“since the restrictions imposed by the Council on the right of the parties 
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concerned to a fair hearing must be offset by a strict judicial review which is 
independent and impartial”, it follows that “the Community Courts must be able 
to review the lawfulness and merits of the measures to freeze funds without it being 
possible to raise objections that the evidence and information used by the Council is secret or 
confidential” (para. 155, emphasis added).  
Therefore, the OMPI judgment marks a shift in the CFI jurisprudence on 
terrorism-related issues towards a more promising approach, whereby security 
concerns are balanced against countervailing individual rights. It thus re-
establishes the centrality of the rule of law, together with the power-checking 
mission of (European) administrative law.  
 
 
4. The European Case-Law on the Issue  
The CFI judgments can be divided into two strands. The first concerns 
European measures implementing global decisions to freeze assets. Since the 
content of such European measures is determined by UN decisions, the CFI 
limits itself to reviewing their legitimacy according to jus cogens, “understood as a 
body of higher rules of public international law binding on all subjects of 
international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no 
derogation is possible” (T-306/01, Yusuf, para. 277). Due to the lack of due 
process guarantees within jus cogens, it inevitably follows that the CFI declined to 
improve the standards of protection (see T-306/01, Yusuf and T-315/01, Kadi). 
The subsequent Hassan (T-49/04) and Ayady (T-253/02) cases followed the same 
basic path, but suggested a more proactive stance towards individual protections. 
Here the CFI, having regard to the fact that individuals are not entitled to be 
heard in person by the Sanctions Committee, required the government in 
question “to act promptly to ensure that such persons’ cases are presented 
without delay and fairly and impartially to the Committee, with a view to their re-
examination”, and to provide the concerned parties with judicial review “against 
any wrongful refusal by the competent national authority to submit their cases to 
the Sanctions Committee for re-examination” (Hassan, para. 120). 
The second strand concerns “autonomous” European measures, i.e. 
decisions that are not bound by previous UN Resolutions, but rather based upon 
judicial decisions adopted at the Member State level. In this context, the relevant 
legal parameter is not jus cogens obligations, but Community law and the ECHR. 
As a consequence, the CFI fully applies transparency and due process standards 
to such cases, balanced against the inevitable exigencies and time constraints 
imposed by security concerns. This different approach, first adopted in the OMPI 
case, has been relied on again more recently, both in the Al Aqsa case (T-
327/03), in which a Council decision was annulled for insufficient statement of 
the reasons behind it, and in the Sison case (T-47/03), in which the CFI held that 
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“the breach of the applicant’s rights of defence is sufficiently serious for the 
Community to incur liability” (para. 240).  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has thus far only dealt with issues 
indirectly related to terrorism. The most relevant case is Ocalan (C-229/05), 
where the ECJ confirmed its traditional restrictive understanding of the 
individual right to challenge European decisions (Article 230.4 EC Treaty). In the 
Sison case (C-266/05 P), the ECJ upheld the Council decision to prevent an 
individual from accessing the documents upon which her listing as a suspect 
terrorist was based. Finally, in the Gestoras and Segi cases (C-354/04 P and C-
355/04 P) the ECJ affirmed that, due to its lack of jurisdiction over the second 
pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy), it could not rule on EC liability for 
Council listing decisions. 
However, new important developments have been announced. The Kadi case, 
in fact, was appealed before ECJ (C-402/05 P) and Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro delivered his opinion in the case on 16 January 2008. At least two points 
of this opinion need to be stressed. Firstly, jus cogens is questioned as the 
appropriate standard for reviewing the legality of European measures 
implementing UN Resolutions: according to the Advocate General, “the 
relationship between international law and the Community legal order is 
governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate 
that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of 
the Community” (para. 34). Secondly, while applying European standards to 
decisions concerning security matters, there is no reason – according to Maduro 
– for the Court to depart from its usual interpretation of due process and 
fundamental rights: “The fact that the measures at issue are intended to suppress 
international terrorism should not inhibit the Court from fulfilling its duty to 
preserve the rule of law. In doing so, rather than trespassing into the domain of 
politics, the Court is reaffirming the limits that the law imposes on certain 
political decisions” (para. 45). 
  
 
5. Issues: Due Process and the Security Council 
In the OMPI case, the CFI re-established the reach of the rule of law and the due 
process principle over the asset freezing measures adopted by the EU, despite the 
fact that, in all of the previous cases, the same court did not apply those 
principles and protections to similar European measures implementing UN 
decisions (see the abovementioned Yussuf, Kadi, Hassan and Ayady cases). Does 
the OMPI case amount to a révirement of the Court of First Instance?  
The answer is negative, for the simple reason that the OMPI standard still 
does not apply to European measures implementing UN decisions. Its reach is 
limited to autonomous European acts, i.e. EU Council measures that are not 
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bound by pre-existing UN listing Resolutions. Why should the EU – which is not 
a UN member – recognize the primacy of UN law over EU law? Why should a 
European Court review a European regulation implementing a UN rule 
according to international jus cogens norms alone? 
The final outcome of this double standard raises doubts. The distinction 
between discretionary and non-discretionary European measures has the perverse 
consequence that suspected terrorists whose assets are first frozen by an EU 
decision enjoy rights and protections that those listed by the UN do not. In brief, 
the level of legal protection varies considerably depending on how efficient the 
EU decision-making process is, compared to that of the UN (as a rule, EU 
Member States send their listing proposals at the same time – as soon as they 
gather the relevant information – to both the competent European and UN 
institutions). 
Four sets of questions are in order. First, is this bifurcated case law, which 
upholds or denies fundamental rights according to the discretionary or non-
discretionary character of the EU measure at stake, acceptable? Is this double 
standard based upon a reasonable diversity of situations? Second, UN institutions 
are, of course, aware of the need to fill the accountability gaps existing in the UN 
listing procedure, and they are also aware of the need to reform the system in 
order to prevent the risk of an adverse court decision (see, for instance, UN 
Second Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2005/83, para. 
54, and Annex I to the Sixth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring 
Team, S/2007/132). Yet, is the 2006 revision of the UN delisting procedure (UN 
Res. 1730 and 1735) satisfactory, given that the procedure remains diplomatic in 
character? What if the ECJ upholds Maduro’s Opinion, and decides to protect 
fundamental rights against UN-bound European measures? What would this 
imply for the domestic implementation of UN resolutions? Third, what happens 
beyond Europe? Do suspected terrorists enjoy the same “double standard”, 
provided that some domestic measures are autonomous while others are UN-
bound? Lastly, taking for granted that the only satisfactory remedy in this context 
must be global, is there any room for global administrative law to expand in this 
regard? Given that such a remedy would require a globalized due process and 
rule of law, how quickly can it emerge? And will it be the result of a top-down 
international political initiative, or the bottom-up rebellion of a domestic court, 
or both?  
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4.2. The Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: The Bustani 
Case 
Bruno Carotti 
 
 
1. Background 
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction was signed in Geneva 
on September 3, 1992. It was opened for signature in January 1993 and entered 
into force on April 29, 1997. 182 States, representing 98% of the world’s 
population, are parties to the Convention. 
The Convention established the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW, Art. VIII of the Convention), based in the Hague, whose goal 
is to aid States in preventing the production of new chemical weapons and 
facilitating the destruction of existing ones within stipulated deadlines (although 
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this latter objective is conditional upon a specific declaration of the Member 
State). The Organization conducts inspections of suspected civil and military 
sites, provides assistance to States threatened by third parties and fosters the 
study of chemistry for peaceful uses. The Convention promotes cooperation 
between States, requires them to adopt the necessary implementation measures 
(e.g., impose sanctions for the construction of new weapons) and compels them 
to designate an authority responsible for the fulfillment of the objectives in this 
field. In ten years of activity, various programs have been established in order to 
achieve the Convention’s goals; almost 3,000 inspections have been conducted; 
and it is estimated that, since the establishment of the OPCW, around 30% of 
the world’s chemical weapons have been eliminated. The annual budget of the 
Organization is around 75 million Euros. 
The bodies of the OPCW are the Conference of the State Parties, the 
Executive Committee and the Technical Secretariat. The Conference includes all 
of the Member States (Art. VIII, para. 9), and is the main body of the 
Organization, entrusted with the most important matters addressed by the treaty, 
on which it can make decisions and recommendations. The Executive 
Committee is charged with the implementation of the Convention. Composed of 
41 members, it performs the functions provided for in the Convention, and 
those delegated to it by the Conference (Art. VIII, para. 30). The Technical 
Secretariat provides administrative support to the Conference and the Committee 
(Art. VIII, para. 23 et seq.). 
The Organization is headed by a Director-General, who is elected by the 
Conference and holds office for a four-year term, which can renewed once. The 
first Director was J.M. Bustani, a Brazilian citizen elected in 1997. In 2000, his 
mandate was renewed until 2005. 
The United States is the Organization’s main financer. Considering Bustani’s 
leadership to be unsatisfactory, it presented a no-confidence motion to the 
Executive Committee in March 2002. The motion was rejected. The US then 
brought the motion to the Conference, which adopted it on April 22, 2002. 
Bustani was then removed from office and replaced by the Argentinean Rogelio 
Pfirter. 
On 19 July 2002, Bustani appealed his removal to the Administrative Tribunal 
of the International Labour Organization, which has jurisdiction to hear claims 
brought by staff members against a number of international organizations, 
including the OPCW. 
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2. Materials and Sources 
- Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization, Judgment 
No. 2232, of July 16, 2003, Bustani v. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/fulltext/2232.htm); 
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 
(http://www.opcw.org/docs/cwc_eng.pdf); 
- Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour 
Organization adopted by the International Labour Conference on 9 October 
1946 and amended by the Conference on 29 June 1949, 17 June 1986, 19 
June 1992 and 16 June 1998 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/stateng.htm). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
Bustani argued that the decision terminating his contract was illegal. He asked for 
material damages and compensation for the “enormous pain, anguish and 
suffering” that the decision caused him. He intended to donate his winnings to 
the Organization, in order to fund activities of the Programme of International 
Cooperation (Technical Assistance to Developing Countries). 
This case raised a preliminary question relating to the jurisdiction of the ILO 
Tribunal. The Convention requires that, before a dispute can be referred to the 
Tribunal, there be a previous examination by the Appeals Council, which is 
competent to hear appeals by staff members against administrative decisions 
concerning them. This procedure was unavailable in the Bustani case, as the 
impugned decision was adopted by the Organization’s highest authority. The 
Tribunal thus held that Bustani could appeal to it directly, since the decision was 
administrative in nature, final, and directly affected his interests. 
On the merits, Bustani made a number of arguments. First, he asserted a 
procedural prejudice: the special session of the Conference that fired him was not 
convened according to the Convention (Art. VIII, paras. 19-21), and that its 
decision ought therefore to be annulled. Second, he claimed that the Conference 
had exceeded its powers: the norms establish the procedure for the selection of 
the Director-General, including the possibility to renew his mandate; nothing, on 
the contrary, is said about his removal. Removal is possible, in any event, only as 
a result of criminal or quasi-criminal behavior, which was not alleged in this case. 
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Third, he claimed the Conference was not competent to review the decisions of 
the Committee. Fourth, he argued that there was a breach of procedural 
protections and a violation of the principles of due process and natural justice: 
the Director-General was not informed of the charges against him, and neither 
was he allowed to contest them or to defend his interests. Finally, he argued that 
the Conference had not acted in the interest of the Organization, giving in 
instead to political pressure. 
The Organization asserted that the loss of confidence in the Director-
General was an exceptional event, justifying his removal (see part C of the 
decision of the Administrative Tribunal). It also argued that the Director-General 
should have pursued other remedies (such as negotiations, good offices or 
arbitration) before presenting his claim to the ILO Tribunal; furthermore, it 
affirmed the political and not administrative nature of its decision, and thus 
challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the matter. 
The Tribunal affirmed its jurisdiction over the case, holding itself competent 
to decide controversies relating to both the staff and the officials of international 
organizations, according to the Organization’s declaration accepting the 
jurisdiction of the ILO Administrative Tribunal and Article VIII, paragraph 46 of 
the Convention.  
The Tribunal reasoned that no other remedies were available, other than the 
Tribunal: the Appeal Council, internal to the Organization, operates under the 
authority and the control of the Director-General, so it was inconceivable that, 
once removed, he could have brought a claim before that body. In addition, the 
Appeal Council cannot review a decision of the Conference. It thus held it 
proper to affirm its own jurisdiction in this situation, in order to guarantee the 
fundamental right of judicial protection. 
The Tribunal stressed the importance of ensuring the independence of 
international civil servants. This serves not only their own individual interests, 
but also the “proper functioning” of international organizations. The Tribunal 
thus recognized the potential conflict between the interests of the Organization 
and the very States that created it. 
When the specialized organs of international organizations are in conflict 
with each other, their functional stability becomes more important: the Director-
General’s removal suggests, on the other hand, the vulnerability of even top 
international civil servants to external pressures. The Tribunal concluded that an 
officer with a fixed term cannot be removed on the basis of political evaluations, 
because these are highly discretionary. Objective reasons must instead be given 
(e.g., a serious breach of his duties) and respect for due process, through 
transparent procedures granting the right to defense, must be ensured. 
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4. Issues: Due Process in the Internal Affairs of International Organizations 
The Bustani case highlights the importance of adopting an administrative law 
methodology in the international arena (here concerning the relationship between 
an international officer and an international organization). 
This case also illustrates the common principle that international officers 
ought to be independent in the performance of their duties. In particular, their 
own government must not try to influence them. Only in this way can 
international administrations carry out their tasks autonomously and impartially. 
The European Commission provides a specific example of this principle in a 
different context (Art. 213 of the EC Treaty). In the Bustani case, however, 
different nuances begin to emerge. The Director-General’s removal raised 
questions about the role of the specialized organs of an international 
organization, and the protection of the persons performing their functions from 
political influence. There is a clear difference between the officer-organization 
relationship, on the one hand, and the relationship between the executive bodies 
of an organization and political authority (e.g. States) on the other. A trace of this 
distinction can be found in the opinion of the Tribunal, in which it states, in 
response to the defendant’s claim that it has no jurisdiction over a political act, 
that “a decision terminating the appointment of an international civil servant 
prior to the expiry of his/her term of office is an administrative decision, even if 
it is based on political considerations” (para. 10). Thus, the same issue discussed 
in national legal systems appears in the global arena: what are the boundaries 
between political and administrative power? Can the risk of undue influence be 
avoided by invoking the concept of a “political act”? 
The Bustani case thus seems to affirm an important principle: political 
decisions should not influence the administrative functioning of an international 
organization. There must be a fiduciary relationship between political and 
administrative bodies, but this relationship ought not to jeopardize the regular 
exercise of the supranational administration’s functions. 
The case leaves us with the following question: is there a nascent principle of 
separation between politics and administration in the global legal order? 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. W. CHANAKA, “The Bustani Case Before the ILOAT”, 1 International 
Organizations Law Review 197 (2004); 
b. T. DUNWORTH, “The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW): Is a Culture of Legality Possible?”, paper presented at the “Second 
Global Administrative Law Seminar”, Viterbo, June 9-10, 2006 
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(http://www.irpa.eu/public/File/Global%20Administrative%20Law/Dunw
orthOPCW.doc); 
c. J. KLABBERS, “The Bustani Case before the ILOAT: Constitutionalism in 
Disguise?”, 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 455 (2004); 
d. G. MONBIOT, “Chemical coup d’Ètat”, The Guardian, April 16, 2002; 
e. A. STANIC, “Removal of the Head of a Multilateral Organization – 
Independence of International Organization and Their Secretariat – Political 
Interference by Member State in the Operation of International 
Organization”, 98 American Journal of International Law 810 (2004). 
 
 
 
 
4.3. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS): The Juno 
Trader Case 
Diego Agus and Martina Conticelli 
 
 
1. Background 
A refrigerated cargo vessel (the Juno Trader), flying the flag of Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, was boarded by maritime officers of Guinea-Bissau.  
According to the Guinean administration, the vessel was caught fishing 
unlawfully inside the exclusive economic zone of Guinea-Bissau. St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines asked the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) 
to review Guinea’s decision providing for the detention of the vessel and the 
confiscation of its cargo, and to declare whether the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) governing this type of 
proceeding had been breached. The ITLOS ruled that the Guinean maritime 
administration had violated Article 73(2) of the Convention, which provides that 
arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of 
reasonable bond or other security, as well as principles such as due process of law 
and reasonableness which, according to the Tribunal, were implicit in the 
provisions of Article 73.  
The dispute originated from the alleged violation by the Juno Trader of the 
Guinean fishing legislation, which provides for the detention of the vessel and 
the confiscation of the cargo (Articles 56-58 of Decree-Law No. 6-A/2000 
concerning Fisheries Resources and Fishing Rights in the Maritime Waters of 
Guinea-Bissau). 
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The normative ground of this case was the UNCLOS, which entered into 
force in November 1994 and which lays down a comprehensive legal regime for 
the world's oceans and seas, establishing the rules governing all uses of the 
oceans and their resources. Article 73 of the Convention provides that the coastal 
State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, 
including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be 
necessary to ensure compliance with its laws.  
In seeking to settle any dispute concerning the interpretation or application 
of the Convention, each Member State is free to choose one or more of the 
following bodies: the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and two different arbitral tribunals. 
The ITLOS is an independent judicial body composed of 21 members 
elected (by secret ballot) by States Parties to the Convention. Under Article 292 
of the Convention, the Tribunal has jurisdiction over disputes between Member 
States concerning the prompt release of vessels and crews. 
The dispute in this case involved two States, both Parties to the Convention: 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Guinea-Bissau. A private party, the owner 
of the Juno Trader (registered in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and authorized 
to transport refrigerated dry products), intervened in the dispute, as did other 
governmental bodies of Guinea-Bissau: the Fisheries Inspection Service (which 
carried out the first inspection on board the Juno Trader); the Centre for Applied 
Fisheries Research (formed at the request of the National Fisheries Inspection 
and Control Service (FISCAP), which inspected the cargo on board the Juno 
Trader in the port of Bissau for the second time); the Fisheries Control Technical 
Committee (a technical body that met to consider both the serious fishing 
infraction and the inspection reports concerning the arrest of the Juno Trader); the 
Interministerial Maritime Control Commission (IMCC – the body charged with 
determining the amount of fines and other incidental remedies); and the Regional 
Court of Bissau (which decided on the ship owner’s application for the release of 
vessel and crew, and that any procedure aimed at selling the fish and fishmeal 
found on board the vessel should be annulled pending judgment in the case). 
  
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
 (http://www.itlos.org); 
- The “Juno Trader” case, December 18, 2004 n. 13 
(www.itlos.org/cgi-bin/cases/case_detail.pl?id=13&lang=en);  
- Application on behalf of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
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(http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html); 
- Declaration of Judge Kolodkin 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_250.doc); 
- Separate Opinion of Judge Park 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_252.doc); 
- Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Mensah and Wolfrum 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_253.doc); 
- Separate Opinion of Judge Chandrasekhara Rao 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_254.doc); 
- Separate Opinion of Judge Treves 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_255.doc); 
- Separate Opinion of Judge Lucky 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2004/document_en_257.doc); 
- United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overvi
ew_convention.htm). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines argued that Guinea’s decisions ordering the 
detention of the vessel, the confiscation of its cargo and setting of a bond for its 
release were unlawful, as no breach of the national Guinean fisheries legislation 
by the Juno Trader had been proven. Notwithstanding the Guinean national 
court’s jurisdiction to rule on the legality of these two national administrative 
acts, St. Vincent and the Grenadines claimed the right to bring the case before a 
global judicial body, the ITLOS, asking for the judicial review of those acts under 
the UNCLOS. 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines thus asked the Tribunal to declare a breach 
of Article 73(2) of the UNCLOS, and to order the immediate release of the 
vessel and its cargo, either removing entirely the bond requirement, or at least 
setting this at a reasonable level. Guinea-Bissau responded that the ITLOS had 
no jurisdiction over the case, as the dispute concerned a national administrative 
procedure. 
After affirming its jurisdiction over the case and declaring the admissibility of 
the claim, the ITLOS found there to have been a breach of Article 73(2), which, 
it argued, must be read in the context of Article 73 as a whole. According to the 
Tribunal, the Guinean administration failed to respect the elementary 
considerations of humanity and due process of law inherent in the obligation to 
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promptly release both vessels and crew; and the principles of fairness and 
reasonableness in setting the level of bond required. These principles do not 
appear explicitly in Article 73; they are, however, implied by the purposes of that 
provision. Finally, the Tribunal stressed the fact that between the time of the 
arrest of the vessel and the time of the application to the Tribunal, all national 
procedures in the case had been inaudita altera parte. In conclusion, the 
confiscation had been made in violation of due process and fines had been 
imposed without the requisite procedural guarantees. 
 
 
4. Issues: Global Bodies Reviewing National Administrative Decisions 
The case raises important questions concerning the role and power of global 
judicial bodies in reviewing national administrative acts. The limits of judicial 
review and the principles applicable by global courts to national administrative 
decisions require further analysis. In the particular context of the Juno Trader case, 
the issue was whether the ITLOS should have made reference only to UNCLOS 
principles or to other principles as well. 
A second group of problems arises from the specific features of global 
administrative law. It is interesting to highlight the global function of traditionally 
national principles of administrative procedure, such as participation, due process 
and reasonableness. 
A last group of questions concerns the interaction between global and 
national norms, emerging from the implementation of global decisions by 
national administrations. It is useful to compare the different levels of protection 
afforded by the global and national systems, and to examine the effects of their 
reciprocal interpenetration. 
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
On July 6, 2007, two applications were submitted to the ITLOS under Article 
292 of the UNCLOS, relating to the release of two fishing vessels, flying the 
Japanese flag, boarded by the Russian coastguard patrol board while fishing in 
the Russian exclusive economic zone: the first application concerned the release 
of the 88th Hoshinmaru and of 17 members of its crew; while the second 
concerned the release of the 53rd Tomimaru. On August 6, 2007, the ITLOS 
ordered release of both vessels upon the posting of a bond. 
About these events, see the following links: 
- ITLOS, Press release, ITLOS/Press 110, 6 July 2007 
(http://www.itlos.org/news/press_release/2007/press_release_110_en.doc);  
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- ITLOS, Press release, ITLOS/Press 112/113, 6 August 2007 
(http://www.itlos.org/news/press_release/2007/press_release_112_en.doc) 
(http://www.itlos.org/news/press_release/2007/press_release_113_en.doc).  
  
 
6. Further Reading 
a. C. BROWN, “‘Reasonableness’ in the Law of the Sea: The Prompt Release of 
the Volga”, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 621 (2003); 
b. G. EIRIKSSON, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, The Hague 
(2000); 
c. ID., “Prompt release of vessels and crews in accordance with article 292 on 
the United Nations convention on the law of the sea”, Cuadernos de derecho 
pesquero 19 (2000); 
d. R. KHAN, C. RAO (eds.), International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Law and 
Practice, The Hague (2002);  
e. S. ROSENNE, Provisional Measures in International Law: the International Court of 
Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Oxford (2005); 
f. J. SEYMOUR, “The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Great 
Mistake?”, 13 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 1 (2006); 
g. Y. TANAKA, “Prompt Release in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea: Some Reflections on the ITLOS Jurisprudence”, 51 Netherlands 
International Law Review 237 (2004); 
h. T. TREVES, “The Proceedings Concerning Prompt Release of Vessels and 
Crews before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea”, 11 The 
International Journal of Marine Law and Coastal Law 179 (1996), and also 
published in Diritto marittimo 933 (1997);  
i. ID., “Le Tribunal international du droit de la mer et la multiplication des 
juridictions internationales”, 3 Rivista di diritto internazionale 726 (2000). 
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4.4. The World Bank Inspection Panel: The Indian Mumbai Urban 
Transport Project Case 
Mariarita Circi 
 
 
1. Background 
The World Bank Inspection Panel is a forum established in 1993 by a joint 
resolution of the two organizations that together constitute the World Bank 
(WB): the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and 
the International Development Association (IDA). The Panel was established to 
evaluate requests for inspections by private citizens claiming that their interests 
have been, or could be, adversely affected by World Bank-financed projects, 
carried out in violation of internal Bank procedures. 
The Mumbai Urban Transport Project case concerns a project financed in 
part by the IBRD (US$ 463 million) and in part by the IDA (US$ 79 million), 
making a total WB commitment of US$ 542 million and a total project cost 
(including funding from Bank and non-Bank sources) of US$ 945 million. The 
project, the third most costly ever for the WB in India, and the 6th most costly 
worldwide (in the transportation sector), was approved by the WB Board on June 
18, 2002, and was intended to create substantial improvements in the Mumbai 
(India) transport system. It included the demolition of several homes and shops, 
and the transfer of 77,000 residents to other areas. It was due to be completed by 
June 30, 2008. 
 
 
2. Materials an Sources 
- World Bank Inspection Panel 
 (www.inspectionpanel.org); 
- India: Mumbai Urban Transport Project (2004) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONP
ANEL/0,,contentMDK:20223785~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~the
SitePK:380794,00.html); 
- Panel Operating Procedures; World Bank Policies and Procedures; 
Resolution Establishing the Panel (September 23 1993) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONP
ANEL/0,,contentMDK:20173262~menuPK:64129254~pagePK:64129751~
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piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html); 
- 1996 Review of the Resolution 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources
/1996ReviewResolution.pdf); 
- 1999 Clarification of the Second Review 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources
/1999ClarificationoftheBoard.pdf);  
- WB Policy on Involuntary Resettlement 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJU
STICE/EXTENVIRONMENTNATRESLAW/0,,contentMDK:20675447~
menuPK:1737138~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:1001743,00.ht
ml);  
- Press Release on WB Board discussion on Inspection Panel Investigation of 
Mumbai Urban Transport Project 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources
/MUTPPressRelease.pdf). 
  
 
3. Analysis  
The Panel received four requests for inspection (on April 28, June 24, November 
29 and December 23, 2004) by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
representing local businesses and residents. 
The Panel processed all of the requests jointly, due to their common subject 
matter. The 6 km Santa Cruz-Chembur Link Road was the subject of the first 
three requests, and the fourth request addressed the other Mumbai east-west 
road link (Jogeshwari-Vikhroli). The Requestors alleged violations of Operational 
Bank Policies and Procedures, in particular regarding the Project Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation scheme under which they were entitled to an area of 225 
square meters, regardless of the size of the actual area on which the buildings 
scheduled for demolition stood. Some of the Requestors objected to the 
classification of their particular area as a slum, and to the decision to be moved to 
a resettlement site, called Mankhurd, located near the main municipal dump, 
alleging that it was one of the most polluted areas in Mumbai. 
Considering the violations alleged in the requests, the two WB Management 
reports on the first two requests (May 27 and July 28, 2004) and a provisional 
inspection of the affected area (June 22-27, 2004), the Panel submitted a report 
to the WB Board of Executive Directors (September 3, 2004). The Panel 
declared the requests to be admissible, and requested authorization to carry out 
an inspection. The Board approved the requests on September 24, 2004. 
Following an inspection, during which the Panel also verified the 
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admissibility of the third and fourth requests, it issued an Investigation Report, and 
submitted it to the WB Board on December 21, 2005.The Panel made three 
significant observations. First, it acknowledged the project’s lack of compliance 
with the WB’s policies, particularly with regard to policy OD 4.30 – Involuntary 
Resettlements, in view of the fact that the WB had failed to consult with parties 
affected by the relocation. Second, the Panel observed that the project did not 
allow the people affected to appeal in the event of disagreement. Lastly, the Panel 
also noted that almost all responsibility for the relocation process had been 
delegated by the Government to NGOs, which were unable to handle the 
enormous task. On February, 27 2006, the WB Management submitted its own 
Report and Recommendations to the Board in response to the Panel’s 
observations, in which it recognized the claims put forth by the Panel (lack of 
opportunity to appeal, inappropriate delegation of responsibility to NGOS) and 
proposed an Action Plan to render the project compliant with the procedures of 
the Bank. 
The Board decided to suspend funding as an initial precautionary measure 
(March 1, 2006); to approve the Management’s Action Plan and the Panel’s 
Investigation Report (March, 28 2006), defining how the project would be 
monitored (a progress report of the WB Management to be submitted within 6 
months of the Board meeting, followed by a report from the Panel on the 
progress of the project); and to continue funding the project until June 29, 2006. 
With regard to the monitoring of the project, on March 1, 2007, the Management 
submitted its Progress Report to the Board of Executive Directors, which stated 
that progress had been made on many of the measures contained in the Action 
Plan, and that the implementation of rehabilitation and resettlement measures 
had improved. In its progress report, the Panel recognized the Management’s 
efforts since March 2006, noting, however, that a number of issues still needed to 
be resolved, and that many of the targets listed in the Management’s Action Plan 
had not been met. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Participation of Citizens in Global Administrative Proceedings 
The above case provides an example of procedures that grant citizens the right to 
participate in global administrative proceedings. In the initial stage, participatory 
rights are granted by the WB and national authorities, and the parties affected by 
the project in question are informed. Another chance to participate arises at the 
inspection phase. Part VII of the Panel’s Operating Procedures grants broad 
participation in inspections to the interested parties (the Panel hears the injured 
parties who have forwarded the request, the relevant WB officials, governmental 
representatives of the country benefiting from the loan, and the interested local 
NGOS; moreover, all of these parties can submit documents on their own 
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initiative), as well as to “any member of the public able to provide information 
considered relevant in assessing the request”. 
In this case, the Eligibility Report and the requests for information offer 
indirect evidence of how the procedures in the initial stage of participation 
function; the Investigation Report instead concerns the second stage. They are 
particularly useful in helping us assess whether the operative relationship is only 
bilateral (private party – international organization) or perhaps rather trilateral 
(private party – country benefiting from the loan – international organization) in 
nature. In other words, they help us to better understand whether the activity 
scrutinized by the inspection must be attributed solely to the global actor (WB 
staff and institutions), or also to the State involved. 
This case also provides us with an insight into other, more general matters 
tied to the functioning and nature of the Panel. 
Considering that the Panel does not actually take decisions, but rather carries 
out inspections and makes recommendations, one might wonder whether the 
legal function of the body is to resolve disputes or to review the decisions of 
other bodies. To answer this, we must examine the Establishing Resolution and 
Operating Procedures, in order to first address some preliminary questions: what 
conditions trigger a Panel intervention? Who sits on the Panel? Is the Panel a 
genuinely third party review mechanism? Can its decisions be appealed? And 
finally, even if it cannot be defined as a mature dispute resolution body, can it at 
least be considered an embryonic one, given its protection of the participation 
rights of interested parties? 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. G. ALFREDSSON, R. RING (eds.), The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A 
Different Complaints Procedure, The Hague (2001); 
b. M. CIRCI, “The World Bank Inspection Panel: is it really effective?”, Global 
Jurist, University of Berkeley Electronic Press, 2006 
(http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol6/iss3/art10);  
c. D. CLARK, “A Citizen’s Guide to the World Bank Inspection Panel”, Center 
for International Environmental Law, 1999 
(http://www.ciel.org/Publications/citizensguide.pdf);  
d. D. CLARK, J. FOX, K. TREAKLE, Demanding Accountability. Civil-Society Claims 
and the World Bank Inspection Panel, Lanham (2003); 
e. J.A. FOX, “The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five 
Years”, 6 Global Governance 279 (2000); 
f. D. HUNTER, L. UDALL, “The World Bank’s New Inspection Panel: Will It 
Increase the Bank’s Accountability?”, Center for International Environmental 
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Law 
(www.ciel.org/Publications/issue1.html); 
g. B. KINGSBURY, “Operational Policies of International Institutions as Part of 
the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous People”, in G.S. 
GOODWIN-GILL, S. TALMON (eds.), The Reality of International Law. Essays in 
Honour of Ian Brownlie, Oxford (1999); 
h. I.F.I. SHIHATA, The World Bank Inspection Panel: in practice, II ed., Oxford 
(2000); 
i. L. UDALL, “The World Bank’s Revised Information Policy and the New 
Inspection Panel: Public Accountability or Public Relations?, in J. 
CAVANAGH, D. WYSHAM, M. ARRUDA (eds.), Beyond Bretton Woods, Boulder 
Colorado (1994), pp. 145 et seq.; 
j. World Bank Inspection Panel Annual Reports (from 1994 to 2007) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONP
ANEL/0,,contentMDK:20311664~menuPK:64129472~pagePK:64129751~
piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html); 
k. The World Bank Inspection Panel, “Accountability at the World Bank. The 
Inspection Panel 10 years on”, Washington D.C., 2003 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONP
ANEL/0,,contentMDK:20240459~menuPK:495293~pagePK:64129751~pi
PK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html). 
 
 
 
 
4.5. Participation of Indigenous People: The Guatemala Marlin Gold Mine 
Gianluca Sgueo 
 
 
1. Background 
Guatemala is a Latin American country in which social injustices toward the 
indigenous community are widespread. Indigenous people make up more than 
50% of the total population, and are excluded from political life. Local, non-
indigenous elites hold the economic and social power. This situation persists 
despite constitutional protection for the local cultural patrimony and ethnic 
minorities, and the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples that 
the Guatemalan Government signed in 1995 with the Unidad Revolucionaria 
Nacional Guatemalteca.  
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Implementing neo-liberal policies aimed at attracting foreign capital, the 
Guatemalan Government in 1996 hired Montana exploradora SA to undertake 
mining explorations in San Marcos County. Mining exploration is considered an 
activity of public interest by Article 125 of the Guatemalan Constitution. The 
relevant feasibility studies were concluded in June 2003, focusing on the 
possibility of expanding gold and silver strip mines near the villages of Sipacapa 
and San Miguel Ixtahuacan.  
On November 27, 2003, the Government issued the excavation concession. 
Glamis Ltd. (a local branch of Montana exploradora SA) sought financing from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). The involvement of IFC in the project 
was considered necessary in order to avoid the political risks of unprecedented 
large-scale excavation activities in Guatemala. In June 2004, the IFC granted 45 
million dollars in financing. 
In January 2005, the Colectivo ecologista Madreselva (CEM), an NGO 
fighting for indigenous peoples’ rights, made an official complaint to the 
Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO), the independent recourse mechanism 
for the private sector arms of the World Bank Group. The NGO cited the 
negative impact of the project on the environment and the inadequate 
procedures for consulting with the indigenous people. On June 12, 2006, after a 
follow-up report from the CAO, a coalition of NGOs (including the Bank 
Information Center, Halifax Initiative Coalition, Friends of the Earth and Oxfam 
America) lodged another complaint. 
In March 2005, the CAO upheld the claim. On September 8, 2005, it 
prepared an assessment report containing some suggestions for promoting the 
participation of all of the parties involved. The CAO then prepared two follow-
ups: the first one after a mission of October 8, 2005; the second one after a 
mission that took place from January 23 to February 2, 2006. 
In the meantime, on June 18, 2005, the Guatemalan Government did organize 
a public consultation in order to seek the opinion of the Sipakapa population 
concerning the mining activities. Eleven out of thirteen voting districts voted 
against the continuation of the mining activities, one abstained and only one 
voted in favor. Montana exploradora asked the Constitutional Court to invalidate 
this vote. Instead, the Court affirmed the results of the public consultation in a 
decision of April 6, 2006. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal People 
Convention n. 169/1989 
(http://www.wwda.org.au/indig1.pdf);  
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- Guatemala Government, Resolution 29 settembre 2003, n. 779-
2004/Crmm/em, Espansiòn de concesiones y actividades mineras en territorios 
centroamericanos 
(http://www.madreselva.com.gt/Veredicto%20TLA.pdf); 
- Montana Exploradora de Guatemala S.A., 2004 Indigenous People 
Development Plan submitted to IFC 
(http://www.goldcorp.com/_resources/project_pdfs/marlin/IPDP%2002-
19-04.pdf); 
- Montana Exploradora de Guatemala S.A., 2004 Land acquisition procedures 
submitted to IFC 
(http://www.goldcorp.com/_resources/project_pdfs/marlin/landacq.pdf); 
- Montana Exploradora de Guatemala S.A., 2004 Public Consultation and 
Disclosure Plan 
(http://www.goldcorp.com/_resources/project_pdfs/marlin/pubconst.pdf); 
- Colectivo Ecologista Madreselva, Complaint 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/pdfs/Complaint-English%20Translation.pdf); 
- CAO, 2005 Assessment Report to Complaint 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/pdfs/CAO-Marlin-assessment-English-
7Sep05.pdf); 
- CAO, 2005 Assessment Report to Complaint (supporting tables) 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/pdfs/CAO-Marlin-assessment-English-
7Sep05.pdf); 
- IFC, Response to CAO 2005 Assessment Report 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/Marlin-
Responsetofinalreport_000.pdf); 
- Colectivo Ecologista Madreselva, Response to CAO 2005 Assessment Report 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/MadreSelvaRespon-
seCAOAssessmentReportEnglishwithtechnicalReviewAnnexEnglish.pdf); 
- CAO, 2006 Follow-up Assessment Report 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/CAOGuatema-
laMarlinReport-english-May12006.pdf); 
- Consortium of civil society, Response to CAO 2006 Follow-up Assessment 
Report 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/CAOGuatema-
laMarlinReport-english-May12006.pdf); 
- Glamis Gold Ltd., Response to CAO 2006 Follow-up Assessment Report 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html-english/documents/GlamisRespon-
setotheCAOFollow-UpAssessmentReport.pdf); 
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- CAO, Annual Report (2005-2006) 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/documents/CAOAnnualReport2005-
06English.pdf); 
- G8, Agenda for Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy for 2007 
(http://www.g-8.de/Content/EN/Artikel/__g8-summit/anlagen/2007-06-
07-gipfeldokument-wirtschaft-eng,property=publicationFile.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis  
The main issue regarded the participation of indigenous peoples in the decisions 
of the central Government. The NGOs involved criticized the violation of the 
rules requiring the Government to establish suitable consultation procedures in 
order to protect the rights of indigenous populations. One of these rules is 
embodied in Resolution n. 169 of the International Labour Organization, which 
requires local governments to guarantee the participation of indigenous peoples 
in decisions affecting their interests. It specifies that “effective participation” 
implies procedures that give populations a real opportunity to express their 
opinion. 
In general, the NGOs asserted a lack of transparency in all the procedures 
used to obtain mining exploration rights, acquire land and begin excavations: 
furthermore, the consequences for the local environment were hidden from 
public opinion. The importance of transparency in mining activities is affirmed in 
Article 81 et seq. of the G8 Agenda for Growth and Responsibility in the World 
Economy for 2007. 
In the view of the NGOs, the lack of transparent procedures and 
participation of the indigenous people could be explained by the intention of the 
Government and the mining company to hide the environmental consequences 
of the mining activities. The planned use of cyanide (a chemical compound used 
during the processes of mining) to extract gold and silver would have inflicted 
irreversible damage on the environment, including on the supply of clean water. 
Goldcorp Inc. (which acquired Glamis Gold Ltd. in 2002) denied all of these 
claims, arguing instead that the indigenous peoples’ rights had been respected, as 
foreseen by the local government and by company policies. As a consequence, it 
maintained that the participation rights of affected parties had been respected, 
and that all the necessary measures had been taken to avoid harm to the local 
environment. For example, the company asserted that all the relevant 
information regarding the land acquisition procedures had been publicized in the 
main newspapers and in the broadcast media. Furthermore, Montana exploradora 
demonstrated that funds had been periodically granted to the local NGOs in 
order to promote trade and employment and to improve the economy. In the 
DUE PROCESS IN THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 137 
end, the company maintained that the local population had been consulted 
periodically and that its requests had been considered. 
The CAO examined every aspect of this controversy. It held the concerns 
regarding the water pollution to be unfounded, and also found that the measures 
taken to reduce the social and economic risks to be adequate. The CAO also 
held, however, that the consultation proceedings had been inadequate. The 
public disclosures had been written up in a technical language, inaccessible to the 
uninitiated. Moreover, an insufficient understanding of the local culture and 
traditions was a key cause of the many unfruitful attempts at constructive 
dialogue. In other words, the CAO found that, in spite of the numerous 
consultations with the indigenous people, these had not represented effective 
participation. 
 
 
4. Issues: Participatory Rights within the Global Order 
The main problem in this case was the degree of effective participation. 
According to the IFC, the original guarantees provided by the Government of 
Guatemala and the mining company were inadequate. As a consequence, the IFC 
required the adoption of more effective measures to promote the participation of 
the indigenous peoples, as a condition of financing. These measures were 
considered adequate by the CAO.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the appropriate degree of participation is 
variable. At least three factors have to be considered: the level of the government 
(national or supranational) in which the participation is granted; the transparency 
of proceedings; and the issue of which institution evaluates the level of access to 
participation. The first and the last factors are directly related, as we can see from 
the CAO’s attempt at conciliation. On first impression, this attempt seems 
unsatisfactory, for two reasons. First of all, the mining company opposed it and 
the Colectivo Madreselva thought that it was inadequate (because it did not consider 
the environmental damages). Secondly, it failed to set up a constructive dialogue 
between the parties involved. But it is possible to say (even if such a conclusion is 
not entirely grounded in the documents) that CAO involvement helped to launch 
a public consultation that helped to resolve the issue in question. Therefore, the 
participatory rights that were denied the national level and then evaluated at a 
global level were finally reconsidered at the national level.  
There is also a direct relationship between participation and transparency. In 
this case, there was a conflict over the level of the information provided to the 
indigenous people. Both parties agreed that the level of transparency of the 
procedures at the beginning had influenced the manner in which the participatory 
rights had been exercised. But they disagreed over the adequacy of the 
information provided: Goldcorp and the Guatemalan Government argued that it 
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was adequate, while the NGOs argued that it was not, due to the lack of 
transparency.  
Finally, there are at least three other contingent factors influencing 
participation. The first is related to the limits upon participation that are imposed 
in the proceedings. One example is the time limit within which every party has to 
send its views to its counterpart. The second factor is related to the forms of 
participation. The methods adopted by the Montana exploradora to consult the 
indigenous people do seem formally adequate, but in this case they proved quite 
inadequate in practice. The manner in which information was provided, in using 
highly technical language, ignored the needs of the consulted party and in fact 
became itself an obstacle to a full understanding of the issues involved, thus 
producing a distorted result.  
The third and last factor is related to the parties. The Montana case involved 
private parties (indigenous peoples), the national NGOs that appealed to a 
supranational institution, a multinational company, and a supranational 
institution. Each party had a different concept of participation. 
In conclusion, this case is important because it underscores the connections 
between national and global law. The right to participate in public decisions 
intersects with both of these levels. This intersection does, however, generate 
tensions, which are only increased by the different concepts of procedural 
protection in play and the importance of the interests at stake.  
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5. JUDICIAL GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
 
 
5.1. The Rise of International Administrative Tribunals: The Mendaro 
Affair 
Mariangela Benedetti 
 
 
1. Background 
A civil or public servant is a civilian career public sector employee working for a 
government department or agency. An international civil servant is a civilian 
career public sector employee working for an international organization. It is 
essential that international organizations be able to control their own personnel, 
because this allows them to accomplish their mandate and to express their own 
opinions, independently of the individual Member States. The international civil 
service should be unaffected by competing national policies. Because staff 
members are recruited from all over the world, the choice of a particular 
municipal law in regulating them would be arbitrary. Allowing an international 
civil servant to use his or her municipal law would subject the organization to 
pressure from national governments. Furthermore, multinational personnel are 
expected to act only in the interests of their organizations and not of their 
national States. International civil servants are therefore generally governed by 
the internal authority of their organization, rather than by the municipal law of 
the Member States. 
International organizations enjoy certain privileges and immunities under the 
laws of their Member States, much as do the governments of foreign States. One 
such immunity is immunity from suit in the national courts of the Member States. 
For example, under Article 104 of the UN Charter, the UN shall enjoy in the 
territory of its members such legal capacity “as may be necessary for the exercise of its 
function and the fulfillment of its purpose”. Under Article 105, the UN shall enjoy in the 
territory of each of its members all privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
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fulfillment of its purposes. These articles were implemented in the United States by 
the International Organizations Immunity Act (IOIA). 
The IOIA provides that international organizations shall enjoy the “same 
immunity” as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that they 
waive it. The US Federal Court of the DC Circuit has interpreted this provision 
to apply not only to waivers that are made in the context of a specific case or 
contract, but also to more general waivers that may be found in an organization’s 
charter agreement. Thus, it has found that organizations have waived their 
statutory immunity where the immunity provisions of their charter agreements 
contemplate more limited protections from suit than the IOIA provides. 
The Mendaro case involved a claim against the World Bank by a former 
employee, who alleged that she was subjected to a pattern of sexual harassment 
and discrimination in the course of her employment. While conceding that an 
employment dispute would ordinarily be immune from judicial scrutiny, 
nevertheless she argued that in this case the World Bank could be brought before 
a national judge. Interpreting the World Bank’s broad waiver narrowly, the 
Circuit Court disagreed, noting that it was well established under international 
law that an international organization is entitled to such immunity from the 
jurisdiction of a Member State as is necessary to fulfill its organizational 
purposes. It therefore argued that the “unclear” scope of the waiver provision 
should be interpreted so as to advance the objectives of the institution. Thus, a 
waiver that would enable the organization to pursue its goals more effectively 
should be liberally construed, while a waiver that would subject the organization 
to suits that could frustrate its efforts are “inherently less likely to have been 
intended,” and should be carefully scrutinized. 
Reading the Bank’s waiver provision in the context of the objectives set out 
in the Articles of Agreement, the Court concluded that waiving immunity from 
suits arising out of its internal administrative affairs would not advance the 
Bank’s organizational objectives, and would in fact be likely to impede them. For 
the Court, judicial scrutiny of the Bank’s employment practices would yield little 
in terms of improving the Organization’s ability to recruit and retain qualified 
staff, as it already had an administrative grievance mechanism in place. Such 
scrutiny could impose onerous administrative costs, by obliging the Organization 
to adhere to a patchwork of potentially conflicting national employment laws. 
The Court therefore concluded that claims arising out of internal administrative 
or employment disputes did into fall under the general waiver of immunity. 
 
 
2. Materials  
- Administrative Tribunal of the World Bank 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/OR
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GANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTCRS/EXTTRIBUNAL/0,,contentMD
K:20295339~menuPK:64214665~pagePK:64214693~piPK:64214661~theSi
tePK:570681,00.html); 
- Mendaro, WBAT Decision no. 26 (1985) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/OR
GANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTCRS/EXTTRIBUNAL/0,,contentMD
K:20579993~menuPK:64214668~pagePK:64214693~piPK:64214661~theSi
tePK:570681,00.html); 
- Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983); 
- Statute of Administrative Tribunal of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development  
(http://A:\Tribunal-WBAT Statute.htm); 
- Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the Asian Development Bank 
(http://www.adb.org/ADBT/ADBT_Statutes.pdf); 
- Statute of Administrative Tribunal of International Labour Organization 
(http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/stateng.htm); 
- International Organization Immunities Act, United States, 1945 
(http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad034.htm);  
- Civil Rights Act, PL 88-352, 88th Congress, H. R. 7152, 8 July 1964 
(http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/majorlaw/civilr19.htm). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
Ms. Mendaro claimed that, during her employment in the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, she had been the victim of sexual harassment 
and discrimination by other Bank employees. She further contended that the 
Bank refused to promote her to the position of consultant, although she already 
performed some of the duties of consultant. She complained to the Bank about 
these problems through the normal administrative channels, but it did not 
investigate her complaint effectively. Some time after Ms. Mendaro made these 
complaints, the Bank fired her. 
After the termination of her employment, she filed a complaint with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination 
and retaliatory termination on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1946. The EEOC area office dismissed the complaint for lack 
of jurisdiction, finding the World Bank immune as an international organization. 
Ms Mendaro decided to sue the Bank before the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia. The Bank sought dismissal of the case, claiming 
immunity from the jurisdiction of Member States in suits arising out of its 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 142 
internal administrative affairs. The District Court dismissed the complaint for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
Ms. Mendaro appealed to the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit. She 
argued that, while the World Bank clearly enjoyed the immunity granted to 
international organizations, its charter contained an effective waiver of immunity 
from national suit by stipulating the conditions under which actions may be 
brought. 
The Court of Appeals held that immunity from suit fully applied to the 
Bank’s employment contracts and its relations with its own staff members.  
On April 30, 1980, the WB Board of Governors had approved the 
establishment of the World Bank Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal was 
created to give employees legal recourse against institutional actions, which are 
alleged to violate their legal rights. On December 27, 1983, Mendaro filed an 
application before the WB Administrative Tribunal.  
In determining the nature of Mendaro’s complaint, the Tribunal examined 
whether it had jurisdiction over sexual harassment and discrimination. Article II, 
section 1 of the Administrative Tribunal Statute confers authority on the 
Tribunal to hear an employee’s grievances “upon any application by which a 
member of the staff of the Bank alleges non-observance of the contract of 
employment or terms of appointment of such staff members”. The Tribunal held 
that, although the employment contract constitutes the chief statement of the 
rights and duties of the Bank vis-à-vis its employees, it is not an exhaustive 
statement. The contract is just one of many elements, which collectively establish 
the conditions of employment operative between the Bank and its staff members. 
Therefore, in deciding Mendaro’s case, the Tribunal had to decide whether 
freedom from sexual discrimination and harassment was an implied provision of 
a WB employment contract. This question it answered affirmatively, 
acknowledging that otherwise Bank employees would have no legal means for 
enforcing such rights. 
The second issue analyzed by Tribunal was the question of respect for time 
limits. Because all of the pertinent events giving rise to the application took place 
prior to July 1, 1980, the application, in order to be timely, had to meet the 
conditions set forth in Article XVII, which requires that the cause of complaint 
must have arisen after January 1, 1979, and that the application must have been 
“filed within 90 days after the entry into force of the present Statute,” that is, by 
September 29, 1980. 
Mendaro sought to bring her case within Article II by invoking the decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals of September 27, 1983, and the filing of 
her application with the Tribunal within ninety days thereafter.  
The Tribunal did not accept this argument. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals could not be regarded as “the occurrence of the event giving rise to the 
application” mentioned in paragraph 2(ii)(a) of Article II, because this language 
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refers to the allegedly wrongful action taken by the Bank. Nor could the US 
court's decision be regarded as representing an exhaustion of the “remedies 
available within the Bank Group” mentioned in paragraph 2(ii)(b) of the same 
Article. 
As an exception to the general principle laid down in Article II, which 
“reflects a desire to bring cases to the Tribunal without delay”, Article XVII 
cannot be construed so as to “render the time limits of the Statute almost 
ineffective”. 
In 1985, the Tribunal dismissed Mendaro’s claim due to the expiration of the 
statutory time for filing it. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Jurisdiction of International Administrative Tribunals 
The particular nature of employment in international organizations necessitates 
the development of a corpus juris unique to each, because these organizations are 
established under, and governed by, their own constitutions or statutes.  
International law has generally recognized international organizations’ 
immunity from suit in national courts. This immunity is traditionally meant to be 
limited to what is necessary for the organization to function. Where the immunity 
is not necessary to the functioning of the organization or even gets in the way, 
the organization can waive it. The Mendaro court faced the question of whether 
immunity from suit by an employee is necessary to the functioning of the World 
Bank. In finding immunity necessary, the court saw the need for the international 
civil service to be unaffected by competing national policies. Because staff 
members are recruited from all over the world, a choice of a particular municipal 
law would be arbitrary. 
The nature of Mendaro’s complaint involves an important right. The tribunal 
examined whether freedom from sexual harassment and discrimination is an 
implied provision of a contract with the Bank. If sexual harassment and 
discrimination are viewed as breach of contract, then the Tribunal would have 
subject-matter jurisdiction over Mendaro’s complaint. If, on the other hand, 
freedom from sexual discrimination is not an implied provision of an employee 
contract with the Bank, then Bank employees have no legal means for enforcing 
such rights. 
The Mendaro case offered the Tribunal the opportunity to affirm the 
possibility, alluded to in the Administrative Tribunal Statute, of extending its 
jurisdiction over a broader range of staff complaints, if and when necessary. 
Under the Administrative Tribunal’s Statute, the nature of claims and remedies 
available to staff members of the World Bank appear to be very limited. In the 
same manner, the prior case law interpreting the Statute did not seek to expand 
or broaden the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The issue in this case was whether the 
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Tribunal would assert broader jurisdiction over this complaint or interpret the 
statute narrowly, thereby leaving Mendaro without legal redress. The decision 
was significant in that it interpreted the Administrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione materiae fairly liberally. 
International administrative tribunals guarantee an effective remedy for the 
decisions made by supervisors and officials in managing the workforce of a given 
international organizations. Employees may obtain a final, binding determination 
of their workplace claims or grievances 
Why did international administrative tribunals come into existence? The 
reason is that, when an administrative power harms the rights of its employees, 
only judicial review can accord due process to the aggrieved party. Where 
international organizations do not offer internal legal mechanisms to their 
employees for resolving staff grievances, national courts appear increasingly 
prepared to assert jurisdiction, thereby interfering with the efficiency of the 
organizations and creating the risk of conflicting employment regulations 
applying within the same organization, as each nation seeks to apply its own laws.  
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
- Skandera, WBAT Decision no. 2 (1981) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/OR
GANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTCRS/EXTTRIBUNAL/0,,contentMD
K:20579858~menuPK:64214668~pagePK:64214693~piPK:64214661~theSi
tePK:570681,00.html99); 
- De Merode, WBAT Decision no. 1 (1981) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/OR
GANIZATION/ORGUNITS/EXTCRS/EXTTRIBUNAL/0,,contentMD
K:20579851~menuPK:64214668~pagePK:64214693~piPK:64214661~theSi
tePK:570681,00.html); 
- Administrative Tribunal of the Asian Development Bank, Amora, ADBAT 
Decision no. 24 (1997) 
(http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/ADBT/ADBT0024.asp); 
- Mesh & Siy, ADBAT Decision no. 35 (1997) 
(http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/ADBT/ADBT0035.asp). 
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5.2. Settling Global Disputes: The Southern Bluefin Tuna Case 
Bruno Carotti and Martina Conticelli 
 
 
1. Background 
In 1999, New Zealand and Australia reported a breach of the Convention for the 
Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) by Japan, which had 
exceeded the total allowable catch established by the Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
When negotiations failed, Australia and New Zealand brought a claim before 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 146 
an UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, constituted in accordance with Article 286 and 
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
Before the award was rendered, both States appealed to the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), to request provisional measures.  
Questions arose concerning the applicable law in, and the jurisdiction of, 
both Tribunals, because the States parties to this dispute are members of both 
the CCSBT and the UNCLOS (see supra, Ch. 4.2). The former, signed in 1993, 
includes only Japan, New Zealand and Australia, and is addressed to the 
protection of a single species of tuna. The latter, which entered into force in 
1994, involves 157 states and is a general convention (one of the most important 
achievements of the United Nations). Both Conventions provide for their own 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
In addition to the States, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna was also involved. This is a global administrative body responsible 
for the enforcement of the CCSBT by Member States; it has the power to adopt 
restrictive measures addressed not only to States, but also to private actors (the 
official text refers to “fishing entities”), as well as to third States that are not party 
to the Convention at all. 
Two tribunals thus had potential jurisdiction in this case, an Arbitral Tribunal 
and the ITLOS. Both tribunals are judicial organs established under the 
provisions of UNCLOS. Japan challenged the ITLOS’s jurisdiction, arguing that 
the CCSBT provided for a specific dispute resolution mechanism of its own, 
different from that established by the UNCLOS. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, 
August 27, 1999, n. 3 and 4 
(http://www.itlos.org/case_documents/2001/document_en_116.pdf); 
- Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Australia and New Zealand v. Japan, Award 
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 4 August 2000 
(http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&ac
tionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=%3Ca
%20href=javascript:goHome%3EPublications%3C/a%3E%3E%20%3Ca%
20href=/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp%3ENews%20Releases%3C
/a%3E&pageName=Archive_%20Announcement7); 
- Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/convention.pdf); 
- United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 64; art. 
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116-119; art. 286-296; Annex VI  
(http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclo
s_e.pdf); 
- ITLOS, Rules of the Tribunal 
(www.itlos.org/documents_publications/documents/Itlos.8.E.27.04.05.pdf); 
- Rules of Procedure of the Commission for the Conservation of the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/rules_of_procedu
re_of_the_commission.pdf); 
- Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific 
Committee and Rules of Procedure of the Extended Commission for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/the_Extended_co
mmission.pdf); 
- CCSBT, 2000 Action Plan 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/action_plan.pdf); 
- CCSBT, Resolutions pursuant to the 2000 Action Plan 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/resolutions_on_t
he_action_plan.pdf); 
- CCSBT, Sbt Statistical Document Program, November 2006 
(www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/trade_information_sche
me.pdf); 
- Terms of References for Subsidiary Bodies 
(http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/terms_of_referen
ce_for_subsidiary_bodies.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
Australia and New Zealand claimed that the dispute should be heard by the 
ITLOS, on the ground that there had been a violation of the UNCLOS. Through 
the unilateral adoption of some experimental fishing programs, Japan had 
breached Articles 64, 116 and 119 (Art. 64 provides that Member States of the 
UNCLOS shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations to ensure the conservation of highly migratory species; Art. 116 et 
seq. provide for the right of Member States to engage in fishing). Australia and 
New Zealand asked for precautionary measures to force Japan to immediately 
cease its experimental fishing programs. Japan argued that the jurisdiction of 
ITLOS was limited to disputes closely related to the interpretation of UNCLOS, 
and could not be extended to controversies arising out of special conventions.  
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Each tribunal resolved the question of the applicable law differently, though 
both recognized the existence of a plurality of norms. The ITLOS gave 
prevalence to the provisions of the Montego Bay Convention, to which the 
CCSBT is complementary (in accordance with Articles 64, 116 and 119 of 
UNCLOS). The UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, by contrast, based its decision on 
Article 16 of the CCSBT and its Annex, which set out the rules for the 
arbitration of disputes arising under the Convention. It stated that this norm 
constituted a lex specialis, which trumped the competing UNCLOS provisions. It 
thus denied its own jurisdiction over the dispute, and left it to the parties to 
negotiate a solution between themselves.  
 
 
4. Issues: Global Judicial Review 
The case raises a number of different general questions. The first group relates to 
the legality of global administrative decisions and to the system of judicial review. 
Do global administrative decisions exist? If such decisions provoke a conflict 
between States, can an external, global judicial body intervene? What shall the 
applicable law be? What are the criteria for this decision? 
A second group of questions addresses the relationships between different 
global regulatory regimes. Among the multiple regimes, who ultimately prevails, 
and who decides this? 
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Environmental Law Journal 361 (2000); 
e. J. PEEL, “A Paper Umbrella which Dissolves in the Rain”, 3 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 53 (2002); 
f. V. RÖBEN, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases: Re-Regionalization of the 
Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes?”, 62 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 61 (2002); 
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g. C. ROMANO, “The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Hints of a World to 
Come... Like It or Not”, 32 Ocean Development and International Law 313 (2001); 
h. L. STURTZ, “Southern Bluefin Tuna Case”, 28 Ecology Law Quarterly 455 
(2001); 
i. Y. TANAKA, “Obligation to Co-operate in Marine Scientific Research and the 
Conservation of Marine Living Resources”, 65 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 937 (2005). 
 
 
 
 
5.3. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: The 
Tokios Tokelès Case 
Hilde Caroli Casavola 
 
 
1. Background 
In 1989, a business enterprise named Tokios Tokelès was incorporated under the 
law of Lithuania. It was engaged primarily in advertising, publishing and printing, 
both in Lithuania and beyond. Ukrainian nationals own ninety-nine percent of 
the outstanding shares of Tokios Tokelès and comprise two-thirds of its 
management. In 1994, Tokios Tokelès created Taki Spravy, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary established under the law of Ukraine. From 1994 to 2002, Tokios 
Tokelès invested more than $6.5 million in Taki Spravy. A bilateral investment 
treaty (BIT) between Ukraine and Lithuania was signed on February 8, 1994 and 
entered into force on February 27, 1995. By 2004, more than six thousand 
Lithuanian enterprises were wholly or partially owned by foreign investors, 
mainly Russian, German and Ukrainian.  
On August 14, 2002, Tokios Tokelès and Taki Spravy submitted a Request 
for Arbitration (RFA) to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), claiming that the Ukrainian authorities had violated the BIT. 
On October 15, 2002, the ICSID notified the requesting parties that the dispute 
had not been subject to negotiation for a period of six months, as required by 
Article 8 of the Treaty. On October 17, 2002, the requesting parties withdrew 
their RFA until such time as it “may be renewed and resubmitted for 
consideration to the Centre”. The RFA was reinstated by Tokios Tokelès (and 
Taki Spravy) on November 22, 2002. On December 20, 2002, the Secretary-
General of ICSID registered the RFA. Tokios Tokelès contended that, beginning 
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in February 2002, the Ukraine had engaged in a series of unreasonable and 
unjustified actions against Taki Spravy that adversely affected its investment. 
Tokios Tokelès argued that the governmental authorities took these actions in 
response to the publication of a book by Taki Spravy in January 2002 that 
favorably portrayed a leading Ukrainian opposition politician. 
The dispute mainly focused on the issue of ICSID jurisdiction. The ICSID 
was established by the Washington Convention of 1965, to address two problems 
raised by the remarkable development of international economic relations: first, 
to provide guarantees to foreign investors against the economic, legislative and 
political policies of national public authorities; and second, to create the 
necessary conditions for increased financial and technical support of foreign 
enterprises. The ICSID Convention set up an arbitration and conciliation 
mechanism for resolving disputes between states and foreign investors. Many 
national laws and bilateral treaties refer to the ICSID system. The Convention 
establishes that States Parties shall apply the dispute settlement procedure and 
shall execute the decisions adopted by the Center, which shall be binding on both 
the contractors and the States.  
In reaching its decision on jurisdiction, the Tribunal was guided by Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention, as well as Articles 1 and 8 of the Ukraine-Lithuania 
BIT. 
 
 
2. Materials  
- International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Tokios Tokelès 
v. Ukraine, ICSID case n. ARB/02/18 (case n. 40) 
(http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&ac
tionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Cases_Home); 
- Decision on Jurisdiction of April 29, 2004, published in 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 
205 (2005); 
- Dissenting Opinion – Prosper Weil of April 29, 2004, published in 20 ICSID 
Rev.—FILJ 245 (2005); 
- Procedural Order No. 3 of January 18, 2005. 
 
 
3. Analysis 
In this dispute, the resolution of the preliminary issue of ICSID’s jurisdiction 
depended upon certain substantive elements. 
Tokios Tokelès and Taki Spravy (the Claimant) initiated the ICSID 
proceeding, alleging that various actions by Ukrainian governmental authorities in 
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2002 constituted violations of the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT. The Ukraine raised 
objections to ICSID’s jurisdiction, and requested that the proceeding be 
bifurcated so that jurisdiction could be addressed first, separately from the merits 
of the case. 
The Claimant opposed this request, arguing that the four objective criteria 
provided by Article 25 of the Convention had been met: first, Tokios Tokelès 
was an investor of one Contracting Party to the ICSID Convention, namely 
Lithuania; second, that company had invested in the territory of another 
Contracting Party, creating the company Taki Spravy under Ukrainian law; third, 
the dispute arose between the two Contracting Parties in connection with that 
investment; and fourth, the Parties had agreed to submit the case to ICSID 
jurisdiction. 
The Ukrainian Government argued instead that ICSID had no jurisdiction 
over the matter, claiming, firstly, that Tokios Tokelès, although incorporated 
under Lithuanian law, was in reality a Ukrainian company, very largely owned and 
run by Ukrainian nationals, and with no substantial business activities in 
Lithuania. In essence, the claim was that Tokios Tokelès was effectively a 
Ukrainian investor in Lithuania, not a Lithuanian investor in Ukraine. Secondly, it 
claimed that, even if this argument was rejected, the investment made by Tokios 
Tokelès in Taki Spravy was not made in accordance with Ukrainian law, and 
hence fell outwith the scope of the BIT. 
The main issue related to the nationality of Tokios Tokelès, and the formal 
and substantive consequences that flowed from that. The Ukrainian authorities 
argued that the corporation was not a “genuine entity” of Lithuania, and asked 
the Tribunal to “pierce the corporate veil” by determining its nationality 
according to that of its controlling shareholders and managers. Such a “control-
test” had, it argued, been relied upon by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, was 
recognized by ICSID jurisprudence in certain contexts at least, and is explicitly 
endorsed in numerous BITs (but not, however, in the Treaty in question in this 
case).  
The majority of the ICSID Tribunal took a formalistic position, based largely 
on the language of the BIT, and concluded that “the Claimant is an ‘investor’ of 
Lithuania under Article 1(2)(b) of the BIT and ‘a national of another Contracting 
State’ under Article 25 of the Convention”. The decision also stated that “the 
origin of the capital is not relevant to the existence of an investment” (Tribunal 
decision, paras. 80 and 82).  
In his dissenting opinion, the President of the Tribunal stressed that disputes 
between States and their own nationals may not be settled by this particular 
international judicial body (Dissenting Opinion, para. 5). He also argued that 
“[t]he ICSID mechanism and remedy are not meant for, and are not to be 
construed as, allowing nationals of a State Party to the ICSID Convention to use 
a foreign corporation, whether preexistent or created for that purpose, as a 
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means of evading the jurisdiction of their domestic courts and the application of 
their national law” (Dissenting Opinion, para. 30). 
 
 
4. Issues: Determining the Jurisdiction of International Tribunals 
This arbitration case provides a paradigmatic example of a decision of a global 
judicial body in a conflict between public and private entities, belonging to 
different Contracting States to the ICSID, regulated by a BIT.  
The key issue it raised was how the jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal can be 
determined. Its jurisdiction is based mainly on a ratione personae requirement, 
meaning that one of the parties in the arbitration must be a Contracting State of 
the ICSID Convention, and that the other must be a national of another 
Contracting State. Therefore, the requirement that actors from more than one 
State be involved in a dispute, and the rules for determining when this is the case, 
is important both for the establishment of supranational jurisdiction, and the 
subsequent application of global rules. The assessment of the nationality of the 
disputing parties in an ICSID arbitration procedure must be carried out in a 
cautious manner, in order to minimize the risk that recourse to ICSID becomes 
simply a means for national companies to evade the application of national rules 
and jurisdiction of domestic courts. Such a claim would be beyond of the scope 
of the Convention. 
The second problem deals with the control test: to determine the nationality 
of a private entity (such as a corporation), and the limits of the applicability of 
the ICSID Convention can a control test be used only when it is explicitly 
provided for in the BIT in question? Or is it always necessary to do so, on the 
basis of a teleological and systematic interpretation of the Convention as aimed at 
promoting only private foreign (international) investments? In its decision, the 
ICSID Tribunal declined to use a control test as a means of restricting the 
meaning of the term “investor” in the application of the BIT. The decision 
provided an interpretation of the legal text based strictly on the language of the 
Treaty in question. The jurisdictional question, which was raised in Tokios 
Tokelès for the first time before the ICSID, split the Tribunal on the extent to 
which the international tribunals can rely upon the aim and purpose of global 
norms in interpreting and applying them. 
The third issue is related to the effects of the ICSID Convention on the 
national administrative regulations of the Contracting States, and to the limits it 
establishes on the power of domestic administrative authorities. The dispute 
involved a foreign private entity (the investor company, subject to the law of one 
Contracting State) and the authorities of the host state; not, however, the 
Contracting State to which the claimant belonged. The BIT also contained 
provisions limiting the subjection of foreign investors to national administrative 
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regulations by host States. In seeking to apply the BIT and the ICSID 
Convention, the ICSID Tribunal and the Ukrainian Government came to 
incompatible interpretations of the relevant norms. The arbitral decision in effect 
protected the foreign investors against the interpretation and application of the 
bilateral rules by national authorities, and gave particular emphasis to their right 
to a fair and impartial judicial review of the decisions of state agencies. In this 
way, the evolving “jurisprudence” of ICSID Tribunals at once reflects and 
constitutes an emerging transnational regime for foreign investments. This 
emerging regime binds national administrations to the findings of hybrid 
public/private procedures and bodies. Private investors play a key role in the 
arbitral proceedings, in choosing the arbiters and bringing claims directly against 
the host State, without the need for any previous consultation with the other 
Contracting State of the BIT. It follows that the emerging global investment 
regime and the right of foreign investors to sue the host state before the ICSID 
Tribunal can conflict with the administrative discretion and the review bodies of 
the State that formulated the rules contained in the BIT in the first place (and 
from which, in this case at least, most or indeed all of the capital invested in fact 
comes), when the private investor involved is a national of another Contracting 
State. 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. F.G. DE COSSÌO, “The International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes”, 19 Journal of International Arbitration 227 (2002); 
b. D.A. GANTZ, “Investor-State Arbitration Under ICSID. The ICSID 
Additional Facility and the UNCTAD Arbitral Rules” 
(http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/Gantz/Gantz_ICSID.pdf);  
c. A. GIARDINA, “La legge regolatrice dei contratti di investimento nel sistema 
ICSID”, Riv. dir. intern. priv. process. 677 (1982); 
d. M.R. MAURO, Gli accordi bilaterali sulla promozione e la protezione degli investimenti, 
Turin (2003); 
e. M. POLASEK, “Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine. Introductory Note”, 20 Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 1 (2005); 
f. G. SACERDOTI, “La Convenzione di Washington del 1965: bilancio di un 
ventennio dell’ICSID”, Riv. dir. intern. priv. process. 13 (1987); 
g. T. WEILER, International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Custumary International Law, London, 
(2005); 
h. A.S. ZANNA, “Incorporation or Control? Contested Determinants of 
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Corporate Nationality in ‘Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine’”, 6 Griffin’s View on 
International and Comparative Law 64 (2005). 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Alternative Dispute Resolution: The ICANN’s Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP)  
Bruno Carotti 
 
 
1. Background 
The registration of domain names (see also supra, Ch. 2.1) is carried out by both 
registries and registrars. The registries – either public or private bodies – ensure the 
proper functioning of a specific top-level domain name (gTLDs), such as “.edu”, 
or country-code top level domain names (ccTLDs), such as “.it”; the registrars – 
nearly always private bodies – are responsible for assigning a particular second-
level domain name (such as “.nyu” or “.uniroma1”) to those who request it. On 
occasion the same body fulfils both functions. 
The ICANN, a private non-profit Californian corporation, was established in 
1998 to supervise internet regulation (see supra, par. 2.1). It was created in order 
to address the legal problems related to the protection of intellectual property 
rights on the internet. Many doubts had previously been raised about the legal 
nature of domain names, and the most appropriate analogy had been drawn from 
trademark law. National courts often offered different solutions. This led to the 
attempt to create a new mechanism, based on a unique, globally valid legal 
foundation: in 1999, ICANN adopted the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy 
(UDRP), a private dispute resolution system based on a report of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Under this Policy, both service 
providers and WIPO can perform dispute resolution functions, to resolve cases 
of cybersquatting (i.e. registering a domain name with bad faith in order to profit 
from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else) or domain 
grabbing (i.e. registering a domain name likely to be desired by another, with the 
sole intent of selling it for profit). Service providers can, however, do so only 
after signing an accreditation agreement with ICANN.  
The system set up by the UDRP has some special features: its primary 
normative source is the body of rules adopted by the ICANN; supplemental rules 
can be added by the different service providers; decisions are binding upon the 
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parties; users can directly appeal to global quasi-judicial bodies in the form of 
arbitral proceedings; and the right to go before a national court is expressly 
acknowledged, thus ensuring judicial review even where the UDRP provider has 
stated otherwise. 
These characteristics raise two questions. First, what is the significance of this 
kind of fragmented system for dispute resolution? In the absence of norms 
coordinating the UDRP and national procedures, conflicting decisions can arise. 
This a particular risk when the same controversy is decided first by a dispute 
resolution service provider and then by a national court. 
The second question concerns the effects of such decisions, insofar as they 
are applied to the registries. Particularly when country code top-level domain 
names (see supra, Ch. 2.1) are at stake, public authorities are likely to be involved. 
The registries of this kind of domain name might belong to national agencies. 
This embodies an important aspect of administrative law: the decision of a global 
quasi-judicial organ has direct consequences upon national public bodies. 
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- World Intellectual Property Organization, Arbitration and Mediation Center, 
UDRP – Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
(http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/index.html); 
- Administrative Panel Decision, Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. 
Barcelona.com Inc., Case No. D2000-0505 
(http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0505.html); 
- United States Court Of Appeals For The Fourth Circuit, Barcelona.com Inc. v. 
Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, No. 02-1396 
(http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/021396.P.pdf); 
- Administrative Panel Decision, 22 July 2003 Casio Keisanki Kabushki Kaisha, 
Casio Computer Co., Ltd v. Fulviu Mihai Fodoreanu, Case No. DRO2003-0002 
(http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2003/dro2003-0002.html); 
- Administrative Panel Decision, December 28, 2004 Austrian Airlines 
Österreichische Luftverkehrs AG contre Laurent Nunenthal, Litige No DFR2004-
0003 
(http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2004/dfr2004-0003.html); 
- Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
(http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm); 
- ICANN Rules 
(http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/uniform-rules.htm); 
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- Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
WIPO (July 14, 1967, as amended on September 28, 1979) 
(http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/pdf/trtdocs_wo029.pdf); 
- WIPO supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy 
(http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/rules/supplemental/index.html); 
- Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), Pub. L. No 106-113, § 
3001 et seq., 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.), section 1114(2)(D)(v) 
(http://copywrite.org/2006/10/13/the-anticybersquatting-consumer-
protection-act-of-1999). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The Ayuntamiento de Barcelona case concerned the registration of the domain name 
“barcelona.com”. This was a dispute between an American tourism company, 
Bcom Inc. (incorporated in Delaware, but operating in Spain) and the 
Municipality of Barcelona. The controversy was brought before a WIPO panel, 
which held that Bcom’s registration of the domain name violated the trademarks 
owned by the Municipality of Barcelona. Furthermore, the Panel found that 
Bcom did not have a legitimate interest in using the contested name; on the 
contrary, the company had registered it in bad faith (it later tried to resell the 
name back to Barcelona). 
The American company filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia (see also Art. 4 (k), of the UDRP). 
Applying both the UDRP and Spanish law (in a manner highlighting the 
influence of the WIPO Panel decision on a national court), the trial court rejected 
Bcom’s complaint. 
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that national 
judges are not compelled by decisions based on the UDRP. National courts must 
be able to review such decisions (only in one case, involving the domain name 
“corinthians.com”, did a national court decline jurisdiction, on the grounds that 
the dispute had already been resolved by a WIPO panel; again, however, the 
Court of Appeals reversed this). 
The Court of Appeals then had to determine the applicable law. The 
Municipality of Barcelona argued that ICANN policy and Spanish law must be 
applied: ratione personae et materiae, the WIPO Panel’s decision must be recognized 
[15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v)]. The appellant, on the contrary, invoked the 
jurisdiction of the national courts and the applicability of American law. 
The Court sided with Bcom. First of all, it grounded its jurisdiction in the 
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administrative nature of the WIPO procedure (an adjudicatory proceeding). The 
possibility of a judicial appeal must be open to parties in an administrative 
proceeding: “this process is not intended to interfere with or modify any 
‘independent resolution’ by a court of competent jurisdiction” (p. 8). The 
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) of 1999, which amended 
the 1946 Lanham Act on trademarks, does not establish a form of deference to 
the UDRP: “[…] any decision made by a panel under the UDRP is no more than 
an agreed-upon administration that is not given any deference under the ACPA. 
To the contrary, because a UDRP decision is susceptible of being grounded on 
principles foreign or hostile to American law, the ACPA authorizes reversing a 
panel decision if such a result is called for by application of the Lanham Act” (p. 
12). 
The Court of Appeal, furthermore, affirmed the applicability of national law: 
“ACPA explicitly requires application of the Lanham Act, not foreign law” (p. 
14). According to §1114(2)(D)(v) of that statute, a trademark registration based 
on a mere “geographically descriptive” name is not valid: therefore, the Court 
held that the domain name assignment to the American company was not 
precluded by the Municipality of Barcelona’s putative trademark claim. 
Two additional cases illustrate the effects of WIPO panel decisions and the 
nature of the actors involved. In the Casio.ro and Austrian-Airlines.fr cases, two 
disputes were resolved through the UDRP procedure. There was, however, an 
important difference between them: in the Austrian-Airlines case, the decision was 
addressed to a private actor, while Casio concerned a public body (a branch of the 
central government administration); in the latter case, then, the UDRP also had 
important effects upon national public administration. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Effectiveness of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
Several issues emerge from these cases. 
First, when a global technical resource such as the domain name system is at 
issue, what legal instruments can be used? Is it necessary to provide for solely 
judicial review? Is it necessary to create new rules or institutions? Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms are highly effective, fast and inexpensive, 
and are based on private law. But do they ensure an effective and impartial 
review? Or ought protection to rely on public law instruments instead? In the 
case of non-compliance with a panel decision, what is the competent body to 
enforce it? Must national courts be appealed to? This would mean a shift away 
from private-international law instruments to public-national ones. In other 
words, this would mean a return to a reliance on sovereign States. 
Second, it is necessary to examine the influence of this mechanism on the 
right to judicial protection. From this point of view, the impartiality of the panel 
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is the key issue, as scholars have often argued. This makes it important, generally 
speaking, to define the role of global judicial or quasi-judicial bodies and their 
relationship to national courts. 
Third, there is a difference between this regime and international law: 
generally, international law requires the exhaustion of local remedies before 
international bodies can be appealed to. The UDRP has no such requirement and 
its arbitration panels can be resorted to immediately. 
Fourth, there is a mixed-structure here, characterized by the presence of 
private and public actors interacting at both the global and national levels. In 
particular, it is worth examining the mechanisms that allow for the influence of 
ICANN and UDRP on national administrative authorities. In this perspective, it 
should be stressed that the UDRP is mandatory only in the cases of general top-
level domain names. In the case of country code top-level domain names, by 
contrast, the procedure is not immediately binding: to be mandatory, an explicit 
demonstration of consent is required (for example, the UDRP applies to ESNIC, 
which manages the “.es” country code, but not to the Italian Registration 
Authority, which operates the “.it” one). This difference can be explained by 
considering the strong influence of national governments upon the registries of 
the ccTLDs. ICANN rules cannot be imposed directly upon these registries, as to 
do so would mean that they prevail over the conflicting laws of national public 
authorities. And this is the reason why a system based on dialogue and 
consensual measures has been sought, rather than a hierarchical one. States can 
still condition the scope of global norms (as they try to establish a universal and 
uniform regulation). But how great a role must still be accorded to national 
sovereignty in the construction of the global legal order? 
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
- WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Administrative Panel Decision, 
Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA v. David Sallen, Sallen Enterprises, and J. D. 
Sallen Enterprises, Case No. D2000-0461 
(http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-
0461.html);  
- United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, No. 01-1197, Jay D. 
Sallen d/b/a J.D.S. Enterprises, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Corinthians Licenciamentos 
Ltda and Desportos Licenciamentos Ltda, Defendants, Appellees, of December 5, 
2001 
(http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/01-1197-01A.pdf). 
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6. Further Reading 
a. A. D’ARCANGELI, “Il dibattito sui domain name e la prima sentenza di merito”, 
Rivista di diritto civile 497 (2004); 
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5.5. New Protection Mechanisms: The ICANN’s Reconsideration 
Committee and the Verio case 
Bruno Carotti 
 
 
1. Background 
One of the competences of the ICANN Board (see supra, Ch. 2.1) is the adoption 
of specific policies for establishing the general rules for the sector of domain 
names. These rules, once adopted, are binding upon the operators. 
The Verio case arose out of a policy on the use of personal data, specifically, 
the “Whois service”. This service was created in order to avoid illegal domain 
name registration, as it publicizes the data of persons registering a new domain 
name. This was highly controversial, giving rise to issues of both privacy 
protection and regulatory differences (the EU, for instance, requires operators in 
its jurisdiction to respect European privacy laws). 
The ICANN policy on the use of personal data was aimed at preventing the 
collection of bulk personal data, in order to prevent spam. It was approved 
pursuant to a notice and comment procedure, in which every interested subject 
was allowed to participate (Bylaws, Art. III). 
ICANN’s decisions can be challenged through different instruments, 
provided for in its statute: the Reconsideration Committee, the Ombudsman and 
the Independent Review Panel. The Reconsideration Committee and 
Ombudsman are internal to the corporation, while the Independent Review 
Panel is external. The Reconsideration Committee was set up by Article IV of the 
Bylaws. Its function is to re-examine the decisions of ICANN, in particular the 
effects of the Board or staff actions or inaction, if any person has been adversely 
affected (Bylaws, Art. IV, Sect. 2.1). The Reconsideration Committee consists of 
three directors, who decide on the admissibility of claims; conduct factual 
investigations and request information from the parties, staff or third parties; and 
hold meetings with the parties involved (Art. IV, Sect. 2.11 et seq.). It makes its 
recommendations on the merits of the request to the Board (Art. IV, Sect. 2.3). 
The Board is not bound by the Reconsideration report, but its final decision shall 
be made public (Art. IV, Sects. 2.17 and 2.18). 
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2. Materials 
- Committee on Reconsideration, Reconsideration Request 01-4, Verio, 
Recommendation of the Committee, January 11, 2002 
(http://www.icann.org/committees/reconsideration/rc01-4.htm); 
- United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, January 23, 2004, 
Docket No. 00-9596 11, Register.Com, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Verio, Inc., 
Defendant-Appellant 
(http://www.icann.org/registrars/register.com-verio/decision-23jan04.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
In order to implement the new policy on the use of personal data, contractual 
arrangements with the operators had to be modified (in order to act in the 
domain name “market”, everyone had to conclude an Accreditation Agreement 
with the ICANN). The contracts with operators providing services to consumers 
(the “registrars”: for this distinction, see supra, Ch. 5.4) had to be modified. One 
of these operators was Register.com; its database was used by Verio. Inc, a 
corporation using bulk data for advertising purposes. 
In accordance with the new anti-bulk data policy, Register forbade access to 
its database. As Verio did not comply with the new usage rules, Register asked 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York for an injunction 
against Verio, to prevent it from accessing Register’s database (the injunction was 
later upheld by the Court of Appeals for the 2nd District). ICANN was not party 
to the process and intervened only as an amicus curiae. 
Verio then appealed to the ICANN Reconsideration Committee, arguing that 
the adoption of the new policy did not respect the Bylaws and that therefore 
could not be used as a basis for modifying the contract regulating access to 
Register database. 
The Committee held that the procedure had been open and transparent: the 
decision was legal and the new policy could modify the contracts with the 
operators. Thus, Verio could not claim the application of its previous contract 
with Register, and could not make use of the data. The Committee also addressed 
some specific problems relating to linguistic difficulties, but held that it was not 
the proper body to evaluate this question: the merits of the decision had to be 
discussed in the competent forum, the Domain Name Supporting Organization 
(DNSO). For these reasons, it recommended that the decision be remanded to 
the DNSO; meanwhile, it suggested that the contracts in question should not be 
modified until the DNSO had made its assessment. 
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There are several interesting issues to consider. 
First, there were two bodies discussing the same controversy: a State judicial 
body and a quasi-judicial committee of a global institution. With specific 
attention to the latter, the presence of both internal and external accountability 
mechanisms (the latter provided by the national legal system, and the former by 
the global internet governance regime) is worth highlighting. The procedure 
before the Committee runs in parallel to that before the national courts, in that 
the Committee’s decision comes after the decision of the trial court, but before 
the appeal. These bodies decide in an independent manner and could 
theoretically come to conflicting resolutions, although that did not happen in this 
case.  
Second, the new ICANN policy concerned not only Verio, but all domain 
names operators (registries and registrars), as well as third parties. 
Third, a notice and comment procedure was used to enable participation, the 
implementation of which was overseen by ICANN’s Reconsideration 
Committee. 
Fourth, the procedural protection afforded by ICANN is not general (the 
Reconsideration Committee can only be resorted to by the person or entity that 
has been adversely affected by one or more actions or inactions of the ICANN 
Board, taken or refused to be taken without consideration of material 
information: Art. IV, section 2.2, Bylaws); moreover, it leads to a non-binding 
decision. 
Fifth, the Committee admitted an appeal that was not properly formulated, 
affirming the flexible scope of its protection. 
 
 
4. Issues: New Protection Mechanisms within the Global Administrative Space?  
This case seems to provide an example of the configuration of new protective 
mechanisms in the global administrative space. The activity of a global institution 
like the ICANN needs adequate accountability measures, suitable to the 
regulatory regime in question and to ongoing technological progress. As technical 
norms require great flexibility and methods for adopting them become ever more 
efficient, the need for accountability measures that respond adequately to the 
needs of consumers, operators and the authorities increases.  
There are some doubts over efficacy of the Committee’s decision, as it does 
not ultimately bind the Board, resulting, perhaps, in a form of partial protection. 
Other instruments are also available: the Ombudsman and the Independent 
Review Panel (which has never been used); but the most effective protection is 
still the potential resort to national courts (see supra, Ch. 5.4). 
These different protective mechanisms also promote greater institutional 
legitimacy: the first method of addressing this concern, as has been explained 
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earlier (supra, Ch. 2.1), is the adoption of a multilateral agreement. But other 
administrative law-type mechanisms can also be used, such as notice and 
comment or the Reconsideration Committee proceeding (which is very similar to 
the Italian “ricorso in opposizione”). The mechanisms internal to the ICANN 
complement those provided by national law. 
Finally, the principle of participation is also beginning to emerge in this 
sector. What kind of participation is provided by Article III of the Bylaws? Does 
the right to participation apply in rulemaking or adjudication procedures, or 
both? The law has an undoubtedly limited sectoral relevance, in that it is confined 
to domain names governance; on the other hand, however, it involves, potentially 
at least, actors from every part of the world (for example. every interested person 
can participate in the notice and comment procedure accompanying the adoption 
of a new policy). 
In conclusion, it could be interesting to examine whether the development of 
these mechanisms in the global legal system might contribute to the evolution of 
national law, such as in Italy, where participation in rulemaking procedures is less 
widely granted. 
 
 
5. Further Reading 
In addition to the works cited supra, Ch. 2.1, it may be worthwhile to read the 
following documents: 
a. ICANN Reconsideration Committee Annual Report 
(http://www.icann.org/committees/reconsideration/rc-annualreport-
06dec06.htm); 
b. ICANN Ombudsman Annual Report 
(http://www.icann.org/ombudsman/documents/annual-report-2006-
english-15nov06.pdf); 
c. ICANN Accountability and Transparency - Draft Frameworks and 
Principles, of 23 June 2007 
(http://www.icann.org/transparency/acct-trans-frameworks-principles-
23jun07.htm). 
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5.6. The Impact of Human Rights Law on Supranational Regimes: The 
Bosphorus Case 
Marco Pacini 
 
 
1. Background 
With a view to addressing the armed conflict and severe human rights violations 
in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 820 (1993), which imposed on the Member 
States the obligation to impound all aircrafts in their territories in which a 
majority or controlling interest was held by a person or undertaking in, or 
operating from, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
The Resolution was implemented in Europe by Council Regulation (EEC) No 
990/93, of 26 April 1993, according to which the aircrafts were to be impounded 
by national authorities. The Irish government designated the Department of 
Transport, Energy and Communications (hereinafter Department of Transport) 
as the national authority in charge, with the powers conferred by the Regulation. 
Pursuant to the UNSC Resolution and the Council Regulation, the 
Department of Transport stopped and impounded an aircraft owned by 
Yugoslav Airlines, and leased to a Turkish company. Upon request from the 
Turkish Embassy, the case was referred to the United Nations Sanctions 
Committee, which confirmed the validity of the impoundment. Following a 
renewed rejection from the Department of Transport, the Turkish company 
applied to the Irish High Court, which dismissed the Sanctions Committee’s 
opinion, declaring the Regulation inapplicable and ordering the impoundment to 
be lifted. The Irish government appealed to the Irish Supreme Court, which 
referred the interpretation of the Regulation to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ). Meanwhile, the aircraft was impounded anew. 
The Advocate General of the ECJ argued that the Regulation was applicable 
to the aircraft, that the impoundment pursued the legitimate aim of counteracting 
a devastating civil war and that the losses suffered by the company were not 
wholly unreasonable in the light of the aim pursued. Therefore, a fair balance had 
been struck between demands of the general interest and the requirements of the 
protection of fundamental rights of private parties. Joining the Advocate 
General’s opinion, the ECJ confirmed the legality of the aircraft’s impoundment. 
Given the ECJ’s ruling, the Irish Supreme Court quashed the previous High 
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Court’s decision, without granting the company any compensation. Meanwhile, 
the aircraft was released and returned to Yugoslav Airlines. The case was 
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Article 8 of the implementing Council Regulation reads as follows: “All vessels, 
freight vehicles, rolling stocks and aircrafts in which a majority or controlling 
interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by the 
competent authorities of the Member States”. 
Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with 
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties”. 
 
 
2. Materials  
- UN Security Council, 3200th Meeting, Resolution S/RES/820, April 17, 
1993 
(http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930417a.htm); 
- Council Regulation (EEC) No 990/93 of 26 April 1993, concerning trade 
between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in Official Journal L 102, 28/04/1993 at 
p. 14 – 16 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31993R09
90:EN:HTML); 
- ECJ, Judgment of 30 July 1996, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v 
Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others, Case C-84/95, 
European Court Reports 1996 p. I-03953 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61995J00
84:EN:HTML); 
- First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Paris, 20.III.1952 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf); 
- ECtHR, Grand Chamber, Judgment of 30 June 2005, Application no. 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 166 
45036/98, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland 
(http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=77
7884&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649). 
 
 
3. Analysis  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that there had been no 
violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. First, it held that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the claim: although EC regulations are not subject judicial 
review by the ECtHR, as the EC is not a Party to the ECHR, the aircraft was 
impounded by national authorities, on territory the territory of a Member State, 
and as a result of the Department of Transport’s decision. Second, the 
impoundment had its legal basis directly in the Regulation. The Regulation has 
direct effect in the State, and leaves national authorities no margin of 
appreciation as to the legal requirements implementing its provisions. Third, the 
Regulation’s provisions were drafted in a sufficiently clear manner. Fourth, the 
impoundment pursued a legitimate aim, which was to comply with the legal 
obligations flowing from membership in the EC. It remained, therefore, to be 
established whether there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the Department of Transport’s decision and the legitimate aim pursued. 
In order to respond to this question, the ECtHR reasoned as follows. 
The ECHR does not prohibit Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign 
power to supranational organizations. That being the case, these organizations 
are not held responsible under the ECHR, as they are not Contracting Parties. 
Member States retain their responsibilities under the ECHR, regardless of 
whether their acts are a consequence of domestic law or international legal 
obligations. Thus, national acts taken in compliance with international legal 
obligations are justified, as long as the relevant organization protects fundamental 
rights, in terms of both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms 
for ensuring that they are observed, in a manner that can be considered at least 
equivalent to or comparable with that provided by the Convention. However, 
any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be subject to review 
in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights protection. If it is found 
that such equivalent protection is provided by the organization in question, the 
presumption will be that a State has not departed from its obligations under the 
ECHR when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its 
membership in that organization. However, any such presumption can be 
rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, the protection of 
Convention rights was manifestly deficient.  
The EC treaty did not originally contain provisions for the protection of 
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fundamental rights. The ECJ subsequently recognized that such rights were 
enshrined in the general principles of Community law, and that the ECHR had a 
“special significance” as a source of such rights. These developments were 
reflected in certain treaty amendments, as well as in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 
1997 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. However, the 
effectiveness of such substantive guarantees depends on the mechanisms of 
review in place to ensure that they are respected, in particular the possibility of 
appeal to the ECJ. Although the right individual access to the ECJ in annulment 
actions is limited, actions brought before the ECJ by Community institutions or 
Member States constitute an important means of review of compliance with 
Community norms; and individuals can bring an action for damages before the 
ECJ with respect to the non-contractual liability of Community institutions. 
Moreover, it is essentially through the national courts that the Community system 
provides a remedy to individuals against a Member State or another individual for 
a breach of EC law. Certain EC Treaty mechanisms, such as the doctrine of 
direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure, have given national courts 
a complementary role in reviewing Community law from the outset.  
Further, the ECJ’s development of the supremacy of EC law, direct effect, 
indirect effect and State liability has greatly enlarged the role of national courts in 
the enforcement of Community law and its fundamental rights’ guarantees. The 
ECJ can review the application of EC law – including fundamental rights – by 
national courts, through the preliminary reference procedure, wherein the ECJ’s 
response will often be dispositive in national proceedings. The parties to national 
proceedings have the right to put their case to the ECJ during the preliminary 
reference process. National courts, moreover, usually operate in legal systems in 
which the ECHR has been incorporated, albeit to differing degrees. In such 
circumstances, the protection of fundamental rights by EC law can be considered 
to be “equivalent” to that of the ECHR system. Finally, in the circumstances of 
this case, no dysfunction was detected in the mechanisms for review of the 
observance of ECHR rights within the Community legal system. Therefore, it 
cannot be said that the protection of the applicant's rights was manifestly 
deficient. Thus, the ECtHR held that the relevant presumption of ECHR 
compliance by the respondent State had not been rebutted.  
 
 
4. Issues: Supranational Review of National Decisions 
This judgment deals with a wide range of questions: does a case involving a 
national administrative decision implementing a supranational norm fall within 
the jurisdiction of the ECtHR? If so, what kind of control can the EctHR 
exercise over such a decision – or even over the supranational regime more 
generally? And what legal effects might follow from the fact that either the 
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normative act or the supranational regime in general are incompatible with the 
ECHR? These questions arise for a purely technical reason, connected to the 
legal requirements for acceding to the ECHR: it can be acceded to only by States 
which are Contracting Parties of the Council of Europe. The possibility of a 
supranational organization acceding to the ECHR has, thus far, only been 
discussed only with reference to the EU, but this has not yet taken place. 
Therefore, for the time being at least, supranational organizations do not have 
locus standi before the ECtHR, and cannot be held responsible by that Court for 
any decisions potentially incompatible with the ECHR. 
The judgment sets out three general findings. First of all, if the subject matter 
of a case is a national decision, then the ECtHR always has jurisdiction, even 
when that decision is adopted with a view to achieving a Community aim. 
Moreover, if the national decision directly executes Community instruments, 
rather than any the national legislation implementing it, then the ECtHR may 
verify the legality of that decision with respect to Community instruments. This 
finding has two important consequences. Firstly, the ECtHR is prepared to 
utilize Community norms as an intermediate law for reviewing the compatibility 
of national decisions with the ECHR. Secondly, with a view to ascertaining the 
legality of the national decision with respect to Community law, the ECtHR 
evaluates the predictability and clarity required by the Community instruments 
themselves. In other words, while Community law is not formally subject to 
judicial review under the ECHR, the ECtHR relies upon it in order to verify the 
legality of the implementing national decisions, and submits it to an autonomous 
evaluation as to its predictability and clarity.  
Finally, if the national decision limits itself to implementing Community 
instruments, and these instruments afford no margin of appreciation to the 
competent authorities, then the ECtHR may extend its judicial review even as far 
as to effectively review Community law in particular cases. As explained in depth 
by the Court, judicial review over Community law takes place in two stages, 
separated by a rebuttable presumption. According to that mechanism, the 
national decision is compatible with the ECHR only if Community law ensures a 
level of human rights protection at least equivalent to that afforded by that 
Convention, and if the protection of the rights at stake does not prove to be 
manifestly deficient. Thus, the first stage of review consists in evaluating the level 
of human rights protection afforded by Community law. This type of evaluation 
is general in character, as its object is not merely a single subject, but rather 
Community law as a whole. It is carried out in abstracto, as it does not take the 
circumstances of the particular case in question into consideration. It is an 
extensive review, as reference is made to the ECHR in its entirety and not to 
single rights. The second stage of review implies evaluating the measures adopted 
by the Community institutions in the case at hand. By that, the ECtHR seeks to 
satisfy itself that human rights protection is not manifestly deficient to the 
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detriment of the applicants in the particular case. However, this type of 
evaluation does not seem to entail an in-depth scrutiny, as the ECtHR limits itself 
to reviewing only whether the acts of the Community institutions acts are 
manifestly illogical or unreasonable. 
 
 
5. Similar Cases  
- ECtHR, decision of 23 May 2002, applications no. 6422/02 and no. 9916/02, 
Segi e Gestoras Pro-Amnistia and Others v. Germany and others; 
- ECtHR, decision of 10 March 2004, application no. 56672/00, Senator Lines 
GmbH v. Austria and others; 
- ECommHR, decision of 9 February 1990, application no. 13258/87, M.&Co 
v. Federal Republic of Germany; 
- ECommHR, decision of 10 January 1994, application no. 21090/92, Heinz v. 
the Contracting States Party to the European Patent Convention insofar as they are High 
Contracting Parties to the ECHR; 
- ECtHR, Judgement 28 August 1996, application no. 17862/91, Cantoni v. 
France; 
- ECtHR, Judgement 18 February 1999, application no. 24833/94, Matthews v. 
the United Kingdom; 
- ECtHR, Judgement 2 May 2007, applications no. 71412/01 and no. 
78166/01, Behrami e Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and 
Norway. 
 
 
6. Further Reading 
a. I. CAMERON, The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United 
Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions, Council of Europe 
publications, 2006 
(http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/public_internation
al_law/Texts_&_Documents/2006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf);  
b. I. CANOR, “‘Primus inter pares’. Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of 
Fundamental Rights in Europe?”, 25 European Law Review 3 (2000); 
c. S. DOUGLAS-SCOTT, “A tale of two courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the 
growing European human rights acquis”, 43 Common Market Law Review 629 
(2006); 
d. L. SCHEEK, “The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration 
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through Human Rights”, 65 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 837 (2005); 
e. J.H.H. WEILER, “Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: on the 
Conflict of Standards and Values in the Protection of Human rights in the 
European Legal Space”, in ID., The Constitution of Europe. “Do the new clothes 
have an emperor?” and other essays on European integration, Cambridge (1999), pp. 
102 et seq. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
6. THE ENFORCEMENT OF GLOBAL DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
6.1. The Domestic Implementation of International Regulatory Norms: 
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen 
Marco Macchia 
 
 
1. Background  
The Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen case was triggered by a 1982 US 
law suspending new licenses for Mexican motor carriers operating within the US, 
in response to the discriminatory treatment of American motor carriers by 
Mexico. This moratorium was extended until 1995 by a succession of presidential 
orders. Later, Congress authorized the President to extend, lift or modify the 
moratorium.  
The signature of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
between the two States involved in 1994 was not sufficient to make the American 
authorities review this prohibition. Only after a decision by a NAFTA 
international arbitration panel did the US President express his intention to lift 
the moratorium, upon condition that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) adopted new regulations. The President’s policy met 
with harsh domestic criticism from environmental associations, who feared the 
pollution that would be generated by the increased levels of road traffic. As is the 
case for all federal agencies, proposals for new regulations must be preceded by 
an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), and they must comply with the Clean Air Act (CAA).  
In December 2001, Congress passed Section 350, prohibiting the FMCSA 
from granting new operating licenses to Mexican motor carriers until it 
promulgated new regulations for such carriers. The new regulations would have 
to include stricter safety requirements, such as insurance checks and regular 
inspections, thus meeting the demands of the environmental groups. In order to 
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comply with the NEPA, the FMCSA issued an EIS, which concluded with a 
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), rendering a statement of compliance 
with the CAA unnecessary. However, the EIS issued by the FMCSA took only 
the new regulations into consideration, and not the impact that might be caused 
by the increased presence of Mexican trucks within the US. This latter impact 
would be an effect not of the new regulations themselves, but of the lifting of the 
moratorium on Mexican motor carriers, which was solely for the President to 
decide. In November 2002, President Bush lifted the moratorium.  
The Public Citizen group immediately challenged the FMCSA’s EIS before 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and then before the Supreme Court, claiming 
that the provisions of the NEPA and CAA had been violated, given that the 
opening of the borders to Mexican motor carriers was a “reasonably foreseeable” 
effect of the new FMCSA regulations. Therefore, the FMSCA should have 
considered all of the effects connected to the lifting of the moratorium in its EIS. 
The Department of Transportation – representing the FMCSA – argued in 
contrast that the FMCSA could not make the outcome of an EIS conditional 
upon a decision over which it had no authority, since it depended entirely on the 
will of the President. Had it done so, the EIS procedure would have served “no 
purpose” in light of the NEPA regulatory scheme, as it could have no impact on 
the final Presidential decision.  
The Court of Appeals upheld Public Citizen’s claim, stating that an 
administrative agency was required to consider all of the consequences of rule-
making in the EIS, even if only potential, and even if dependent on the actions of 
third parties not bound by the NEPA. However, the judge specified that she did 
not intend to subject the actions of the President to a review on the basis of the 
parameters established in the NEPA and CAA.  
The Supreme Court overturned the Appellate Court decision, endorsing 
instead the Agency’s conduct on the ground that the FMCSA did not have the 
authority to prevent the environmental effect that might be caused by the new 
regulatory framework. In fact, although FMCSA’s action was a pre-requisite for 
the entry of Mexican motor carriers into the US, the resulting environmental 
impact – and hence its consideration in the decision – had to be seen as an 
indirect effect, given FMCSA’s inability to countermand the President’s lifting of 
the moratorium.  
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- Supreme Court of the United States 
(http://www.supremecourtus.gov); 
- Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, June 7, 2004, 541 U.S. 752 
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(2004) 
(http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/07june20041115/www.supreme
courtus.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-358.pdf); 
- Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) 
(http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/nepa/current); 
- Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. §7506 
(http://www.epa.gov/air/caa); 
- North American Free Trade Agreement 
(http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343);  
- National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U. S. C. §§4321-4375; 
- Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ), §1515; 
- Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 49 U. S. C. §113.  
 
 
3. Analysis and Issues: Judicial Review and Foreign Policy 
The issue underlying the Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen case concerns 
the relationship between judicial review and the decisions taken by executives at a 
supranational or international level.  
It is known that US citizens are generally entitled to the judicial review of 
federal administrative acts under the US legal system. However, this does not 
seem to apply to decisions affecting national administrations taken at an 
international level, according to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case. Is the 
President’s discretion subject to judicial review? Is judicial review admissible over 
foreign policy decisions, in which the President “speak(s) for the nation with one 
voice”?  
Moreover, when the government adopts measures in non-domestic forums, 
the interests of its citizens receive much less protection than they would 
otherwise, even though they have inevitable administrative implications. And yet, 
such measures are not preceded by a dialogue with the private parties concerned, 
and nor is their any right to request access to relevant documents, the normal 
procedural protections that would accompany a similar decision in a domestic 
forum. When a government representative undertakes commitments binding 
upon national administrative bodies in an international or supranational forum, 
such as NAFTA, the regular procedural limitations upon the exercise of power 
do not apply, leaving the rights and interests of private parties unprotected.  
Judicial review of such decisions thus seems even more important, because it 
can counteract the absence of a normal administrative relationship between 
public powers and citizens.  
In contrast, the Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen decision shows 
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how administrative agencies can adapt to international commitments. Therefore, 
domestic administrative decisions applying international obligations are treated 
differently from measures that are of only domestic relevance. According to the 
United States Supreme Court in this case, the regime cannot be the same, or the 
credibility of the executive power in international negotiations would be 
compromised.  
To what extent, therefore, can an agency be rendered unable to exercise its 
competences as a result of an international obligation? In other words, to what 
extent are the decisions taken in global forums immune from the type of judicial 
review that would otherwise apply to exclusively domestic acts? 
 
 
4. Further Reading  
a. E. BENVENISTI, “The Interplay Between Actors as a Determinant of the 
Evolution of Administrative Law in International Institution”, 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 323 (2005) 
(http://www.iilj.org/GAL/documents/10120510_Benvenisti.pdf); 
b. J. MILLER, “United States Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen”, 
28 Harvard Environmental Law Review 594 (2004) 
(http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/vol28_2/josephmiller.pdf). 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Incomplete Domestic Enforcement: The Metalclad Corporation Case 
Chiara Mari 
 
 
1. Background 
The case United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation provides an interesting 
example of national courts’ involvement in reviewing the decisions of global 
institutions. The dispute arose out of the construction of a landfill in the 
central Mexican State of San Louis Potosì by a private business (Coterin), 
owned and operated by the Metalclad Corporation (an American company). 
Metalclad obtained permission from both federal and State authorities to 
construct the landfill. Demonstrations took place at the inauguration of the 
landfill, which prevented it from opening. Metalclad reached an agreement 
with federal environmental agencies, setting forth the conditions under which 
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the landfill would operate. The local government, however, obtained an 
injunction against the operation of the landfill. The Governor of San Louis 
Potosi, moreover, issued an Ecological Decree in which he mandated that the 
land on which the landfill site was located would become a permanent 
ecological preserve, without awarding any compensation to Metalclad. The 
Corporation then filed an arbitration claim with the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), complaining of a breach by 
Mexico of the obligation to grant fair and equitable treatment in investment 
matters under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The Arbitral Tribunal awarded damages against Mexico to 
Metalclad for two reasons: first, the breach of the standard of fair and 
equitable treatment (NAFTA, Art. 1105); and second, it found that the 
Mexican measures amounted to an expropriation of Metalclad’s investment 
(NAFTA, Art. 1110). In determining the compensation owed to the 
corporation, the Arbitral Tribunal did not take expected future profit into 
account because the landfill had never been operative. Mexico sought 
permission to appeal the award to the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
(Canada), invoking the provisions of both the Commercial Arbitration Act 
and the International Commercial Arbitration Act. The Court set aside the 
part of the arbitral award determining the calculation of interest. 
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- The Supreme Court of British Columbia, Reason for Judgment, May 2, 
2001, The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation (2001 BCSC 664) 
 (http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Metaclad-BCSCReview.pdf); 
- The Supreme Court of British Columbia, Supplementary Reason for 
Judgment, October 31, 2001, The United Mexican States v. Metalclad 
Corporation (2001 BCSC 1529) 
 (http://ita.law.uvic.ca/Metaclad-BCSCAdditionalReasons.htm); 
- International Centre for settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
Award of the Tribunal, August 30, 2000, The United Mexican States v. 
Metalclad Corporation, case n. ARB (AF) 97/1 
(http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH
&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=Cases_Home); 
- North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Chapter 11 
 (http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343); 
- ICSID – Additional Facility Rules 
 (http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp); 
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- International Commercial Arbitration Act (International CAA), R.S.B.C 
1996-British Columbia 
 (http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/I/96233_01.htm). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
In The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation case, the ICSID Arbitral 
Tribunal awarded damages to Metalclad against Mexico for a breach of the 
NAFTA rules on investments.  
The Arbitral Tribunal award concerned the interpretation of NAFTA 
Articles 1105 and 1110, and the calculation of damages.  
The Tribunal found that the principle of fair and equitable treatment, set 
forth in NAFTA Article 1105, had not been applied to Metalclad in 
accordance with international law, because Mexican policy had not been 
transparent. This conclusion was based on the rules of interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. According to these rules, fair and 
equitable treatment has to be interpreted in light of the NAFTA’s object, 
which is to increase investment by means of greater transparency. The 
Mexican government had not acted in a transparent manner with Metalclad, 
because the state and federal authorities had given permission to construct the 
landfill, but the local government prevented its operation. There was, 
therefore, a conflict between state, federal and local measures and a 
consequent breach of the principle of fair and equitable treatment.  
The Tribunal found, moreover, that Metalclad’s investment in Mexico had 
been expropriated, and that NAFTA Article 1110 thus required that 
compensation be paid for measures that directly or indirectly expropriated the 
investment. In this case, there was an expropriation for two reasons. The first 
related to the obscure municipal permit granting process. The corporation had 
been led by federal officials to believe that it did not require a municipal 
construction permit that was in fact required, and then later refused, by the 
local government. 
The second reason stems from the Ecological Decree, approved at the last 
minute by the local government, which prevented the operation of the landfill. 
This Decree established a protected natural area that incorporated the landfill 
site. The Tribunal awarded damages, but the compensation did not include 
lost profits because the landfill was never operational.  
The Supreme Court of British Columbia upheld the award and set aside 
only the part regarding the calculation of interest. According to the Court, the 
compensation did not have to include interest from the date of the local 
government injunction to the date of the Ecological Decree because there had 
not been a violation before that Decree.  
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4. Issues: The Relationship between National and Supranational Judicial Bodies 
In the Metalclad case, a Canadian court, the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia, reviewed the award of an international court, an Arbitral Tribunal 
constituted under ICSID rules. The case raises many questions about the 
relationship between national and global judicial bodies: can national courts 
really review the decisions of global courts? Is such review legitimate? What is 
the scope of these judgments? How wide is the involvement of national courts 
in checking the decisions of global institutions? Does this kind of check 
promote or obstruct the development of global law?  
A second problem is the relationship between transparency and fair and 
equitable treatment under NAFTA Chapter Eleven. In the view of the 
Arbitral Tribunal, the policies of the Mexican Government were not clearly 
communicated to Metalclad, resulting in a lack of transparency and a 
consequent breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. The Tribunal 
considered the denial of a municipal construction permit to be improper, 
because the corporation had already obtained permission from federal and 
State authorities. Such non-transparent policies create confusion in business 
planning and investment. But what is the relationship between fair and 
equitable treatment and transparency? Do the two principles coincide in 
investment matters? If an agreement does not contain a transparency 
provision, can the duty to make information publicly available be implied 
from a fair and equitable treatment clause?  
Another problem arises out of the liberal interpretation of the word 
“expropriation” of NAFTA Chapter Eleven. According to the Arbitral 
Tribunal, the injunction against the operation of the landfill was a form of 
expropriation. Do this broad interpretation of the word “expropriation”, and 
the consequent award of damages, promote corporate interests over the 
public interest?  
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. E. AISBETT, L. KARP, C. MCAUSLAND, “Regulatory Takings and 
Enviromental Regulation NAFTA’ Chapter 11” (2005) 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=886168); 
b. A.A. ESCOBAR, Introductory Note to the case in ICSID Review-Foreign 
Investment Law Journal 
 (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid); 
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c. S.L. KASS, M. MCCARROL, “The Metalclad Decision under NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11”, New York Law Journal (2000) 
(http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub-990359_1.html); 
d. A. KOTERA, “Transparency and Investments Agreements” 
(http://www.ilahq.org/pdf/Foreign%20Investment/ILA%20paper%20K
otera.pdf); 
e. T. WEILER, “Metalclad v. Mexico: a Play in Three Parts”, 2 J. World Trade 
L. 685 (2001). 
 
 
 
 
6.3. The WTO “Science-Fest”: Japanese Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples  
Antonella Albanesi 
 
 
1. Background 
In 1971, Japan officially opened its markets to apple imports. However, it did not 
allow the import of apples from the US, in order to avoid the spread of fruit 
diseases, such as “coddling moth” and “fire blight”. This policy was based on a 
1950 law setting out restrictive measures for the importation of apples, the Plant 
Protection Law Enforcement Regulations (Art. 9 and the Annexed List to Table 
2). Under this law, apple imports from the US had to meet certain requirements. 
The orchard from which such apples originated had to a) be designated by the 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) as free of plants infected with fire blight; 
b) be surrounded by a 500-meter buffer zone; c) be inspected at least three times 
annually and disinfected by a chlorine treatment. 
The first requirement regarding fruits infected with fire blight was met with a 
demonstration by the US growers that any such bacteria are killed during the 
required cold storage period (apples are kept in a dark room at near freezing 
temperatures with almost no oxygen). 
The question, therefore, shifted to the second requirement, providing for a 
buffer zone in order to prevent the spread of the fire blight disease. To meet this 
requirement, the 4,000 US orchard owners exporting to Japan had to isolate 
3,200 acres of apples, keeping them at least 500 meters from pear trees and other 
plants. However, in 1997, US growers presented published scientific research 
showing that mature, symptomless apples are not carriers of fire blight. The 
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USDA thus designated the orchards in the States of Washington and Oregon to 
be fire blight-free (Washington alone produces 100 million boxes of apples a 
year, of which 9% are exported to Asia, with a gross value of $393 million). 
Despite the adoption of these measures and the scientific evidence presented, 
the Japanese Government maintained its restrictive measures against US apple 
imports, triggering a yearly loss of $75 million and a dispute before the WTO. 
In this dispute, the following provisions were relevant. 
Firstly, there is Article XI of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), which requires the general elimination of quantitative restrictions on the 
export and import of any products between Member States. In this case, the 
Japanese measures effectively restricted the quantity of US apple imports, thereby 
discriminating against a Member State.  
Secondly, there is Article 5.1 of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement, which requires Members to ensure that their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment of the risks to human, animal 
or plant life or health. The WTO Appellate Body asserted in the Australia – 
Salmon dispute (see section 5) that the risk assessment has to: a) identify the 
diseases and the potential biological and economic consequences; b) evaluate the 
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases, as well as the 
associated potential biological and economic consequences; and c) evaluate this 
likelihood in the light of the different SPS measures which might be applied.  
Thirdly, there is Article 2.2 SPS, which requires Members to adopt sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures based on scientific principles and to maintain them only 
when supported by sufficient scientific evidence.  
In exception to this rule, finally, Article 5.7 establishes the precautionary 
principle: if there is insufficient scientific evidence demonstrating the total 
absence of risk, a Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures for health protection. Where this principle is applied, the measure must 
be adopted on the basis of the relevant information available, and Members must 
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk, and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly 
within a reasonable period of time. 
In this dispute, therefore, Japan could have adopted restrictive measures in 
two cases: according to Article 2.2, it could have done so by providing sufficient 
scientific evidence regarding the existence of risks to life; or according to Article 
5.7, by proving that the scientific evidence submitted by the United States is 
insufficient to demonstrate that mature, symptomless apples could not 
disseminate the disease. 
Members of the WTO may thus adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures if 
founded on sufficient scientific evidence and on an appropriate risk assessment. 
The SPS Agreement seeks to limit the negative effects that these measures could 
have on free trade. Legitimate SPS measures must impact upon one of the 
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following risks: an indirect food-borne risk to human and animal (though not 
plant) health, or the direct risk of epidemic disease affecting human, animal and 
plant health. The risk assessment is different in each case. In the case of indirect 
food-borne risk, it is necessary to evaluate the potential harmful effects from 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages 
or foodstuffs. 
In the case of direct risk, it is necessary to evaluate the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of these diseases in the territory of the Member State, 
and the associated potential biological and economic consequences. In particular, 
the evaluation of indirect or food-borne risk concerns the possibility of harmful 
effects; the direct risk assessment, by contrast, is relevant only if it demonstrates 
that there is the probable (and not just possible) entry, establishment or spread of 
these diseases in question. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 
WT/DS245/R, 15 July 2003 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm); 
- Report of Appellate Body, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Apples,WT/DS245/AB/R, AB-2003-4, 26 November 2003 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm); 
- Request for Consultations by the United States, Japan – Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/1, 6 March 2002 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm); 
- Report of the Panel, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United 
States,Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 
WT/DS245/RW, 23 June 2005 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm); 
- Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Japan – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/21, 2 September 2005 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm); 
- Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
(www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15-sps.pdf). 
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3. Analysis  
Notwithstanding the USDA designation, Japan maintained its restrictive 
measures against US apples, holding them necessary to avoid the introduction of 
fire blight into Japan. On March 1, 2002, the United States requested 
consultations with Japan, and thereafter the establishment of a WTO dispute 
resolution panel. 
The US claimed that the Japanese measures violated Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement, because they were not based on sufficient scientific evidence. The 
Japanese Government argued that, on the contrary, each requirement involved in 
its the import measures (the Ministry declaration, the necessity of buffer zone, 
the frequency of inspection and the type of disinfestations required) was 
reasonably supported by the relevant scientific literature. 
The Appellate Body rejected the Japanese claim, finding that the restrictive 
measures did violate Article 2.2, because there was not sufficient evidence 
demonstrating the risk of spreading the E. Amylovora (fire blight) bacteria to 
healthy apples and other plants (and, in doing so, upheld the Panel’s findings on 
this point). It reasoned that the term “sufficient” implied a “rational and neutral 
relation between SPS measures and the scientific evidence”, and that no such 
relation could be found in respect of the Japanese measures. The Japanese 
measures were also disproportionate with respect to the risk of entry, 
establishment or spread of fire blight, as identified by the scientific evidence. 
The US also claimed that Japan’s phytosanitary measures were inconsistent 
with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, because they were not introduced on the 
basis of an appropriate assessment of risk. Japan countered that the appropriate 
assessment of risk had been carried out, based on the General Guidelines for 
Pest Risk Analysis (PRA), established by the International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures (ISPM). 
According to the Appellate Body, Japan’s measures were inconsistent with 
Article 5.1. The Japanese authorities’ assessment proved only that the risk of 
entry, establishment or spread of disease depended on a generic link between 
host and vector; in consequence, there was not a sufficient detailed assessment of 
the risk posed by imported US apples in particular to justify the contested 
measures. 
The United States also claimed that Japan’s measures were inconsistent with 
Article 5.7, as they were adopted without a demonstration of the insufficiency of 
the scientific evidence presented by the US. According to the Appellate Body, the 
risk of entry, establishment or spread of fire blight by mature and symptomless 
apples has to be evaluated adequately, using a broad range of appropriate 
scientific proof. However, Japan did not perform such an evaluation, and 
therefore did not prove the insufficiency of the US evidence. The Appellate Body 
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thus found that the Japanese measures were also inconsistent with Article 5.7. 
On December 10, 2003, the DSB adopted the conclusions of the Appellate 
Body, which had reaffirmed the findings of the original Panel in the dispute. 
Japan demonstrated its will to comply with the decision and agreed on a 
reasonable period of time within which to do so. When Japan failed to comply 
within the time limit, the US requested the establishment of another panel, 
following the procedure pursuant to Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). After the June 23, 2005 publication of the new Panel’s 
Report, Japan and the US reached a further agreement on the execution of that 
decision on September 2, 2005. 
 
 
4. Issues: Global Bodies Interpreting International Obligations 
This case raises several issues. 
First of all, were the Japanese measures protectionist? Were they 
discriminatory or were they justified by SPS norms? To answer those questions, it 
is necessary to take the following circumstances into account. 
Annex A, § 1, of the SPS Agreement defines as “sanitary or phytosanitary” 
any measure that aims at protecting human, animal, or plant life or health. 
Second, the average price of Japanese apples is between 3-4 dollars a pound, 
whereas American apples are only about 1 dollar a pound. Third, the Panel’s 
experts defined the risk of US apples introducing the disease into Japan as 
negligible. Finally, Japan did not present an adequate record of risk assessment, 
nor any scientific evidence about the entry, establishment or spread of the disease 
from US apples.  
Japan further failed to demonstrate that the national regulation was intended 
to protect public health. The Regulation in fact protected Japanese apple 
producers from American competition, saving them from a considerable 
economic loss. Therefore, the Japanese measures did indeed discriminate against 
the US and protect the national market. 
Another, more general issue concerns how the Panel and the Appellate Body 
interpret the SPS Agreement. How does the WTO guarantee free trade in 
relation to human, animal and plant health? 
The Panel and Appellate Body did not only carry out a review of the 
legitimacy of the challenged measures. In evaluating the proportionality and 
reasonableness of national measures, the global judges acted like national 
administrative judges. But why should this be so? Is it correct for global judges to 
adopt the methods and standards of their national counterparts? 
The WTO’s goal is to facilitate free trade. This pushes the Panel and the 
Appellate Body to uphold only those restrictive measures adopted on the basis of 
a risk assessment, founded on sufficient scientific evidence and aimed at 
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protecting health. National authorities, however, seek to set their own risk policy, 
to ensure their citizens what they believe is an appropriate level of health 
protection. In defining what constitutes an acceptable level of risk, every Member 
State also makes a social value judgment. In this dispute, the Panel and the 
Appellate Body defined the risk of entry, establishment or spread of the disease 
as “unimportant”, thus denying the Japanese authorities the right to formulate 
their own risk policy. Is it proper for a global body to declare the illegitimacy of a 
measure adopted by a Member State, based on a social value judgment and risk 
policy? Is it proper to ignore non-scientific factors, such as consumer concerns, 
and cultural and moral preferences? If the democratically elected national 
authority is accountable to the population for the possible harms caused by SPS 
measures, should a global body, in the face of scientific uncertainty, override this 
decision in the name of free trade?  
How final are the decisions of global judicial bodies? Are they subject to 
further review? Might the Panel have decided differently if the risk concerned 
human, rather than plant, health?  
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
Since 1995, WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have addressed a number of 
analogous cases, holding that national measures restrictive of trade in agricultural 
and food products have not been based on correct scientific risk assessments. An 
example is the 1997 dispute between Canada and Australia over Australian 
measures limiting salmon imports, found to have violated the requirements of 
Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement (Australia – Measures Affecting 
Importation of Salmon, Dispute DS18).  
Another example is the 1998 dispute between the US and Japan over 
Japanese measures prohibiting the importation of fresh apricots, cherries, plums, 
pears, quince, peaches, apples, and walnuts from the continental US, on the 
grounds that these fruits were potential hosts of the coddling moth (Japan – 
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Dispute DS76). A final example can be 
found in the 1998 dispute which arose when the European Community banned 
the sale of US beef from cattle treated with certain growth hormones (European 
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Dispute 
DS26).  
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6. Further Reading 
a. L. CALVIN, B. KRISSOFF, “Technical Barriers to Trade: a Case Study of 
Phytosanitary Barriers and U.S.-Japanese Apple Trade”, 23 Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 351 (1998);  
b. J.N. DAMIEN, J.H.H. WEILER, “Japan – Measures Affecting Importation of 
Apples (AB-2003-4): One Bad Apple? (DS245/AB/R): A Comment”, in H. 
HORN, P.C. MAVROIDIS (eds.), The WTO Case of Law 2003 (2006), pp. 280 et 
seq.;  
c. O. LANDWEHR, “Decision of the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products”, 10 
European Journal of International Law 461 (1999) 
(http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No2/sr2.html); 
d. J. PAUWELYN, “The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
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of the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body Reports regarding Environment-
oriented Trade Measures”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 14/01 
(http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/013701.rtf); 
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Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute 
Settlement”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/00 
(http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/00/000901.html). 
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6.4. EU Countermeasures against the US Byrd Amendment 
Mariangela Benedetti 
 
 
1. Background 
The WTO dispute settlement system is a central mechanism for providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. In order to ensure 
that system is not reduced to the status of soft law, there are enforcement 
procedures. At the heart of this enforcement mechanism is the principle of 
retaliation: the WTO can impose an economic penalty on states that do not 
comply with international agreements. This economic penalty has proven to be a 
fairly reliable enforcement strategy. 
When a panel or the Appellate Body finds that a measure adopted by a 
Member State is inconsistent with its obligations under a covered agreement, it 
may recommend that the Member in question bring it into conformity with the 
agreement. Members are normally given a reasonable period of time to 
implement the final recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
If, however, within that reasonable period of time, the Member finds it 
impracticable to comply with the DSB’s recommendations, it may choose 
provide mutually acceptable compensation to the other party within 20 days after 
the expiry of the time limit set. If no such mutually acceptable compensation 
agreement is reached within the 20-day period, the complaining party may make a 
request to the DSB for authorization to retaliate (i.e., to suspend concessions or 
other benefits). With the negative consensus rule in the WTO, such a request will 
be granted unless there is a consensus to reject it. This means that even the 
requesting Member itself would also have to object. The DSB then has another 
10 days (that is, 30 days minus the 20 days which have been consumed by the 
parties in negotiating possible compensation) to decide whether to accept or 
reject the request for retaliation. The disputing parties may disagree over the 
appropriate level of retaliation. Any such disagreement must be resolved by an 
arbitration established for the purpose within 60 days after the expiry of the 
reasonable period of time. 
The practice of “dumping” can refer to any kind of predatory pricing. In 
international trade law, this word is generally used to describe the exportation of 
a product to another country at a price that is either below the price it sells for in 
its home market or is below its costs of production. Thus, dumping occurs when 
the price of a good is lower in an export market than in its home market. 
Although dumping is often inadvertent (due to exchange rate fluctuations or 
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accounting practices) it may also be intentional.  
Dumping is an unfair trade practice, and States usually react against it in order 
to defend their domestic industries. The WTO sets forth specific policies for 
how Member States can choose to react to dumping.  
In particular, the WTO Agreement allows governments to react against 
dumping where there is a genuine injury to the competing domestic industry. The 
government in question thus has to be able to show that dumping is taking place, 
calculate the extent of dumping (how much lower the export price is compared 
to the exporter’s home market price) and show that the dumping is causing injury 
to the domestic market, or is threatening to do so. In turn, where excessive anti-
dumping duties are imposed by one Member, WTO treaties authorize the victim 
thereof to charge countervailing duties to compensate for this. The term 
“countervailing duty” suggests the intention to counteract an imbalance, so the 
target should be the same industry that is subject to the unfair anti-dumping 
duties. Only where this is determined to be ineffective are countries allowed to 
take action against different industries through the principle of cross retaliation. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- Council Regulation (EC) no. 673/2005, of 25 April 2005, Establishing 
Additional Custom Duties on Imports of Certain Products Originating in The United 
States of America, OJ L 110, 30 April 2005, p. 1 et seq. 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:110:000
1:0005:EN:PDF); 
- Arbitration, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000 Original Complaint by the European Communities), Recourse to 
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU, n. 
WT/DS217/ARB/EEC, 31 August 2004 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm); 
- WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (“Byrd amendment”), WT/DS217, 234/AB/R 
adopted on January 27, 2003. United States, Appellant; Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico and Thailand, Appellees; Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong (China), 
Israel and Norway, Third Participants. Division: Sacerdoti, Baptista, Lockhart 
(http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/234ABR.doc);  
- Award of the Arbitrator, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000, Arbitration under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU, 
WT/DS217/14, DS234/22, ARB-2003-1/16, June 13, 2003 
(http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/234-22.doc);  
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- Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act 
of 2000, WT/217/R, WT/DS234/R, September 16, 2002 
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm);  
- Agreement on the implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp.doc);  
- Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.doc);  
- Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU), Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement 
(http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.doc). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
In the 106th Congress of the US, Senator DeWine authored the Continued 
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), which failed to gather support until 
2000, when the influential Senator Byrd added a critical amendment. The Byrd 
Amendment instructed the US Government to pay the proceeds gathered from 
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties to the American steel manufacturing 
companies that had brought anti-dumping complaints. In order to receive funds 
under the Byrd Amendment, producers had to be certified as eligible with the 
Trade Commissioner. On the basis of this certification, the Commissioner 
distributed all funds received from anti-dumping and countervailing duties 
assessed in the preceding fiscal year. This meant that US companies that brought 
anti-dumping cases before the authorities stood to benefit not only from the 
imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on competing imports, but 
also from direct payments to them from the US Government when those duties 
were dispersed.  
From 2000 to 2005, a total of 1.26 billion US dollars were paid to a relatively 
small number of affected US producers (less than ten companies, including 
Timken, Torrington, Candle.lite, MBP and Zenith Electronics). 
In December 2000, eleven WTO Members (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Thailand) requested the 
establishment of a panel to determine the incompatibility of the Byrd 
Amendment with the WTO regime. The fundamental complaint was that the 
Byrd Amendment violated requirements of the WTO Anti-dumping and SCM 
Agreements that prohibit WTO Members from maintaining any specific action 
against dumping and subsidization, except for action taken in accordance with 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Anti-dumping (AD) 
Agreement. The complaining WTO Members also argued that the Byrd 
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Amendment provided incentives for domestic industry to initiate and maintain 
anti-dumping claims, in order to collect the proceeds from the duties imposed as 
a result. The WTO Panel agreed that the Byrd Amendment constituted an 
impermissible specific action against dumping and subsidization under WTO 
rules. In September 2002, the Panel suggested that the United States bring the 
CDSOA into conformity by repealing the Byrd Amendment. 
The United States appealed the Panel’s decision. The WTO Appellate Body 
(AB) upheld the Panel’s finding that the Byrd Amendment constituted a specific 
action against dumping and subsidization not permitted under the relevant WTO 
agreements. The AB found that the “Byrd Amendment has an adverse bearing 
on, and more specifically, is designed and structured so that it dissuades the 
practice of dumping or the practice of subsidization, and because it creates an 
incentive to terminate such practices, it is undoubtedly an action against dumping 
or a subsidy” (para. 255). On January 16, 2003, the AB recommended that the 
United States bring the Byrd Amendment into conformity with its WTO 
obligations under the Anti-dumping Agreement and GATT 1994. 
Following the ruling of the AB, the United States committed itself to 
bringing the Byrd Amendment into compliance with its WTO obligations by 
December 27, 2003. When it failed to do so, the complaining countries returned 
to the WTO and sought authorization to take action to withdraw concessions 
from, and implement retaliatory duties against, the United States. The key issue 
was the amount of retaliation that would be permitted. The United States did not 
agree with the complaining countries on this amount, and therefore an arbitration 
proceeding was initiated under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.  
The arbitration decision, issued on August 31, 2004, limited the complaining 
parties to suspending concessions based on the trade impact on each country’s 
exports. The arbitrator considered that an appropriate way to assess the trade 
effect of a law operating in economic terms, such as a domestic subsidy, was to 
establish an economic model. This model, when applied to the facts of this case, 
would identify a coefficient that, when multiplied by the amount of disbursement 
over a given period, would produce a figure corresponding to a trade effect that 
could reasonably be deemed to correspond to the level of nullification or 
impairment for that period.  
Each party proposed a model to assess the trade effect of the CDSOA 
disbursements. The arbitrator rejected the United States’ model in favor of a 
modified version of that proposed by the Requesting Parties. This was a hybrid 
solution, to the extent that it combined a fixed coefficient calculated on the basis 
of actual disbursement patterns over a particular period of time – in this case 3 
years – with variable amounts of future disbursements.  
The quantification of the trade impact was based on the amount of Byrd 
Amendment disbursements for imports from the individual complainant 
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countries into the United States. However, the authorized amount for the 
suspension of concessions and the amount of retaliatory duties was not equal to 
the full amount of Byrd Amendment distributions to US producers; rather, the 
arbitrator authorized the adoption of countermeasures in respect of only 72% 
thereof.  
The retaliation by the complaining countries played an important role in 
shaping the political view in the United States of the Byrd Amendment. When 
the retaliation lists from the complaining countries began to take shape in mid-
2005, members of Congress began to pay increasing attention to the possibility of 
repealing the Amendment. On November 18, 2005, the US House of 
Representatives voted to repeal it, but the Senate resisted because it had not 
factored such a course of action into its version of the budget reconciliation bill. 
In Conference, House and Senate conferees agreed on the inclusion of a Byrd 
Amendment repeal, but the insistence of a few members of both pushed the 
effective date of the repeal back to October 1, 2007 (the Senate passed the 
revised spending bill by a 51-50 vote on December 21, 2005 and the House 
against passed the repeal on February 1, 2006, by a vote of 216 to 214). 
As a result, anti-dumping duties accumulated on goods entering the United 
States before October 1, 2007 are still subject to distribution pursuant to the 
Byrd Amendment.  
 
 
4. Issues: Enforcement of Global Administrative Regimes 
First, what goals do the WTO rules on countermeasures achieve?  
The point of retaliation is to induce the compliance of the violating Member 
with its WTO obligations. While this purpose is not explicitly stated in the WTO 
Agreements, it has been deduced from the temporary nature of countermeasures, 
as provided by Article 22.1 of the DSU, and from Article 3.7 of the DSU 
whereby “the first objective of the dispute settlement system is usually to secure 
the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent 
with the provisions of any of the covered agreements”. In the Byrd Amendment 
proceedings, the arbitrators were remarkably reluctant to endorse this objective, 
arguing that the suspension of concessions or other obligations can be at most 
only one of several purposes of retaliation. 
Second, what purposes does the WTO retaliation system serve? 
Retaliation is a trade sanction imposed to induce compliance. This view 
follows naturally if the system is presumed to be similar to other enforceable 
rule-based systems, such as penal codes, although it is also compatible in 
principle with the idea of the WTO rules as an enforceable contract. It also fits 
naturally into the prisoner’s dilemma used by economic theorists, which assumes 
that self-interested parties that could benefit from breach must be induced to 
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comply with the prospect of punitive consequences in response to infractions.  
Breaching an agreement, even when the specific costs of compliance are 
greater than the benefits, can nonetheless do long-term damage to a nation’s 
ability to obtain future agreements. In other words, it could also damage its trade 
and non-trade relationships with other countries.  
Retaliation helps to maintain the balance of concessions negotiated through 
the WTO. WTO Members are presumed to accept obligations only because they 
have received rights in return: they have agreed to reduce their own trade barriers 
and in return have received increased access to other Members’ markets.  
Third, the Byrd Amendment case shows that WTO retaliatory and 
countermeasures do not aim at punishing violators. The WTO regime uses the 
power to impose countermeasures in order to achieve its goal of compliance 
through the market instrument of compensation. The WTO Agreement uses 
market rules to shape Member behavior, and the market is the only mechanism 
to check a breach of WTO law. This system is based on the persuasion of power 
rather than the power of persuasion.  
The traditional economic model of trade negotiations, in which compliance 
depends on the probability and scope of retaliation, is only one aspect of the 
WTO retaliation system. Other factors are surely important. First, important 
actors within each country often have an interest in compliance – for example, 
consumers, exporters, and import distributors. Second, even when Members 
disagree over a particular case, they comply because they continue to believe that 
a trading system based on rules will serve their nation’s interest overall. Third, 
officials and others value their reputations as rule-abiding participants because of 
the interests they have in the current agreement, and their desire to be taken 
seriously when negotiating new ones. Countries are aware that compliance on 
their part could influence the probability that other countries will comply in the 
future. And fourth, countries generally have ongoing relationships in other 
spheres. Those that depend on the United States for aid and defense, for 
example, might be more willing to comply with the findings in disputes in which 
it is involved.  
Fourth, retaliation has been applied by WTO Members exclusively as a result 
of one kind of administrative procedure. This procedure guarantees the legality 
of the countermeasures because it provides for due process in the assessment 
work of the arbitrators, for example the right of each party to the dispute to be 
heard. The WTO legal system uses national administrative principles, such as the 
proportionality principle and the obligation to give reasons, to influence the 
national authorities.  
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6.5. Global Bodies Reviewing National Decisions: The Yellowstone Case 
Benedetto Cimino 
 
 
1. Background  
In 1987, the Crown Butte mining company prepared a project for the extraction 
of precious metals in Montana, on its own property surrounding Yellowstone 
National Park. The firm estimated the economic value of exploiting its mine at 
around one billion dollars. The initiative was supported by local authorities, who 
were interested in the increased jobs promised by the active mine, but opposed 
by environmental groups, national park managers and the Federal Department of 
the Interior. Opponents of the mine argued that it risked polluting the 
groundwater, altering the hydrogeology of the park, affecting the local flora and 
fauna (which were already threatened by various pre-existing human activities 
such as tourism, traffic, and construction), spreading diseases and causing the 
uncontrolled growth of some species. 
In 1993, the Environmental Impact Statement procedure began, as required 
by the National Environmental Policy Act. However, before the conclusion of 
the national procedure, a global body became involved in the dispute: the 
UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC), as Yellowstone has been a world 
natural heritage site since 1978.  
The WHC was created to implement the World Heritage Convention, a 
treaty concluded in 1972, under the aegis of the UNESCO General Assembly, 
which aimed at creating a collective protection framework for important sites of 
cultural and natural heritage. The agreement contains two main groups of norms: 
first, it guarantees technical, scientific and financial assistance to the States whose 
jurisdiction contains properties of universal interest; second, it establishes the 
procedures through which a monument can be included on the World Heritage 
List. This is a prerequisite for enjoying the particular status and the special 
protections provided by the Convention. 
The listing procedure was implemented by the Operational Guidelines, a set 
of documents approved by the WHC on a qualified majority basis. The 
Guidelines distinguish three different procedures: first, that for inscription in the 
World Heritage List; second, that for the qualification of a property as “World 
Heritage in Danger”; third, that for the deletion of a property from the List.  
The inscription procedure is triggered upon the initiative of the interested 
State: every Party can submit an inventory of properties suitable for inclusion on 
the List, with a brief description of the site and its significance (the Tentative 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF GLOBAL DECISIONS 193 
List); in this phase, States are encouraged to hear all the affected parties (local 
communities, non-governmental associations, owners of the areas in question, 
etc.). Every “nomination” is evaluated by an Advisory Body which, based on the 
complex criteria set forth in the Guidelines, prepares a detailed report and a draft 
decision to be approved by the WHC. The Committee can grant the inscription, 
refuse it or ask for a more in-depth assessment or study. 
Article 11.4 of the Convention provides for the inclusion of a property in the 
World Heritage in Danger List, if there is an ascertained or potential threat to the 
property in question, provided that it is serious and specific. The procedure 
normally, but not necessarily, commences upon a request for assistance 
submitted by the Member State responsible for the property. If the Committee 
finds there to be a real danger, it can modify the status of the propriety and 
prepare a corrective action plan, based on the proposal of an Advisory Body 
established for that purpose, and, if possible, through reaching an understanding 
with the interested State.  
The Convention does not explicitly provide for deletion from the List of 
World Heritage, but this power is regarded as implicit. In any case, the 
Guidelines now address this extreme possibility: a property can be deleted if it 
has lost those qualities that were essential to its qualification. In case of 
disagreement with the interested State, a specific procedure has been established 
in order to assess the real conditions of the site. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- UNESCO, Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage 
(http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext); 
- World Heritage Committee (WHC), Operational Guidelines for the Implementation 
of the World Heritage Convention, UNESCO doc. WHC. 05/2, 2 February 2005 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001386/138676e.pdf); 
- WHC, 6th extr. Session, Paris, 17 – 22 March 2003, Policy/legal issues concerning 
inscription of properties on the List of World Heritage in Danger and the potential deletion 
of properties from the World Heritage List, WHC-03/6 EXT.COM/INF.4A, 3 
December 2003 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001291/129139e.pdf); 
- Bureau of the WHC, 18th session, Paris, 4-9 July 1994, Report of the Rapporteur, 
WHC-94/CONF.001/10, 19 August 1994; 
- WHC, 19th session, Berlin, 4-9 December 1995, Report, WHC-
95/CONF.203/16, 31 January 1996 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001035/103554e.pdf);  
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- WHC, 27th session, Paris, 30 June – 5 July 2003, State of conservation of properties 
inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger and on the World Heritage List, 
WHC-03/27.COM/7A, 2 June 2003 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001320/132098e.pdf); 
- WHC, 27th session, Paris, 30 June – 5 July 2003, Draft Summary Record of the 
Twenty Seventh Session of the World Heritage Committee, WHC-
03/27.COM/INF.24, 14 May 2004 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001348/134801m.pdf); 
- WHC, 27th session, Paris, 30 June – 5 July 2003, Decisions Adopted by the 27th 
Session of the World Heritage Committee in 2003,WHC-03/27.COM/24, 10 
December 2003 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001331/133114e.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The Yellowstone case formally commenced in 1994, when the US delegation 
informed the WHC about “potential threats” from mining speculation; some 
environmental associations, well supported by the federal Government, had 
already denounced these threats to the Secretariat. The US did not submit a 
request for assistance, nor did it officially propose the inscription of the park on 
the list of endangered properties; it simply committed itself to a continuous 
monitoring of the problem and to updating the Commission on every 
development.  
Nevertheless, the Bureau (an executive branch of the WHC) decided to 
inspect the site. The potentially serious environmental impact of the exploitation 
came to light; furthermore, the inspection revealed a series of existing dangers, 
resulting from the inadequate management of the park.  
In this phase of the global proceeding, the commissioners carried out a three-
day public hearing and they received many technical reports from governmental 
agencies, private associations and Crown Butte. In December 1995, although no 
decision had yet been made to authorize the mine, the Committee decided to 
inscribe Yellowstone in the World Heritage in Danger List; consequently, it 
ordered the US to take all necessary actions to mitigate the threat and to inform 
UNESCO about its progress. 
This is the core of the decision: “even if the State Party did not request 
action, the Committee still had an independent responsibility to take action based 
on the information it had gathered”. In truth, this point is not clear at all. First of 
all, the travaux préparatoires clarify the necessity, if not of the request, then at least 
of the consent of the interested State in order to make such a determination. In 
the spirit of the Convention, a finding that a threat exists is not intended to 
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function as a sanction; rather, it only aims to guarantee a surplus of protection to 
the properties in danger, within a framework of mutual cooperation. Moreover, 
in previous cases, the WHC acted unilaterally only in circumstances of 
extraordinary necessity and urgency, in accordance with the general principles of 
the Convention. Finally, the heavy reputational consequences of decisions under 
Article 11.4, which often hide an implicit judgment of negligence against the 
interested State, cannot be ignored, and nor can the consequences in terms of 
greater commitments, financial and otherwise, imposed upon that State in order 
to counter the threat. 
The decision to overrule the precedents in the Yellowstone case was probably 
encouraged by certain ambiguities in the behavior of the US. Although formal 
consent was lacking, the US delegation had not declared strong opposition; 
moreover, it had often declared that it “does not consider action by the 
Committee to be an intervention in domestic law or policy”. Also, later, the US 
Government displayed an extremely cooperative attitude. Congress approved a 
series of financial measures in order to deal with the existing environmental 
concerns in the park; and the Administration reached a compensation agreement 
with Crown Butte: the lands surrounding the park would be subjected to a special 
protection regime (by means of the creation of a buffer zone) and the company, 
which withdrew the original plan, obtained federal lands worth 65 million dollars. 
These facts led to a new decision by the WHC in 2004, which noted the 
progress and revoked its 1995 decision. The conclusion of the case proved to be 
particularly complex, in spite of the favorable recommendation of the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), acting as an advisory 
body. In fact, after the draft decision was adopted, many environmental 
organizations submitted technical objections and new information, aiming to 
demonstrate that further corrective actions had to be taken; moreover, other 
arguments were presented orally, during the Committee debate. The scientific 
reliability of these analyses was challenged by the US, but other delegations 
suggested that the decision be suspended, in order to allow further investigation. 
A compromise was reached only by means of some amendments to the text: a 
“conditional” removal of Yellowstone from the List of World Heritage in 
Danger was approved, meaning that some additional obligations upon the US 
remained in force. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Relations between Global Authorities and Domestic Administrations 
The Yellowstone case highlights three important issues for global administrative 
law.  
First of all, what is the extent of the reasonable involvement of global 
authorities in the domestic sphere? Private property rights, land use legislation, 
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and the exploitation of soil and natural resources are traditionally matters 
reserved to national authorities; they are functions jealously regarded as 
expressions of a State’s sovereignty. External control is usually admitted only 
where the regulation affects foreign commercial interests (e.g., through “creeping 
expropriations”), or in the face of injurious extra-territorial effects (e.g., polluting 
emissions). These limits are consistently reaffirmed in the text of the World 
Heritage Convention, which provides that it shall not prejudice sovereignty and 
property rights, as regulated by national law (Art. 6); that the duty of ensuring the 
identification and protection of properties belongs primarily to the interested 
State (Art. 4); and that every action of the WHC must aim to support, not to 
replace or conflict with, national policies. The world heritage regime, however, 
has evolved in a different way, through the Guidelines and the decisions of the 
WHC (norms for which ratification and unanimity are not required). In 
particular, the inscription of a property in the World Heritage in Danger List has 
come to have a potentially punitive character, with heavy reputational and 
financial costs for the affected States. Delisting, moreover, is allowed only after a 
strict scrutiny of the corrective actions taken. 
President Ulysses Grant inaugurated Yellowstone in 1872, calling it “a 
pleasure-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people”. In a globalized 
world, where interests intertwine and transcend national borders, are the 
“people” Grant invoked still just the American people?  
The second problem is linked to the first. Considering the quasi-judicial 
functions of the WHC, do its procedures satisfy the minimum standards of due 
process? Do they give all interested parties an adequate opportunity to represent 
their interests? 
The fact-finding procedure is characterized by a high degree of informality. 
In this respect, the Yellowstone case is particularly illustrative: new evidence arose 
after the draft decision had been made (discovery, therefore, was not regulated); 
and the reliability of the information was not evaluated by means of objective 
and accurate verifications (the possibility of cross-examination, for example, was 
not provided for). Moreover, the involvement of the interested parties is rather 
episodic. The Guidelines require that national authorities hear the landowners 
and the local communities when preparing their Tentative List, and the Bureau 
usually makes public enquiries before its decision is finalized. Considering that 
these decisions can result in the expropriation of private property, are there 
adequate procedural protections? There is no right to participate in the 
procedure, in monitoring compliance with the obligation to undertake 
“mitigating actions”, or during the review or revocation of earlier decisions.  
A third problem arises from the analysis of the facts that precede the global 
phase of the dispute. In the national licensing procedure, the opposing parties 
were the mining company and the authorities of Montana, on the one hand, 
versus the environmental groups and the Federal Department of Interior on the 
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other. The Yellowstone case is a dispute involving various national interest groups 
and different levels of government. This is evident in the ambiguous behavior of 
US delegation within the Committee. Global law was used here to influence a 
domestic proceeding. Is it reasonable that a global body influence national 
controversies? And, if so, to what extent?  
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
- World Heritage Committee, 22nd session, Kyoto, 30 November – 5 
December 1998, Report on the mission to Kakadu National Park, Australia, WHC-
98/CONF.203/INF. 18, 29 November 1998 (Kakadu case) 
(http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001175/117512e.pdf); 
- World Heritage Committee, 21st session, Report of the Rapporteur, 
WHC.97/CONF.208/17 (1997) (Jasper National Park case) 
(http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1997/whc-97-conf208-17e.pdf). 
 
Like Yellowstone, Kakadu in Australia, and Jasper National Park in Canada 
were also threatened by mining exploitation. These two cases were brought to the 
attention of the Committee by environmental groups and local communities. 
Because of the strong opposition of the interested States, the procedure 
expired without a formal inscription of the sites in World Heritage in Danger 
List; nonetheless, pressure from UNESCO forced Australia and Canada to 
modify their exploitation policies.  
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7. CONFLICTING JURISDICTIONS 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Relations between Global Law and European Law 
Elisa D’Alterio 
 
 
1. Background  
What is the relationship between global and European law? Looking at the 
judgments of the European courts and the WTO Appellate Body, three cases 
stand out concerning conflicts between European rules and the rules of such 
global bodies as the UN (United Nations), the WTO (World Trade Organization) 
and the IOC (International Olympic Committee). 
  
The Leonid Minim case concerned the relationship between UN rules (in 
particular, UN Charter rules and Security Council Resolutions) and EU law. 
Leonid Minim was an Israeli citizen, found to be in possession of several 
documents implicating him in arms trafficking, in support of the ex-president of 
Liberia, Charles Taylor; for this reason, his funds and economic resources in the 
Community were frozen following the adoption of EC Regulation No. 
1149/2004 (executing UN Resolution No. 1532 (2004), which added Minim to 
the list of those against whom sanctions were to be enforced). These measures 
were validated by UN Resolution No. 1647(2005) and by EC Regulation No. 
874/2005. Leonid Minim subsequently brought an action under the Article 
230(4) EC for the annulment of EC Regulation No. 1149/2004 (amending EC 
Regulation No. 872/2004, concerning further restrictive measures in relation to 
Liberia) and for the partial annulment of EC Regulation No. 874/2005 
(amending EC Regulation No. 872/2004). Minim argued that the Community 
lacked the competence to adopt the relevant Regulations and that his 
fundamental rights had been violated. 
 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 200 
The Sardines case concerned the relationship between WTO and EU law. This 
dispute was over the name under which certain species of fish may be marketed 
in the European Communities. In particular, EEC Regulation No. 2136/1989, 
setting forth common marketing standards for preserved sardines, states that 
only those fish officially classified as “sardines” may be marketed as such in the 
European Community; this category does not include the species of Sardinops 
Sagax. Therefore, Peruvian sardine-type products, prepared from the above-
mentioned species of sardines, cannot be marketed as sardines within the 
European Community. However, the Codex Alimentarius, which sets worldwide 
standards for food security, provides that both preserved sardines and sardine-
type products prepared from the species of Sardinops Sagax can be marketed 
under the name “sardines” (Standard 94). Peru asked the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) for a consultation with the European Union about the 
inconsistency of the EEC Regulation with Standard 94 of the Codex 
Alimentarius, Articles 2.4, 2.2 and 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (the TBT Agreement) and Article III:4 of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the GATT 1994). In the first instance, the Panel found 
that the EC Regulation was inconsistent with Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, 
but exercised judicial restraint with respect to Peru's claims under Articles 2.2 and 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement and III:4 of the GATT 1994; it recommended that 
the DSB request the European Community to bring its measure into conformity 
with its obligations under the TBT Agreement. The European Community 
appealed to the Appellate Body. 
 
Finally, the Meca-Medina case concerned the relationship between IOC rules and 
EU law (see supra, Ch. 2.2). David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen were two 
professional long-distance swimmers. After finishing first and second, 
respectively, at the Swimming World Cup, they tested positive for the steroid 
Nandrolone; so the International Swimming Federation’s (FINA) Doping Panel 
suspended them. The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) confirmed the 
suspension more than once. Subsequently, the applicants filed a complaint with 
the EC Commission (under Article 3 of EEC Regulation No. 17/1962), alleging 
a breach of Article 81 EC and/or Article 82 EC. In their complaint, the 
applicants challenged the compatibility of certain regulations adopted by the IOC 
and implemented by FINA, and certain practices relating to doping control, with 
the Community rules on competition and freedom to provide services. In 
particular, they claimed that the application of those rules leads to the 
infringement of the athletes’ economic freedoms, guaranteed inter alia by Article 
49 EC and, from the point of view of competition law, Articles 81 EC and 82 
EC. The Commission rejected the applicants’ complaint. They then appealed to 
the European Court of First Instance; the action was dismissed, but then 
appealed to the European Court of Justice. 
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3. Analysis 
Minim’s claims were rejected, including his most important one concerning the 
breach of his fundamental rights. He had alleged that the EC regulations 
breached his right to property, one of the fundamental rights protected by the 
EC system and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR). The Court recognized the relevant EC regulations as 
Community measures implementing the UN obligation to give effect to the 
Security Council sanctions against Charles Taylor and his associates. In 
accordance with the relevant case-law (see, in particular, the Kadi case) and 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, the Court affirmed that UN obligations prevail 
over the fundamental rights set forth in the EC Treaties and the ECHR, because 
of the general supremacy of UN law over Community law (para.101). Moreover, 
the Court recognized the limitations on its judicial review of Community 
measures implementing the decisions of the Security Council or of its Sanctions 
Committee, and also the absence of jus cogens violations in the act of freezing the 
funds of the individuals involved (para. 101). 
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In the Sardines case, the Appellate Body confirmed the Panel Report’s finding that 
the EC Regulation in question was incompatible with Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement. Article 2.4 states that “Members shall use [relevant international 
standards] as a basis for their technical regulations except when such 
international standards…would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfillment of the legitimate objectives”. The European Community argued that 
Standard 94 did not apply to its Regulation, because it was ineffective and 
unsuitable for EC objectives in the field of alimentary security. Conversely, the 
Panel and the Appellate Body recognized the global nature of Standard 94 and its 
applicability to the EC Regulation; this standard, in fact, did not conflict with EC 
objectives. The EC Regulation violated WTO rules, because it was inconsistent 
with the Article 2.4. TBT and did not recognize a species of fish expressly 
included by Standard 94 of the Codex Alimentarius. Moreover, there was no 
reason for excluding the species of Sardinops Sagax from the category “sardines”; 
on the contrary, the global standard, which includes this species, has the clear 
goal of ensuring market transparency. Therefore, the Appellate Body 
recommended that the DSB request the European Community to bring its 
measure into conformity with its obligations under the TBT Agreement. 
 
In the Meca-Medina case, the European Court of Justice set aside the judgment of 
the Court of First Instance, but dismissed the action for annulment of the 
Commission’s decision. The Court declared that, “in holding that rules could 
thus be excluded straightaway from the scope of those articles solely on the 
ground that they were regarded as purely sporting with regard to the application 
of Articles 39 EC and 49 EC, without any need to determine first whether the 
rules fulfilled the specific requirements of Articles 81 EC and 82 EC, as set out in 
paragraph 30 of the present judgment, the Court of First Instance made an error 
of law” (para. 33); accordingly, the Court recognized that IOC anti-doping rules 
were subject to Article 49 EC and to EC competition law (para. 34). The Court 
also stated, however, that the IOC restrictions on professional athletes did not 
seem to “go beyond what is necessary in order to ensure that sporting events take 
place and function properly” (para. 54); moreover, “since the appellants have not 
pleaded that the penalties which were applicable and were imposed in the present 
case are excessive, it has not been established that the IOC anti-doping rules at 
issue are disproportionate” (para. 55).  
 
 
4. Issues: The Relations between Global Systems and the Role of Supranational Courts  
These cases raise the following three kinds of problems. First, supranational 
courts resolve conflicts between the rules of different legal systems. At the 
national level, by contrast, it is usually the legislature that regulates the relations 
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between different legal sources (particularly in civil law systems); courts address 
conflicts of law by applying established legal standards. In the light of the 
increasing judicial involvement in resolving these conflicts, can we say that 
supranational courts are performing a “constitutional function”? Do 
supranational courts contribute to the creation of a “global legal order”? 
Second, supranational courts do not use a uniform legal standard to regulate 
and resolve conflicts between conflicting global and EU laws. In fact, in the 
Menim case, the European Court of First Instance recognized that UN law 
prevails over the EU instruments because of the supremacy of the interest in 
maintaining international peace and security over the protection of individual 
fundamental rights. In the Sardines case, the Appellate Body declared that EU 
rules are subject to WTO rules because of the supremacy of the interest in 
international trade over alimentary security (other judgments of the European 
courts do, however, hold that WTO rules do not normally constitute a legitimacy 
benchmark for EC law). Lastly, in the Meca-Medina case, the European Court of 
Justice declared that IOC rules are subordinate to EU law, because of the 
supremacy of the interest in defending freedom of competition and to provide 
services over the independence of sport. Therefore, in contrast to national 
courts, supranational courts do not apply a pre-established hierarchical standard 
to resolve conflicts of law, but resort to “interests balancing”. Is the lack of a pre-
established hierarchical standard a symptom of the inexistence of a “general 
global law”? Or is this deficiency rather the result of the “reticular”, rather than 
“pyramidal”, nature of multilevel relations? How can supranational judicial 
“interests balancing” clash with the emergence of a global legal order? 
Third, the relationship between global and EU rules can be considered as a 
relationship between the rules of different global legal systems. The EU is also a 
supranational/global legal system, like the UN and WTO: all of these systems are 
grounded in international treaties and have their own legal institutions and 
courts. In this sense, the Olympic Movement (OM), to which the above-
mentioned Committee and the international sports federations belong, is also a 
global system including at least 115 Member States. This notwithstanding, there 
remain some relevant differences between these systems: for example, the UN, 
WTO and OM systems are “sectoral”, because they protect specific interests 
(international peace and security, free competition, and sports competition, 
respectively); the courts of the UN and WTO systems can only be directly 
accessed by States, and not by private actors, while the OM system provides 
mainly arbitral courts; and finally, EU Member States are uniquely involved in a 
process of legal, but also cultural and social integration. Do these differences 
influence the relationship between the rules? And if so, how? Is there an “inter-
exchange” of the different values and principles animating these systems, along 
with their norms? 
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7.2. The Conseil d’Ètat and Schengen 
Mariangela Benedetti 
 
 
1. Background 
The free movement of persons within the EU gives rise to obvious security 
considerations. The suppression of EU internal border controls (regardless of the 
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nationality of persons crossing the borders) corresponds to the reinforcement of 
external border controls. In this sense, there is an urgent need for an operational 
common EU visa policy and a coherent EU immigration policy. 
The Schengen Agreement allows people who are legally present in one of the 
European countries party to the Agreement to move freely within the Schengen 
area, without having to show passports when crossing internal borders.  
The movement of third country nationals, and the related issue of 
cooperation between national police forces, has been limited by the political 
difficulty in reaching an agreement that would inevitably impact upon sensitive 
domains of national sovereignty. As a result, the Schengen Agreement had to be 
an inter-governmental agreement, and was initially signed by Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. A common feature of this inter-
governmental approach was the States’ unwillingness to grant supranational 
judicial review over the interpretation and implementation of the Agreement. 
Article 111 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement states that “any person 
may in the territory of each Contracting Party bring before the courts or the 
authority competent under national law an action to correct, delete or provide 
information or obtain compensation in connection with a report concerning him. 
The Contracting Parties shall undertake amongst themselves to execute final 
decisions taken by the courts of authorities referred to in paragraph 1 without 
prejudice to the provisions of article 16”. 
According to Article 116 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement, “each 
Contracting Party shall be responsible, in accordance with its national law, for 
any injury caused to a person through the use of the national data file of the 
Schengen Information System. This shall also be the case where the injury was 
caused by the reporting Contracting Party, where the latter included legally or 
factually inaccurate data. If the Contracting Party against which an action is 
brought is not the reporting contracting party the latter shall be required to 
reimburse, on request, sums paid out as compensation, unless the data were used 
by the requested contracting party in contravention of this Convention”. 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a complex information system 
that was set up to exchange data on individual identities and descriptions of lost 
or stolen objects. When an individual’s details have been entered into the SIS, 
due to a national assessment of security risk, that individual encounters 
difficulties when applying for entry into (or a visa for) another Member State. 
Specifically, the SIS has a blacklist that allows the participating countries to keep 
a record of persons they do not wish to enter the Schengen area. Inclusion on 
this list has serious consequences for the individual concerned. A person on the 
blacklist may have committed a serious crime, for instance, or may have been 
expelled or deported and ordered not to re-enter a country for a specific period 
of time. 
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2. Materials and Sources  
- Conseil d’Etat, Section du contentieux, sur le rapport de la 2 ème sous-
section, 9 juin 1999, N° 190384, M. et Mme Forabosco; 
- Conseil d’Etat, Section du contentieux, sur le rapport de la 2 ème sous-
section, 9 juin 1999, N° 198344, Mme Hamssaoui 
(http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/index_ac_ld9923.shtml); 
- Schengen Treaty 
(http://www.unhcr.bg/euro_docs/en/_schengen_en.pdf).  
 
 
3. Analysis 
In June 1999, the French Conseil d’État, the court of final appeal on administrative 
matters, handed down judgment in two cases regarding the application of the 
Schengen Implementing Agreement in France, concerning challenges to the 
refusal of visas to third country nationals on the basis of notification of the 
individual’s details contained in the SIS. 
In the first case, Madame Hamssaoui, the visa applicant was a Moroccan 
national who lived in Morocco. Her daughter was a resident in France, married to 
a French citizen, with one child. She sought a short-term residence visa at the 
French consulate to visit her daughter. Her application was rejected because her 
name had been entered into the SIS. Articles 5 and 15 of the Schengen 
Agreement state that a visa must not be issued to foreigners who are reported in 
the SIS for the purpose of being refused entry onto Schengen territory. The 
Advocate General of the Conseil d’État argued that the inability to directly to 
access information on the SIS violates civil liberties. The fact that Mrs. 
Hamssaoui could not even get information as to which State reported her (on the 
SIS) meant that the decision was insufficiently reasoned and therefore ought to 
be annulled. According to the Conseil d’État, the State that wants to prohibit 
movement in the Schengen area must give a reason for its decision and must 
guarantee that suitable information be made available to the affected party. The 
Advocate General also considered Article 8 of European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), relating to the right to respect for family life. In his view, Article 
8 was relevant to a decision to refuse a visa in circumstances such as those of 
Mrs. Hamssaoui. He noted that Article 15 of the Schengen Implementing 
Agreement provides “[i]n principle the visa referred to in Article 10 may be 
issued only if an alien fulfils the entry conditions laid down in Article 5(1)(a), (c), 
(d) and (e)”. The fact that the 1990 Agreement used the term “in principle” 
suggests that a margin of discretion is reserved for each Contracting Party in 
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implementing the Agreement, on the grounds, listed in Article 5(2), of 
humanitarian considerations, national interests or other international obligations. 
Accordingly, he argued that the power of the administration to refuse a Schengen 
visa does not deprive an individual who is reported on the SIS from relying on a 
right to family life in order to be issued with a short-term visa. Finally he 
considered the balance that needs to be struck between the right to family life in 
the form of a visa grant, so that Mrs. Hamssaoui could visit her family in France, 
against the question of public order; as no information was available as to the 
public order reasons for reporting Mrs. Hamssaoui on the SIS, no definitive 
answer could be given to this question. The court followed the Advocate General 
insofar as it annulled the refusal of the visa on the ground that there was 
insufficient reasoning as required under national law.  
The Conseil d’État simultaneously issued a decision in the case of Madame 
Forabosco, a Romanian citizen married to a French man. She applied for a long-
term residence visa for family reunification at the French Consulate in Bucharest. 
The application was refused for having no legal basis in the requirements of 
Article 5(2) of the Schengen Implementing Agreement, which apply only to 
short-term visas and are therefore inapplicable to cases involving long-term visas.  
The German authorities had reported Mrs. Forabosco to the SIS as a person 
who had unlawfully remained in Germany when she had been refused asylum, 
and they did not receive notification that she had left. The two main issues in the 
case were, firstly, whether a report on the SIS could be a ground for the refusal 
of a long-term residence visa; and, secondly, whether a French administrative 
court had the power to remedy a legal error made by a foreign State. In terms of 
the first issue, the Advocate General rejected the purely formal argument that the 
Schengen Implementing Agreement does not address long-term residence visas. 
He noted that the reasons for reporting someone to the SIS are not necessarily 
different from the reasons for refusing a long-term visa under French national 
law. A prohibition on short-term entry into the Schengen area means that the 
question of long-term visas is within the scope of the 1990 Agreement. The 
Advocate General referred to Article 9(1) of the Agreement which states that 
“the Contracting Parties undertake to adopt a common policy on the movement 
of persons and in particular on the arrangements for visas… the Contracting 
Parties undertake to pursue by common agreement the harmonization of their 
policies on visas”. Further, he noted that the abolition of internal controls on the 
movement of persons had consequences for long-term visas. As a long-term visa 
is normally followed by the issue of a residence permit, the beneficiary of that 
residence permit has access to the whole of the Schengen area. The Conseil d’État 
agreed with the Advocate General’s argument. It held that, in view of the 
consequences of a long-term visa, the decision of the French Consulate in 
Bucharest could not be impugned for taking the SIS report into account in 
refusing the visa.  
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The Advocate General then noted that having been refused asylum is not a 
reason for reporting someone on the SIS under Article 96 of the 1990 
Agreement. He argued that the German authorities had made a legal error in 
reporting Mrs. Forabosco on the SIS. While acknowledging that the Court 
normally refuses to review the legality and consequences of the acts of foreign 
authorities and international organizations, he nevertheless invited the Court to 
do so here, arguing that Articles 111 and 116 of the 1990 Agreement did give the 
French Court jurisdiction to remedy an SIS report which is tainted by legal error, 
even though it was made by a foreign authority. In his view, the two provisions 
were designed to allow the correction of information without forcing individuals 
concerned to commence parallel proceedings in another jurisdiction. The Conseil 
d’État followed the reasoning of the Advocate General. It held that an 
administrative judge could review the report of a person on the SIS, even when it 
had been made by a foreign administrative authority. 
 
 
4. Issues: National Courts’ Review of Foreign Transnational Measures 
Do national courts have the power to remedy legal errors committed by foreign 
authorities? 
National courts usually decline to review the legality and consequences of the 
acts of both foreign authorities and international organizations. However, 
Articles 111 and 116 of the Schengen Implementing Agreement do seem to be 
designed to allow the correction of information without forcing the individuals 
affected to bring a claim in the other jurisdiction. 
The granting of a visa can be considered as a transnational measure. The 
sensitive nature of a visa – a symbol of the State’s right to control the entry of 
foreigners, an instrument of foreign policy, and an expression of domestic policy 
objectives on the preservation of international links and domestic security – also 
drives the flexibility in the common visa policy. Under the current Visa 
Regulation, the Member States may retain discretion over the visa requirements 
applicable to a number of special categories of persons. Also, under Schengen 
rules, the Member States retain a large degree of control as to who can obtain a 
visa to enter their individual national territories. But the grant of a visa 
nonetheless remains a transnational measure, insofar as it produces effects in 
other national legal systems.  
These decisions are important for two reasons. 
Firstly, they are important because they raise the issue of the nature and the 
scope of national judicial review of the implementation of an administrative 
measure concerning the free movement of persons. The Conseil d’État, in 
requiring the authorities to provide reasons for reporting an individual on the SIS 
by another Member State, expanded its jurisdiction beyond French borders. This 
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means that judicial review over the SIS must necessarily exceed the national 
boundaries of the reviewing court. The Court, taking its lead from the legislature, 
did not allow its national administrative authority to affirm the legality of an act 
affecting civil liberties on the basis of a foreign administrative determination, 
without first testing the lawfulness of that latter determination itself. While the 
Advocate General justified this review on the basis of the margin of appreciation 
for human rights, the Court did not consider such a reference necessary. The 
Conseil d’État argued instead that the principle of judicial review did not require 
support from human rights commitments.  
Secondly, the French cases send a very clear signal to the European Court of 
Justice: concerns over civil liberties and individuals’ rights of access to the 
information held on them, and its use to exclude or expel them from the 
Schengen territory, justify the judicial review of sensitive decisions, and the 
exercise of strict scrutiny to protect individuals vulnerable to the abuse of State 
power.  
 
 
5. Further Reading 
a. M. GAUTIER, “Le dépassement du caractère national de la juridiction 
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b. M. GAUTIER, “Acte administratif transnational et droit communautaire”, 
Droit Administratif Européen, sous la direction de Jean-Bernard Auby et 
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(http://chairemadp.sciencespo.fr/pdf/seminaires/2007/ContributionMarie
Gautier_8juin07.pdf); 
c. E. GUILD, Moving the Borders of Europe, Inaugural Lecture at the 
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Outside?”, 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 87 (2006). 
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7.3. Jurisdiction over Cyberspace: YAHOO! in the French and American 
Courts 
Mariangela Benedetti 
 
 
1. Background 
The term “cyberspace” was coined by the science fiction author William Gibson 
to describe his vision of a global computer network, linking all peoples, machines 
and sources of information, through which one could move or “navigate” as 
though in a virtual space. 
Cyberspace undermines the significance of physical location in three distinct 
ways. Firstly, events in cyberspace take place everywhere and thus nowhere in 
particular; they are not limited by geographical boundaries, indeed they ignore the 
existence of such boundaries altogether. Secondly, many events and transactions 
have no recognizable tie to any physical place but take place only in the network 
itself, which by its very nature is not a localizable phenomenon. Thirdly, the net 
enables simultaneous transactions between large numbers of people who do not 
and cannot know the physical location of the other parties.  
The consequence of these three features is that that no single law can govern 
the internet. Online activities that are socially acceptable and legally protected in 
one locale may not be in another. Unilateral action by any individual country thus 
threatens the internet’s vitality and freedom. 
Among the different problems arising from the nature of the internet, 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments are gaining importance as 
global electronic commerce expands. In this framework, when can an individual 
State exercise personal jurisdiction over an internet defendant? If you are an 
operator in cyberspace, you may be dragged into court anywhere in the world at 
any time – if for no other reason than to contest jurisdiction or face default. This 
is because territorial jurisdiction in the non-territorial realm of cyberspace is 
highly uncertain. 
Applying traditional notions of personal jurisdiction to the internet is difficult 
at best. In the American federal system, for a court in one state to assert personal 
jurisdiction, the defendant must have continuous and systematic contacts with 
the forum state, or at least satisfy the “minimum contacts” test, which allows for 
jurisdiction over a non-resident, when sufficient contacts exist between the 
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defendant and the forum State such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”. The US Supreme Court's 
minimum contacts test for specific jurisdiction abandons the more formalistic 
tests that focus on a defendant's presence within the forum State, in favor of a 
more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant's contacts with the forum make it 
reasonable to require that the suit be defended in that State.  
The operation of a website does not usually generate sufficient minimum 
contacts with any given forum; it is not enough the citizens in the forum State 
happen to access the site. However, as demonstrated by the Yahoo cases, upon 
examination of the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity 
conducts over the internet, a court may assert jurisdiction if a defendant operates 
an interactive website. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Ordonnance de référé du 22 mai 2000 
(http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522.htm); 
- United State District Court Northern District of California San Jose Division, 
Yahoo!Inc., a Delaware corporation v. La ligue contre le racisme et l’antisemitisme, a 
French Association, and l’Union des etudiants juifs de France, a Frence Association, 
Compliant for declaratory relief n. C-00-21275; 
- United State District Court Northern District of California San Jose Division, 
Yahoo!Inc., a Delaware corporation v. La ligue contre le racisme et l’antisemitisme, a 
French Association, and l’Union des etudiants juifs de France, a Frence Association, 
Order denying motion to dismiss n. 00-21275 JF; 
- United State District Court Northern District of California San Jose Division, 
Yahoo!Inc., a Delaware corporation v. La ligue contre le racisme et l’antisemitisme, a 
French Association, and l’Union des etudiants juifs de France, a Frence Association, 
Order granting motion for summary judgement n. C- 00-21275 JF; 
- United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Yahoo!Inc., a Delaware 
Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. La Ligue contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, a 
French Association; l’Union des etudiants juifs de France, a French Association, 
Defendants-Appellants, Appeal n. 01-17424 
(http://www.bslaw.net/licra/); 
- United States Supreme Court, Orders in pending cases, Order list no. 547, May 
30, 2006 
(http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/orders/2005/053006pzor.h
tml); 
- French law: Loi du 29 juillet 1881, 29/07/1881, sur la liberté de la presse 
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(http://www.droit-technologie.org/legislation-26/loi-du-29-juillet-1881-sur-
la-liberte-de-la-presse.html); 
- Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, 1968 
(http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/brussels.jurisdiction.and.enforcement.of.judgme
nts.in.civil.and.commercial.matters.convention.1968/doc.html); 
- French law: Article R. 645-1 Code penal 
 (http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do;jsessionid=114AF9B73B9A1
DA56F50B9A54B41B0A9.tpdjo14v_3?idSectionTA=LEGISCTA000006165
446&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&dateTexte=20080423); 
- American law: First Amendment 
(http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.billofrights.html). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
On May 22, 2000 La Ligue contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme (LICRA), joined by 
defendant L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De France (UEJF), accused Yahoo! Inc. and 
Yahoo! France of violating French law. Yahoo! was accused specifically of 
violating Section R. 645-1 of the French Penal Code, which prohibits the 
exhibition of Nazi objects for purposes of sale, and Article 24 bis of the 29 July 
1881 Act, which makes it illegal to contest the existence of one or more crimes 
against humanity where these have been recognized as such by a French or an 
international court. 
LICRA and UEJF claimed that Yahoo! violated French law by making 
accessible to all French Internet users via the Yahoo!France website the auction 
of thousands of Nazi artifacts, the sale of which would be illegal in France. 
LICRA initially sent a cease and desist letter to Yahoo! in Santa Clara, California 
asking that such materials not displayed. When Yahoo! did not bring its US site 
into full compliance, LICRA filed a complaint against Yahoo! in a French court. 
The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris ordered “the Company Yahoo! Inc. to take 
all necessary measures to dissuade and render impossible any access via 
Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service and to any other site or service 
that may be construed as constituting an apology for Nazism or a contesting of 
Nazi crimes”. The order subjected Yahoo! and Yahoo!France to a penalty of 
€100,000 for each day of delay or for each confirmed violation. 
Yahoo! subsequently attempted to comply with the French court’s order. 
Specifically, Yahoo! posted the required warnings and banned all displays which 
violated the French criminal code from the yahoo.fr web site. Notwithstanding 
these measures, Yahoo! did not prevent access to other web sites which arguably 
violated French law, because it did not have the technology to block French 
CONFLICTING JURISDICTIONS 217 
citizens from accessing Nazi-related matter on yahoo.com without banning this 
material altogether. On August 11, 2000, the Court called for a team of experts to 
examine ways in which French internet users might be blocked from accessing 
Yahoo’s auction site, and whether it was even technically possible. After 
considering expert testimony, the Court concluded that it was possible to 
determine the physical location of internet users from their IP addresses, and 
thus technically possible to block their access. The court and ordered Yahoo! to 
comply with the order within two months. 
A second interim order was issued on November 20, 2000 reaffirming the 
initial order and requiring Yahoo! to comply within three months. The court 
noted, however, that Yahoo!France had complied in large measure with the spirit 
and the letter of the earlier order.  
On December 21, 2000, Yahoo! filed suit against LICRA and UEJF in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the interim order issued by the French Court was not 
cognizable or enforceable in the United States because it violates the First 
Amendment. On June 7, 2001, the District Court found that there were sufficient 
minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF. The 
two French associations were found to have such contacts because they had sent 
a cease and desist letter to Yahoo! headquarters in Santa Clara, had initiated 
proceedings against Yahoo! in California, and obtained two interim orders from a 
French court against Yahoo!. 
Five months later, the District Court held that enforcing the French decision 
would be incompatible with Yahoo!’s First Amendment rights and would thus be 
in violation of US public policy. The French order, prohibiting the sale of Nazi 
related items, is a content-based restriction that “a United States court 
constitutionally could not make”. As recognized by the Court, “the First 
Amendment does not permit the government to engage in viewpoint-based 
regulation of speech absent a compelling governmental interest, such as averting 
a clear and present danger of imminent violence”, and such compelling interest 
was not present in this case. The French order also ran afoul of the First 
Amendment because it was impermissibly vague, insofar as it directed Yahoo! to 
“take all necessary measures to dissuade and render impossible any access via 
Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service and to any other site or service 
that may be construed as constituting an apology for Nazism or a contesting of 
Nazi crimes”. 
LICRA and UEJF appealed judgment in terms of its findings on personal 
jurisdiction, ripeness (the readiness of the case for litigation) and abstention (the 
doctrine according to which a court can refuse to hear a claim where to do so 
would potentially intrude upon the jurisdiction of another court).  
On August 23, 2004, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the District Court decision on personal jurisdiction. The Appellate Court held 
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that LICRA and UEJF were not subject to personal jurisdiction under federal 
law, which only permits jurisdiction to be exercised over a defendant in an 
American lawsuit arising out of, or related to, the defendant’s contact with the 
forum in question. 
Yahoo! asked that the case be reheard “en banc”. On January 12, 2006, an 
11-judge panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did 
have personal jurisdiction over the defendants, but that the action should 
nevertheless have been dismissed for lack of ripeness. 
The two French associations appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing 
that the ruling left the door open for Yahoo! to use US courts in order to avoid 
judgments by courts in other countries. Yahoo!, which was not forced to pay the 
fine, filed no arguments before the Supreme Court. On May 30, 2006, the US 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. According to one American law firm, the 
Supreme Court denial leaves open the possibility that Yahoo! could file a 
counterclaim against the two associations, which could ultimately lead to a state 
of affairs in which any defendant in foreign lawsuits could file counterclaims in 
their home jurisdictions. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Protection of Fundamental Rights in Transnational Disputes 
Given the global reach of the internet, which enables widely divergent cultures 
and value systems to intersect, this case presents important and novel issues 
regarding free speech, constitutional rights and foreign sovereignty. As the 
internet completely ignores state and national boundaries, it renders our state-
centered notions of jurisdiction and applicable law obsolete. 
The Yahoo! case illustrates the lack of clear jurisdiction over internet 
disputes. No international court exists to assert jurisdiction over websites and 
internet content providers, resulting in a legal tennis match between some or all 
of the potential forums and parties involved. In this case, the parties’ motivations 
were honorable – France wanted to ensure that its citizens are protected from 
offensive material, and American companies wanted to ensure they are not 
subject to liability in a foreign country simply for operating a website. However, 
neither party could offer any decisive argument as to which forum should have 
jurisdiction over this controversy. 
Although territorial sovereigns do regulate cyberspace, are the transnational 
conflicts arising out of internet use properly addressed by traditional conflict-of-
laws instruments? 
The protection of free speech in transnational disputes is also important. Can 
the American First Amendment right to free speech really be violated by the 
enforcement of an order made by a French court? What law should apply to the 
website? Should a website be subject only to the laws of the country in which its 
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operators are based? Is it possible to find a core of common, global principles 
and values? 
The Yahoo! case demonstrates the existence of an asymmetry between highly 
permeable national boundaries (a user in France can reach the Yahoo website 
and vice-versa) and national constitutional and criminal law. While some of these 
prohibitions would not be permitted by the US Constitution, European societies 
had ample justification for striking a different balance between human rights and 
the freedom of expression following World War II. The French rule is also more 
consistent with international human rights norms than is the US doctrine on the 
matter. The French prohibition protects citizens through an “effects doctrine” 
for territorial jurisdiction. French criminal law applies to any crime or felony 
committed outside French territory by a foreign person when the victim is a 
French national at the time of the infraction. 
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7.4. The Internationalization of Antitrust Policy 
Lorenzo Saltari 
 
 
1. Background 
The internationalization of antitrust policy is based on three main phenomena. 
The first concerns the protective effects of some antitrust measures, such as the 
European Commission’s judgment (confirmed by the Court of Justice) against 
the US firm Microsoft for abuse of dominant position. This strained the 
relationship between the United States and Europe regarding the application of 
antitrust laws. The Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice severely 
criticized the European Commission’s position. This situation is very similar to a 
previous clash between the US and the EU when the latter denied authorization 
for the merger between General Electrics and Honeywell. The American antitrust 
authority criticized the European counterpart for protecting its businesses from 
the dominant firm in the industry and neglecting its consumers; granting such 
protection against the dominant firm dissuades others from maximizing their 
own efficiency. Beyond these different visions of antitrust policy, we can take a 
political view of the controversy, and of the protectionist goals that the 
enforcement of antitrust law can serve.  
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The second phenomenon is international and, more specifically, bilateral. It is 
based upon the 1991 and 1995 “Positive Comity” agreements, which deal with 
cooperation on antitrust issues between economic areas such as the European 
Union and the United States. The agreements have been invoked only once 
before the European Commission, in the Sabre/Amadeus affair, which involved 
European and US Computerized Reservation Systems (CRSs) used for air travel; 
in this case, the Commission imposed on the European CRS the obligation to 
behave in a non discriminatory manner towards its American counterpart. There 
are, however, two limits to this particular kind of cooperation. Firstly, it does not 
cover mergers; and secondly, the antitrust authority that acts on behalf of the 
other does not thereby gain exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings – the 
other authority can commence another procedure that overlaps with the original. 
In the EU, the Commission is the relevant antitrust authority, and so the role 
played by States is more hidden. 
The third phenomenon is international and specifically multilateral. It is 
based on the international network of the National Competition Authorities 
(NCAs): the International Competition Network (ICN). It is interesting to 
observe that the actors in the internationalization process are the NCAs and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) (see, in this regard, The Doha Agenda – 
Interactions between trade and competition policy). In this context, the main 
goal is to create an international and multilateral framework for antitrust policy, 
but the main actors, in this case, are the States in their negotiations within the 
WTO. The 2003 Cancun negotiations on competition issues failed, and as a 
result, this topic has been excluded from further negotiations. 
It is not difficult to understand the reasons behind the internationalization of 
antitrust policy. It is, however, a little harder to understand why this 
internationalization does not follow a unitary path, and why the activity of the 
ICN is the more advanced approach to internationalization. 
There is a problem in that international agreements are often ineffective, or 
do not achieve the desired results (for example, neither the positive comity 
agreements nor the negotiations in the WTO have proved particularly 
successful), but the ICN’s creation of global standards, while more effective, 
remains unaccountable. The ICN is a private association of public authorities 
working together to produce common rules: their effectiveness depends on 
implementation at the national level by its members. 
 
 
2. Materials  
- Court of First Instance, Judgment no. 63/2007, of 17 September 2007, in 
case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, the Court of first instance essentially upholds 
the commissions decision finding that Microsoft abused its dominant position 
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 (http://www.curia.europa.eu/en/actu/news/news.htm); 
- Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the 
United States of America on the application of positive comity principles in 
the enforcement of their competition laws 
 (http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:173:002
8:0031:en:pdf);  
- US Department of Justice, Antitrust division, International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee, Final Report, 2000 
(http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm); 
- ICN, Report of the ICN Working Group on Telecommunications Services, Presented at 
the Fifth Annual Conference – Cape Town, South Africa, 3-6 May, 2006 
(http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conferenc
e_5th_capetown_2006/Reportofthe_Telecoms_WorkingGroup.pdf); 
- ICN, Report of the ICN Working Group on Telecommunications Services 
APPENDIX I Recent Case Law With Respect To Anti-Competitive Activity in 
Telecommunications  
(http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conferenc
e_5th_capetown_2006/AppendixI.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
An ICN working group wrote an in-depth report on telecommunications. This 
sector is characterized by a high rate of firm-driven internationalization, though 
the whole structure of national and supranational legal systems impedes this.  
The main contents of the ICN working group report are not specifically 
normative. They are not even soft law rules, but rather best practices that cannot 
be imposed on the affiliated authorities.  
The report deals with the three most important and most problematic aspects 
of the public regulation of the telecommunications sector: the criteria for 
determining the relevant markets and the techniques for verifying the dominant 
positions; the recognition of asymmetrical rights of access and interconnection, 
which leads to a situation in which the infrastructure is owned by incumbents 
and used by third parties; and the relations between regulatory bodies and 
antitrust authorities. The growing competition in this sector makes the distinction 
between ex ante and ex post regulation practices difficult; the two spheres 
increasingly overlap. It is no coincidence that European law uses antitrust 
concepts in order to justify regulatory intervention in this field (Directive 
2002/21/EC, Art. 15). Future developments in the heavily regulated 
telecommunications sector will depend on the evolution of the interactions 
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between regulation and antitrust. It is interesting to observe that national 
antitrust authorities try to participate in the process in order to influence it 
through the ICN. This implies the increase of their antitrust powers; and it also 
helps to internationalize and unify the policy, thanks to the horizontal linkage 
between national authorities. These authorities commonly determine the legal 
and regulatory approach to the telecommunications sector.  
 
 
4. Issues: The Roles of States and Private Bodies in Antitrust Governance 
States do not favor the internationalization of antitrust policy: they prefer to have 
global competition regulated by politics rather than by law. Vice versa, the NCAs 
(which are ontologically dependent on the States, but functionally independent 
from them) would prefer the legal institutionalization of fair competition. This 
underlines the gap between national public powers and general interests created 
(or identified) as a result of economic delocalization.  
Government positions very often prevail over those of their domestic 
antitrust authorities, causing many more cases of conflict than coordination. The 
great relevance of protectionist antitrust measures suggests that antitrust law 
enforcement is based on the clash between protectionist economic policies. 
Using them, States seek to maintain hegemonic positions in global competition.  
Internationalization is based on the activity of the ICN and on international 
cooperation, so the consent of NCAs is necessary. The NCAs can integrate with 
each other despite the orientations of their States, although only if they are 
insulated to some degree from political pressure. The more the ICN working 
group deals with individual sectors or problematic areas, the greater the value of 
the ICN’s suggestions. This is clear in the case of telecommunications. The term 
“best practices” is in fact inaccurate and misleading. The real content of antitrust 
policy is defined by the NCAs through a continuous series of decisions made on 
the basis of international criteria. The first step is to frame the general norms; 
then their specific content must be defined. The ICN can have a role in the 
second phase. If the national authority agrees with the international criteria, it is 
likely to use them, even in absence of strong (e.g. “command and control”) 
compliance mechanisms. The ICN contributes to the evolution of the antitrust 
law, and through the horizontal connection that it fosters between NCAs, it 
makes corrections of market failures easier. Nevertheless, the ICN decision-
making process is based on consensus, which compromises its efficacy.  
How is the internationalization process shaped by private bodies? The ICN 
exercises public power, even although it is an essentially private organization. 
This gives rise to the issues of whether it is accountable, and whether it allows 
private actors to participate in the process of identifying best practices. From this 
point of view, things seem, as they currently stand, to be backwards: it is the 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 224 
ICN’s non-public character that leads us to underestimate its real influence upon 
the national antitrust authorities that it brings together. For this reason, North 
American or European “notice and comment” practices, and the consequent 
participation of private actors in addition to the national authorities, do not as yet 
form part of the process through which the ICN formulates its recommendations 
for the market. 
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8. GLOBAL SECURITY 
 
 
 
 
8.1. The Regulation of Global Security Operations: The Case of the 
European Union’s Operation Artemis 
Edoardo Chiti 
 
 
1. Background 
Since 1999, an armed conflict between local ethnic groups and foreign backers 
such as Uganda and Rwanda has ravaged the Ituri region of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. In the absence of effective control by the national authority, 
the conflict has directly involved the civilian population, and ethnic massacres, 
rape and torture have been documented by the United Nations. In May 2003, 
following the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the region, Lendu militias and 
the Union of Congolese Patriots attempted to maintain control of the town of 
Bunia, provoking a serious humanitarian crisis.  
In response to the crisis, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution N° 1484 on May 30, 
2003. This Resolution authorized the temporary deployment of an Interim 
Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, “to contribute to the stabilization of 
the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in 
Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in 
the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of 
the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence 
in the town”. Following contacts with the French President and the EU 
Secretary-General/High Representative, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations asked EU Member States to provide a temporary stabilization force in 
the Ituri Region in implementation of the mandate provided in Resolution 1484. 
On June 5, 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted Joint Action 
2003/423/CFSP, which provided for and regulated an EU military operation in 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 226 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, codenamed “Artemis”, in accordance with 
the mandate set out in Resolution 1484. The European force was made up of 
1100 troops. France acted as the “framework nation” of the operation, and was 
the main contributor of military personnel (800 troops). In addition to France, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom provided personnel to the force, together with 
some (at that time at least) non-EU contributors (Brazil, Canada, South Africa 
and Cyprus; Hungary provided personnel to the operational headquarters in 
France). The operation ended in September 2003. 
The legal framework was laid down by a number of provisions and measures: 
Articles 39-54 of the Charter of the United Nations; Resolution 1484; Articles 
11-28 of the Treaty on the European Union; the EU measures establishing and 
regulating Operation Artemis, such as EU Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP, 
EU Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP (on the launching of the European Union 
military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo), Political and Security 
Committee Decisions DRC/1/2003, DRC/2/2003, DRC/3/2003 (on the 
acceptance of third States' contributions to the EU military operation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and the setting up of the Committee of 
Contributors). 
Several bodies were involved in the operation: the Security Council and the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations; the European Union bodies competent 
in the field of European security and defense policy (i.e. the Council of the 
European Union, the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee 
of the European Union, and the Military Staff of the European Union); the 
European Union bodies set up in connection with the Artemis operation, such as 
the Operation Commander, the Force Commander, the Committee of 
Contributors, the multinational force; governments and military administrations 
of the European Union Member States as well as those of the third countries 
participating in the operation; and, lastly, the Government of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the Congolese population and the Governments of Uganda 
and Rwanda, which were involved in the conflict. 
 
 
2. Materials and Sources 
- Charter of the United Nations, Articles 39-54 
(http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html); 
- Treaty on the European Union, Articles 11-28 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003), 30 May 2003 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/UNresolution1484.p
df);  
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- Council Common Position 2003/319/CFSP of 8 May 2003 concerning 
European Union support for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement and the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
repealing Common Position 2002/203/CFSP, in OJEU 2003 L 115 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003E0319:
EN:HTML); 
- Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European 
Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in OJEU 
2003 L 50  
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Joint%20action%205
.6.03.pdf);  
- Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003 on the launching of the 
European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in 
OJEU 2003 L 147 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Decision%2012.06.0
3.pdf);  
- Political and Security Committee Decision DRC/1/2003 of 1 July 2003 on 
the acceptance of third States' contributions to the European Union military 
operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in OJEU 2003 L 170  
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003D0
500:EN:HTML);  
- Political and Security Committee Decision DRC/2/2003 of 11 July 2003 on 
the setting up of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union 
military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in OJEU 2003 L 
184 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003D0
529:EN:HTML);  
- Political and Security Committee Decision DRC/3/2003 of 31 July 2003 
amending the Political and Security Committee Decision DRC/1/2003 on 
the acceptance of third States' contributions to the EU military operation in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, in OJEU 2003 L 206 
(http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l_206/l_2062003081
5en00320032.pdf);  
- Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit Military Division, Operation Artemis. The Lesson of 
the Interim Emergency Multinational Force, October 2004 
(http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons); 
- A Secure Europe in a Better World, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Council, Thessaloniki, 
20 June 2003 
(http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/76255.pdf);  
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- Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of 
Multilateralism, COM (2003) 526  
(http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/un/docs/com03_526en.pdf).  
 
 
3. Analysis 
The law governing Operation Artemis stemmed from the combination of a 
number of different UN, EU and national decisions. 
The UN regulation provided the general framework of the operation. 
Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003) defines the mandate of the multinational 
force; it assigns the political responsibility for the operation to the Security 
Council, to be assisted by the Secretary-General; and it confers the strategic, 
operational and tactical responsibility upon the Member States that have 
expressed their intention to participate to the operation.  
The EU regulation set forth the details of the operation, governing the 
organization and functioning of the relevant EU bodies and national armed 
forces. The integration technique used in the operation was centered on the 
establishment of hierarchical relationships between the various levels of 
command, from the bodies responsible for the political and strategic assessment 
(the EU Council, the EU Political and Security Committee, assisted by the EU 
Military Committee and the EU Military Staff) to the offices responsible for the 
technical and operative command (the Commander of the operation and the 
Commandant of the armed force). The Commander of the operation and the 
Commandant of the armed force are at the top of the command chain of the 
Rapid Reaction Force, which here took the form of a multinational force made 
up of all of the States that agreed to contribute at the Force Generation 
Conference, and whose concrete functioning is regulated by European Council 
measures (for example, the “operation plan”), the EU Political and Security 
Committee and the Committee of Contributors. 
National law, by contrast, regulated the service relationship between soldiers 
and national administrations. As a matter of fact, EU law gives EU commanders 
general powers concerning operational and tactical command and control (i.e. the 
powers to carry out of the operation). Yet, within the command and control 
chain, national commanders’ have retain responsibility for, for example, the 
exercise of disciplinary powers, and other aspects of the soldiers’ service 
relationship. 
Thus, the transnational regulation in this case “leaned” on national law. The 
latter constituted the only source of regulation of the authoritative powers of 
national administrations that participated in the Operation. But the exercise of 
the authoritative powers of national administrations took place within the context 
GLOBAL SECURITY 229 
of a regulatory scheme that was defined, at least in its general contours, by 
transnational regulation. In structural terms, the emerging discipline may be 
represented as a “binary” regime, in which a common level, established by 
transnational regulation, coexists with a particular level, characterized by the 
variety of national regimes. This overall design, however, is complicated by the 
circumstance that transnational administrative law in this context is itself a 
“composite” regulatory regime, deriving from the combination of UN and EU 
law. 
 
 
4. Issues: Transnational v. National Administrative Law 
The underlying issue is the relationship between national administrative law and 
transnational administrative law in an area of the global legal space that had 
traditionally been reserved to State action. 
Considered as a whole, the law resulting from the interconnection between 
non-State lawmakers, and between them and national lawmakers, could be 
analyzed according to the traditional interpretative schemes of public 
international law. This makes sense upon consideration of several features of this 
interconnection: the combination of national and non-national regulation; the 
genuinely administrative character of the national regulation, and the function of 
the non-national regulation as coordinating interstate action; and the use of 
conventional intergovernmental measures as the primary source of law. Yet is the 
public international law approach fully satisfactory in this context? Would it not 
be preferable to analyze this regime instead as a branch of the emergent “global 
administrative law”, taking into consideration the essentially unitary character of 
that regime; its reliance on sources other than exclusively conventional ones; and 
its main function of regulating, by means of administrative tools, the combined 
action of a plurality of different public powers, both national and non-national, in 
a specific sector of the global legal order? 
What would be the distinguishing features of this emerging branch of global 
administrative law? The law under examination here reflects a central element of 
global administrative law, the establishment of executive processes in which 
national administrations and non-national administrations, far from being 
separate, engage in a relation of mutual interdependence. But do these executive 
processes also present any relevant peculiarities? What is the relevance, for 
example, of the fact that the joint action of national and non-national 
administrations is achieved through organizational arrangements rather than 
procedural mechanisms? 
Finally, does this institutional design serve to ensure that the polycentric, but 
interconnected, administration responsible for the execution of this operation 
will function well and efficiently? Does this design result only from an uneasy 
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compromise among conflicting exigencies, or might it also serve the ordered 
exercise of administrative action, in so far as it can exploit the traditional 
advantages of both national and international administrative law (i.e. the 
authoritative force of the former and the coordination potentialities of the latter)? 
Or does this regulatory scheme also present some shortcomings? For example, 
might the retention of national autonomy over tactical command actually weaken 
the strategic and operational command, or affect its substantive content? And 
can one really assume the ability of ultra-state administrative law to effectively 
accomplish its organizational function? 
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
Operation Artemis may be usefully compared with other EU military operations, 
such as EUFOR – Althea, conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in conformity 
with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1551 (2004). Operation Artemis 
may also be compared with United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as the 
UNFICYP mission in Cyprus, in which the multinational force acts under the 
authority of the Security Council. 
 
 
6. Further Reading 
a. L. BALMOND (ed.), “Chroniques des faits internationaux”, Revue générale de 
droit international public 719 (2003); 
b. B. CARRIÓN RAMÍREZ, “Tres operaciones PESD: Bosnia i Herzegovina, 
Macedonia y República Democrática de Congo”, Documento de trabajo del 
Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, Universidad San Pablo, n. 3, 
Madrid, mayo de 2004 
(http://www.idee.ceu.es/index.php?item=383&lang=esp); 
c. F. FARIA, “Crisis Management in sub-Saharian Africa. The Role of the 
European Union”, Occasional paper of ISS, n. 51, April 2004, Paris, p. 41 et 
seq. 
(http://www.iss-eu.org); 
d. C. NOVI, La politica di sicurezza esterna dell’Unione europea, Padova (2005); 
e. A. MISSIROLI, The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?, 8 European 
Foreign Affairs Review 493 (2003); 
f. K. VON WOGAU (ed.), The Path to European Defence, Antwerp (2004). 
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8.2. Unilateral and Universalist Pressures on Global Security: The United 
Nations, the Occupying Countries, and the Reconstruction of Iraq 
Edoardo Chiti 
 
 
1. Background 
On March 20, 2003, a multinational coalition, made up mainly of US and UK 
forces, invaded Iraq and launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. Following the 
defeat of the Iraqi forces, the coalition established a transitional government 
provided with executive, legislative and judicial powers, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority. This opened a new phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the 
coalition sought to promote the political, social and economic development of 
the country. 
On May 22, 2003, the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1483 
(2003), recognized “the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations 
under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under 
unified command”, and laid down a working program for the reconstruction of 
the country. On October 16 of the same year, in Resolution 1511 (2003), the 
Security Council affirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and 
emphasized that the Coalition Provisional Authority’s powers would expire 
“when an internationally recognized, representative government established by 
the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority”. 
On June 8, 2004, in Resolution 1546 (2004), the Security Council endorsed the 
formation of a sovereign Interim Government of Iraq and, upon its formal 
request, reaffirmed the authorization for the multinational force under unified 
command. On June 28, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred 
national sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government, which began the process 
towards open elections. In January 2005, direct democratic elections for the 
Transitional National Assembly took place. The Transitional National Assembly 
was called to draft a constitution, which was subsequently ratified on October 15, 
2005. On December 15, 2005, the first elections for the members of the Iraqi 
National Assembly were held. In May 2006, the Government of Iraq succeeded 
the Iraqi Transitional Government. 
The legal framework is laid down by the provisions of Articles 39-54 of the 
Charter of the United Nations and by Security Council Resolutions 1483 (2003), 
1500 (2003), 1511 (2003), 1546 (2004), 1551 (2004), 1557 (2004), 1618 (2005), 
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1619 (2005), 1637 (2005), 1700 (2006), 1723 (2006), 1762 (2007) and 1770 (2007).  
Several actors were involved in this phase of the Iraqi conflict: from the 
United Nations, the Security Council, the Secretary-General, the Special 
Representative for Iraq appointed by the Secretary-General, and the UN 
Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI); many other international bodies were also 
involved, such as the Development Fund for Iraq and its the International 
Advisory and Monitoring Board; coalition bodies such as the Coalition 
Provisional Authority and the Multinational Force operating under unified 
command; and the transitional Government of Iraq, the Government of Iraq and 
the Iraqi people. 
 
 
2. Materials 
- Charter of the United Nations, Articles 39-54 
(http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html); 
- United Nations, Situation in Iraq 
(http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=50&Body=Iraq
&Body=inspect); 
- United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 
(http://www.uniraq.org); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), 22 May 2003 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1483.pdf); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1500 (2003), 14 August 2003 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1500.pdf); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003), 16 October 2003 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/563/91/PDF/N0356
391.pdf?OpenElement); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004), 8 June 2004 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1546.pdf); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1557 (2004), 12 August 2004 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1557.pdf); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1618 (2005), 4 August 2005 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/452/10/PDF/N0545
210.pdf?OpenElement); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1619 (2005), 11 August 2005 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1619.pdf);  
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1637 (2005), 8 November 2005 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1637.pdf); 
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- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1700 (2006), 10 August 2006 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1700.pdf); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723 (2006), 28 November 2006 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/632/35/PDF/N0663
235.pdf?OpenElement);  
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1762 (2007), 29 June 2007 
(http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/405/60/PDF/N0740
560.pdf?OpenElement); 
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1770 (2007), 10 August 2007 
(http://www.uniraq.org/documents/Resolution1770.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
The Iraqi transition and its reconstruction after the coalition’s military success in 
April 2003 was the subject of several United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions. 
These Resolutions identify three main objectives of the post-conflict process, 
closely connected and aimed at guaranteeing the “welfare of the Iraqi people” 
(Resolution 1483, § 4): (i) the restoration of conditions of security and stability; 
(ii) the promotion of economic reconstruction, development and prosperity; and 
(iii) the establishment of a democratic order. The first two objectives are laid 
down by Resolution 1483 (2003), §§ 4 and 8, and reaffirmed by several 
subsequent Resolutions. The objective of a democratic order was variously 
articulated as the right of the people of Iraq to a representative and 
internationally recognized government, as well as, more generally, the right to 
carry out free and fair elections (Resolution 1511, § 3); the right of the people of 
Iraq freely to determine their own political future and take control of their own 
financial and natural resources (Resolution 1511, § 3); the recognition of the 
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq (Resolution 
1546, Preamble); and the respect of the rule of law (Resolution 1546, Preamble). 
These Security Council resolutions also conferred the responsibility for the 
achievement of such objectives in the first phase of the transition and 
reconstruction process on the Coalition Provisional Authority. The Authority 
had to act under the direction and co-ordination of the Secretary-General and the 
Special Representative for Iraq. Thus, the Authority had to work with the United 
Nations, to which it was connected through the organizational relationship 
envisaged in the Security Council authorizations. In the second phase of the 
transition and reconstruction process, some of the powers initially conferred on 
the Coalition Provisional Authority were transferred to the Iraqi Government. 
The Coalition Provisional Authority had an interim nature, as it was provided 
GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, ISSUES 234 
that a representative and internationally recognized Iraqi Government would 
assume the Authority’s responsibilities when it had fulfilled its function. 
 
 
4. Issues: The Limits of Global Security 
The United Nations Security Council Resolutions exemplify the tension between 
the role of the United Nations and the conduct of a coalition of States, as well as 
the ambiguities of an intervention which is not just a coercive reaction to an 
illegal national act, but also a peacekeeping and nation-building operation. 
Looking more closely at this tension, does the conduct of the occupying 
forces represent a simple opposition, gradually developed in the 1990’s, to the 
United Nations putatively exclusive role in providing military security to the 
international community? Or is it a more complex development, at least partially 
complementary to the UN’s functional design, to the extent that security is 
defined on a global scale and in close connection with the protection of human 
rights? And what is the United Nations’ influence on the activity of the coalition? 
Did the Security Council’s intervention allow the United Nations to take effective 
control of the coalition and achieve its objectives? To what extent does the 
Security Council intervention reflect the Anglo-American initiative and to what 
extent does it express the needs of the UN itself? 
Turning to the ambiguities of the intervention, what are the limits in pursuing 
the goal of global security? Through an increasingly broad interpretation of the 
notions of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”, the 
United Nations has gradually developed a view of global security not only as the 
interruption of hostilities between fighting parties, but also as the pursuit of 
further goals, in particular the restoration of international legality and the 
protection of fundamental rights. Yet does such a broad purpose include the 
establishment of a democratic order? Is it possible to export democracy by means 
of military force, or must its development be the result of an internal process? If 
the former is true, which specific form of democratic order may be exported by 
military force? 
 
 
5. Similar Cases 
Operation Iraqi Freedom may be compared to the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). This mission, launched by the 
Security Council in October 1999, established a transitional government to 
pursue, even through the use of military force, political, social and economic 
objectives, as well as to facilitate the development of an independent State, which 
was realized in 2002. 
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6. Further Reading 
a. K. BANNELIER, T. CHRISTAKIS, O. CORTEN, P. KLEIN (eds.), L’intervention en 
Iraq et le droit international, Paris (2004); 
b. E. BELLIN, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative 
Historical Perspective”, Political Science Quarterly 595 (2005); 
c. M.J. GLENNON, “Why the Security Council Failed”, 82 Foreign Affairs (2003); 
d. S.D. MURPHY, “Security Council Recognition of US Postwar Role in Iraq”, 
97 American Journal of International Law 681 (2003). 
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